


AFGHANISTAN, CENTRAL ASIA, PAKISTAN AND THE UNITED STATES



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کتاب پر لپی شمیرہ

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Afghanistan, Central Asia Pakistan and the United States

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Preface

The U.S War on terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan has created many problems for the investment community in the region, but the U.S could nothing gain.

The People of Afghanistan and Pakistan have now fill much difficulties in the American forces and their so called operation against terrorism.

On December 1979, after the Soviet invasion on Afghanistan Pakistan realized a constant threat from Afghanistan. Pakistan, however, from 1980-19889, supported the struggle in Afghanistan and played a good diplomatic role in mobilizing world community.

According to Babar shah:

At the same time Pakistan continued its diplomatic efforts to get the conflict resolved. It called upon the UNSC to condemn the soviet invasion but the resolution was vetoed by the USSR. This resolution was adopted by the UN general Assembly in January 1980, by 104 votes. Pakistan realised that the world community was overwhelmingly against the soviet invasion. From then on it became a test of Pakistan's international credibility to keep the number of votes increasing at each section. The number of votes rose to 123 in 1987.

In the none aligned movement's meeting in new Delhi in November 1981, though India and some pro-soviet countries try to play down the afghan crisis, Pakistan and its friends succeeded in making the NAM express grave concern over the continuing foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan. *Agha shahi* insisted on the insertion of a call for the withdrawal of soviet forces in the text of the final declaration of the conference. 55 countries out of the 96 presented supported Pakistan.

After the Soviet troops withdrawal the Kabul regime continued to maintain its rule, but, its authority and influence were gradually eroding. The demise of the Soviet Union in 1990 not only led to the independence of several Central Asian states but also paved the road for substantial political transformation in Afghanistan. The Kabul regime conceded to the United Nations peace formula detailing the transfer of power to a transitional Islamic government headed by Sebghatullah Mojhaddadi in April 1992 who was succeeded by Burhanuddin Rabbani, head of the Jamiat-e-Islamic party on 30 August 1992. Najibullah resigned and tried to leave the country for India. On his way to the airport opposition forces prevented his departure, and he was forced to seek refuge at the United Nations office in Kabul where he remained until he was dragged out and hanged by the Taliban militias who seized power in Kabul on 26 September 1996.

Although the United States did not open its embassy in Kabul, on 7 October 1992 President George Bush declared that the United States will provide financial assistance and resume normal diplomatic ties with Afghanistan.⁵³ When the struggle for power escalated among various Islamists and gradually assumed ethnic character with each ethnic group being forced to rally behind its leader, Pakistan's policy further ethnicized post-Soviet politics in Afghanistan by its support of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar against Rabbani—a Tajik from Badakhshan province.

The seizure of Kabul by the Taliban, student militia trained in religious schools in Pakistan, could not be accomplished without the support of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United States. The main objective of US policy in Afghanistan has been to establish a secure pipeline to export fossil fuels from Central Asia to Western markets via Afghanistan. US allies, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia's strategic interest in Central Asia include the former's desire

to have access to the natural resources and the latter to prevent Iran's influence and religious authority in the newly independent republics. US ambassador John C. Monjo and his Pakistani counterpart visited Taliban's headquarters, Qandahar, in October 1994 without permission of the Rabbani regime.

The horrific nature of the attacks of 11 September enabled the United States to mobilize widespread international support. On 12 September, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1368, effectively authorizing the use of force in response to the events of 11 September. All major powers, including china, denounced the attacks. NATO invoked articles 5 provisions, defining the attacks on United States as an attack on all numbers of the alliance. However, US policymakers were intent on building a US-directed coalitions of the willing not one involving collective decision-making. The United States would request specific support consult with coalition numbers, but reserve decision-making for itself. While NATO acceded to US requests for deployment of AWACS aircraft and other support only Britain became an immediate close collaborator in Afghanistan. Japan agreed to provide intelligence and logistical support within its constitutional constraints. Singapore became of key importance in facilitating air-to-air refueling and providing port facilities to US carries. Russia provided a significant and unusual quantity of military information.

Coalition-building in the region was operationally more essential than elsewhere, but proved more difficult. Afghanistan, a landlocked, remote and mountainous country is situated far from US bases and facilities. Even the impressive power-projection capabilities of the US armed forces would be severely tested in this conflict. At the outside of the conflict, the United States had no access to bases or facilities in any of Afghanistan's neighbors. Basing operation in the Persian Gulf was problematic

because a US presence threatened to touch on political sensitivities. Bin Laden and the Taliban enjoyed political support among a substantial minority of the population and political elites of certain countries-in particular, US allies Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia notably declined to authorize the operation of combat aircraft from its air bases. Iran had been anti-US since the 1979 Islamic revolution and subsequent hostage crises. Although Iran had almost gone to war with the Taliban regime after it had killed ten Iranian diplomats and one Iranian journalist 1998,

Mussa Khan Jalailzai

July 2003.

Chapter-1

PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN

In 1947, when Pakistan came into being, the government of Afghanistan did not accept its entity on world map. Afghanistan's policy toward Pakistan at the time of partition in 1947 was, however, not a mature and friendly policy. Before partition, Afghanistan did not play any political or military role during the British occupation of the region.

During the Indian Mutiny of 1837, even at the very time when Lawrence was proposing to his superiors that they abandon Peshawar, which he always regarded as an intrusive Afghan element in his otherwise Sikh-dominated province. Dost Muhammad remained neutral. His reward was to be allowed to make himself master first of Kandahar and then of Herat, which he took by storm in May, 1863. There, at the end of the following month, he died, leaving twelve of his sixteen sons to fight for the succession. His death, after a reign of thirty-seven years, could hardly have been unanticipated, but it was still a bad time for the British to lose a friend, for the continued expansion of Russia across the steppes of Central Asia had brought the Czar's troops ever closer to Afghanistan.

Prince Gorchakov, the Russian Foreign Minister, issued a memorandum on 21 November, 1854, in which he justified this expansion. The position of Russia in Central Asia, he said, was that of all civilized states in contact with

half-savage wandering tribes. To repress the pillaging propensities of tribes within the frontier, these had to be reduced to submission. But these tame tribes then became exposed to attacks by wild ones beyond the frontier. The government had to defend the former and punish the latter. When the soldiers withdrew at the conclusion of an expedition it was regarded as a sign of weakness, and soon the operations had to be repeated. With some justification, Gorchakov compared the Russian problems in Central Asia with those then being faced by the United States Government in the Western Plains, the French in Algeria, the Dutch in the East Indies and the British on the North West Frontier of India. Nevertheless, he continued, the Czar desired no further conquests or annexation and had decided to restrict the extent of the countries subject to his sceptre within reasonable limits". The Russian, he said, sought only to prove to their Central Asian neighbours that although aggression would be punished their independence would be respected, and that peaceful and commercial relations would be far more profitable than disorder, caravan raiding, pillage and reprisals.

Despite these high-sounding phrases, according to the author of the Afghan Wars, the forward movement continued. Tashkent was captured and annexed by the Russians in 1865. At the end of 1865 was broke our with the ruler of Bokhara, who had imprisoned a Russian diplomatic mission, just as Stoddart and Connolly and been imprisoned twenty-one years before. But the Russian army was near enough to help the Russian diplomats. Samarkand was seized and annexed in 1868. In 1869 Bokhara accepted Russian suzerainty, and Russian influence had reached the Upper Oxus. (The Afghan Wars, PP-85)

The British government of India tried to establish its political and military rule in Afghanistan, but could not succeed. The people of Afghanistan resisted the British forces and did allow them entering the country.

As the British did not know what the Russians were really up to in Central Asia, Salisbury proposed to establish intelligence agents at Herat and Kabul, openly if possible, secretly if not." Of course, it would need a large expenditure of Secret Service money," he told Northbrook "but it would be well laid out. You may be sure the Russians are not stinting it."

Northbrook was opposed to the idea of establishing British Missions in Afghanistan, but Salisbury continued to insist that some kind of British diplomatic presence be established. In an official dispatch of January 1871 he argued that if the Amir were really a friend of the British, he could have no objection to the idea. Northbrook and his council demurred. Salisbury, in a dispatch of November 1875, ordered them to proceed with his instructions. They were to open negotiations with Sher Ali to establish a British Resident at his court, who would advise him on internal and external affairs, and thus discourage him from unpopular oppressive acts at home, ill-considered aggressive acts abroad.

Rather than implement such measures, according to the author of the Afghan Wars, Northbrook resigned. His last official letter on the subject denied all Salisbury's arguments. The Amir's rule, if not universally popular, was strong and, with Yakub in custody, unchallenged. The Amir in his foreign policy had hitherto complied with British wishes and he showed no desire to seek the friendship of the Russians. But the thing he dreaded most of all was any possible interference in his internal affairs, such as would, be signaled by the arrival of a British Resident. "We deprecate, as involving serious danger to the peace of Afghanistan and to the interests of the British Empire in India, the execution under present circumstances, of the instructions in your Lordship's Despatch," said the departing Governor-General.

To assist him in dealing with any entrenched attitudes that he might find among his official advisers from the Indian military establishment, men whom he later described as "the powers of military darkness", Lytton was given, on his personal staff, an officer of the new school of soldiering, Colonel George Pomeroy Colley. He was a member of the "Wolseley ring", the group of officers associated with Sir Garnet Wolseley, that very model of a modern major general. Colley was impressed by the influence on the conduct of war of the rapidly developing technology of his time, and especially of the introduction of the breech-loading rifle. A single British regiment, he declared, armed with breech-loaders, and plentifully supplied with ammunition, should be able to march at will throughout the length and breadth of Afghanistan. To Major-General Ross, commanding the frontier division at Peshawar, he wrote that his views differed from the officers whose experience was of Indian Wars because "until I came out here I had been living principally with officers fresh from the great breech-loading battles in Europe". His French and German army friends, he said, had convinced him that without prior artillery bombardment it was utterly impossible to dislodge even the worst troops, if they were armed with breech-loaders and had plenty of ammunition.

(The Afghan Wars PP.89,91)

Chapter-2

BRITISH – AFGHAN AGREEMENTS

On 30th March, 1855, a treaty was signed between British India and Afghanistan to extend cooperation between the two countries.



ARTICLE 1

Between the Honorable East India Company and His Highness Ameer Dost Mohammad Khan, Walee of Cabool and those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, and the heirs of the said Ameer, there shall be perpetual peace and friendship.

ARTICLE 2

The Honorable East India Company engages to respect those territories of Afghanistan now in His Highness's possession, and never to interfere therein.

ARTICLE 3

His Highness Ameer Dost Mohammaud Khan, Walee of Cabool and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession,, engages on his own part, and on the part of his heirs, to respect the territories of the Honorable East India Company, and never to interfere therein; and to be the friend of the friends and enemy of the enemies of the Honorable East India Company,.

(Pak-Afghan Discord, PP.45)

A TREATY OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, 1879.

ARTICLE 1

From the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government on the one part and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, and his successors, on the other.

ARTICLE 2

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies engages, on the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, to publish a full and complete amnesty, absolving all his subjects from any responsibility for intercourse with the British forces during the war, and to guarantee and protect all persons of whatever degree from any punishment or molestation on that account.

ARTICLE 3

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees to conduct his relations with Foreign States, in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government. His Highness the Amir will enter into no engagement with Foreign States, and will not take up arms against any Foreign States, except with the concurrence of the British Government. On these conditions the British Government will support the Amir against any foreign aggression with money, and other troops, to be employed in whatever manner the British Government may judge best for this purpose. Should British troops of any time enter Afghanistan for the purpose of repelling foreign aggression, they will return to their

stations in British territory as soon as the object for which they entered has been accomplished.

ARTICLE 4

With a view to the maintenance of the direct and intimate relations now established between the British Government and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and for the better protection of the frontiers of His Highness's dominions, it is agreed that a British Representative shall reside at Kabul, with a suitable escort in a place of residence appropriate to his rank and dignity. It is also agreed that the British Government shall have the right to depute British Agents with suitable escorts to the afghan frontiers, whatsoever this may be considered necessary by the British Government in the interests of both States, on the occurrence of any important external fact. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may on his part depute an Agent to reside at the Court of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and at such other places in British India as may be similarly agreed upon.

ARTICLE 5

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies guarantees the personal safety and honourable treatment of British Agents within his jurisdiction; and the British Government on its part undertakes that its Agents shall never in any way interfere with the internal administration of His Highness's dominions.

ARTICLE 6

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies undertakes, on behalf of himself and his successors, to offer no impediment to British subjects peacefully trading within his dominions so long as they do

so with the permission of the British Government, and in accordance with such arrangements as may be mutually agreed upon from time to time between the two Governments.

ARTICLE 7

In order than the passage of trade between the territories of the British Government and of His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may be open and uninterrupted. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan agrees to use his best endeavors to ensure the protection of traders and to facilitate the transit of goods, along the well-known customary roads of Afghanistan. These roads shall be improved and maintained in such manner as the two governments may decide to be most expedient for the general convenience of traffic, and under such financial arrangements as may be mutually determined upon between them. The arrangements made for the maintenance and security of the aforesaid roads, for the settlement of the duties to be levied upon merchandize carried over these roads, and for the general protection and development of trade with, and through the dominions of His Highness, will be stated in a separate Commercial Treaty, to be concluded within one year, due regard being given to the state of the country.

ARTICLE 8

With a view to facilitate communications between the allied Governments and to aid and develop intercourse and commercial. Relations between the two countries, it is hereby agreed that a line of telegraph from Kurram to Kabul shall be constructed by and at the cost of the British Government, and the Amir of Afghanistan hereby undertakes to provide for the proper protection of this telegraph line.

ARTICLE 9

In consideration of the renewal of a friendly alliance between the two States which has been attested and secured by the foregoing Articles, the British Government restores to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies the towns of Kandahar and Jelalabad, with all the territory now in possession of the British armies, excepting the districts of Kurram, Pishin, and Sibi. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees on his part that the districts of Kurram and Pishin and Sibi, according to the limits defined in the schedule annexed, shall remain under the protection and administrative control of the British Government; that is to say, the aforesaid districts shall be treated as assigned districts, and shall not be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom. The revenues of these districts after deducting the charges of civil administration shall be paid to His Highness the Amir.

The British Government will retain in its own hands the control of the Khyber and Michni Passes, which lie between the Peshawar and Jellalabad districts and of all relations with the independent tribes of the territory directly connected with these Passes.

ARTICLE 10

For the further support of His Highness the Amir in the recovery and maintenance of his legitimate authority, and in consideration of the efficient fulfillment in their entirety of the engagements stipulated by the foregoing Articles, the British Government agrees to pay to His Highness the Amir and to his successors an annual subsidy of six lakhs of Rupees.

(Pak-Afghan Discord PP-48-51)

On 1878, the British forces entered Afghanistan but could not establish their rule. This invasion was on three

fronts. Afghanistan at the time of British invasion was not military strong. According to T.A. Heathcote.

The invasion of Afghanistan in 1878, unlike that of 1839, was made on three fronts. Now the British war aim was not to march on Kabul and dethrone the Amir, but rather to detach from his rule the important frontier districts, and in the process to destroy the army that he had built up. One column, under Lieutenant-General Donald Stewart, marched from Quetta against Kandahar and consisted of two divisions, with a total of seventy-two guns (including a siege train), one squadron of British hussars and six regiments of Indian cavalry, three battalions of pioneers and four companies of sappers and miners, six British infantry battalions and ten Indian infantry battalions. The third column, sent into the Kurram Valley, formed a central front. The commander here was Major-General Frederick Roberts. He had a squadron of the 10th Hussars, the 12th Rengal Cavalry, eight guns of the Royal Horse Artillery and eight mountain guns from the Punjab Frontier Force, a company of sappers, a battalion of pioneers, two British infantry battalions and five Indian infantry battalions.

There was violent disagreement between Lord Lytton and his Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Frederick Haines, over the relative, indeed the absolute, strengths of these columns. Lytton's view was that the Kandahar force should be limited to one division, without brigade headquarters, to save money. Colley had already pointed out that the British had failed to hold Afghanistan in the last war not because of military defeat but because India was going broke from the cost of maintaining a large army there. His faith in the superiority conferred on the British troops by their new breech-loaders led him to the conclusion that the number of troops sent could be reduced to a minimum. Haines pointed out that the force marching on Kandahar might easily run into 15,000 Afghan regulars,

with artillery,, and supported by tribal levies. The British force would be weakened, not only by inevitable sickness and battle casualties but by the need to guard ever lengthening lines of communications as sit advanced deeper into hostile territory. Any reverse, he pointed out, “would make painfully apparent the true economy which inadequate preparation in the commencement confers on all military ventures in their issues”. Lytton said he would take full responsibility in the event of failure, on the grounds that the military problems were less serious than the current financial and political ones. Haines replied that this was not a responsibility of which, by the terms of his own appointment, he could divest himself. Lytton, rather than face a constitutional crisis, had to give way, though without any confidence in Haine’s arguments. To Cranbrook he later wrote: Sir F. Haines had an *Idle fixe*, from which no argument or remonstrance could detach what he is pleased to call his mind, that whatever might be our agreed policy and intention, the Afghan War would necessitate a huge campaign against Heart which is was his hope and mind’s eye he insisted....on making the Candahar Force about three times larger than it need have been.....Our Commander-in-Chief and his whole staff are a coagulation of mediocrities and inveterately obstinate stupidities, and they have weighed upon me and upon India like a horrible incubus throughout the war.”

(*The Afghan Wars*, PP.103-104)

Chapter-3

PAK- AFGHAN RELATIONS AFTER PARTITION.

In 1947, when Pakistan came into existence, though the government of Afghanistan did not support it in the world community, but in 1948 Afghanistan recognized Pakistan and restored friendly relations. On 8, May, 1948, Muhammad Ali Jinnah replied to the speech of the Afghan Ambassador at the time of presenting credentials. Muhammad Ali Jinnah said!

It gives me very great pleasure indeed to welcome you today as the first Ambassador from Afghanistan. The Government and people of Pakistan greatly appreciate the action of His Majesty the King of Afghanistan in sending to us an Ambassador from the Royal family of Afghanistan. We hope and trust that, with a Representative of Your Royal Highness's distinction and experience the age-old links which bind our two peoples will be further strengthened thus paving the way for a bright and happy future for both our countries.

Your Royal Highness has rightly referred to the natural bonds of friendship and affection which bind the people of our two countries. It could hardly be otherwise as these bonds are based on ties of faith and culture and common ideals. With such powerful bonds already in our favour we cannot, I feel, fail to bring the people of our two

countries closer towards each other and closer, than they were before the birth of Pakistan.

As a new born state, Pakistan desires nothing so ardently as the goodwill of the world. Its people are determined to work with heart and soul in the task of consolidating their new liberty and while so engaged in this great task they will be deeply conscious of the help and co-operation extended to them by the other states of the world particularly at this moment. We are indeed glad that we have amongst us today distinguished representative of our closest neighbour and, Pakistan, I am sure, very much appreciates the message of good wishes Your Excellency has brought to us.

Your Royal Highness can rest assured that in striving to cement the bonds of friendship that already exist between our two peoples and my Government will give you all possible, help and cooperation. Coming as you do as a representative of the, great Muslim nation, you.

(Pak-Afghan Discord PP.122)

When the, gulf of differences between Pakistan and Pakistan was widened, Afghanistan's Ambassador to India made a controversial statement which affected both the countries relations. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sir, Zafarullah Khan gave a detailed interview to the App. On July 11, 1949.

In fact, if any body in Pakistan was disposed to adopt their propaganda methods and resort to unfair exploitation of the historical and cultural aspect. He said, it might be urged that the whole of Afghanistan had at one time formed part of the area now called Pakistan and was ruled sometimes from Lahore and sometimes from Delhi. However, we do not wish to encourage such frivolous and mischievous talk as we are anxious to achieve any thing which is snot consistent with our dignity as an independent sovereign country or with our obligations under

international law or under the unwritten code of international amity and good will.

While the inviolability of the Durand Agreement and of subsequent treaties on the subject was not open to question, Pakistan would at all times welcome discussions with Afghanistan on the question of economic cooperation and assistance and in fact on all matters concerning the promotion of good neighbourly relations between the two countries. We could jointly tackle the all important questions of how best to utilize the hydroelectric and other resources of the entire tribal belt on either side of the Durand Line so as to recur for the people of the area as better standard of living.

Pakistan on its' parts, had always made every possible effort to assist and cooperate. Goods for Afghanistan unloaded at Karachi are not only exempt from payment of customs but every possible port and rail facility is being extended to ensure their speedy and smooth transportation.

The utter unreasonableness of the varying and often contradictory claims advanced from time to time by Afghanistan mostly through channels other than officials, is becoming as clear to the whole world, as is the justice and fairness of Pakistan, stand vis-à-vis these claims.

(Dawn, Karachi, July 12, 1949 with the reference of Selected Documents on Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan(1947,1985 PP/ 9-10)

On the issue of Pakhtoonistan, the Afghan King Zahir Shah Addressed the National Assembly of Afghanistan:

Afghanistan is supporting the rightful and just claims of Pakhtoonistan-claims that are based upon Islamic and international principles as well as upon the basic principles of Human Rights, and are in keeping with the spirit of the age we live in. Afghanistan considers the support of the Pakhtoon cause her moral obligation.

Because of the racial and historical identity existing between the people of Afghanistan and Pakhtoonistan, it is quite natural that any hardship suffered by the Pakhtoon people, should affect also the people of this country.

Afghanistan regularly kept in touch with Pakistan Government and always strove to settle the Pakhtoonistan question in conformity with her peaceful intentions and in accordance with human justice, but Pakistan's refusal to listen to Afghanistan's peaceful approaches and obstinate threatening attitude resulted in serious and dismal incidents, menacing peace and security in this part of the world.

Therefore, it is proper that the Government of Afghanistan, in order to safeguard her policy of neutrality and the security of this area against all impeding complications, have decided to take every precautionary measure.

(Asian Recorder, 1955 PP.297)

On February 1958, when Afghan King came to Pakistan, he delivered a friendly speech in Karachi. The Afghan King said:

There exists between our two peoples centuries old, ties of history, culture and faith. More than any formal expressions of friendship, these bonds guarantee the continued esteem and affection of the people of Pakistan for their afghan brethren. I am sure that your Majesty's visit will further strengthen these ties.

Chapter- 4

THE PAKHTOONISTAN ISSUE.

Pakhtoonistan is the core issue between Pakistan and Afghanistan. During the Daud regime, relations between the two countries were dilapidated due to this issue. Afghanistan's case on the Pakhtunistan issue, though nowhere stated systematically, is as follows. Historically according to Afghanistan, the land of Pakhtunistan formed part of Afghanistan. Afghanistan gradually lost it to foreign Powers after the death of Ahmedm Shah Durrani. after the advent of British rule in India, Afghanistan was systematically hammered and rendered important. Its rulers were denied control over many areas in the frontier region including the tribal territories. In 1854 the Khan of Kalat was forced to sever his relations with Afghanistan. British control of Kalat denied Afghanistan access to the sea, and it became completely landlocked. The Durand Line agreement in 1893 was imposed on Amir Abdur Rahman. Abdur Rahman signed the agreement under duress in as much as his bargaining power *vis-à-vis* Great Britain was very weak. The Amir and the British Government continued to have differences over the implications of the agreement, especially as regards the treatment of the tribal territories. Further the actual demarcation of the line could never be completed. The Durand Line divided the tribes into two. It divided Pakhtun from Pakhtun. The linguistic and cultural unity of the Pakhtuns was shattered. The

Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921 recognized Afghanistan's special interest and influence in the Pakhtun tribes east of the Durand Line. The Durand Line was never conceived as an international boundary. It was simply as line demarcating the British from the Afghan zone of influence. Afghanistan has no territorial claims east of the Durand Line, but it supports, the self-generated drive for self-determination of the Pushtuns. It has the right to do so in view of ties of kinship, history, religion, race, and language.⁹

Afghanistan's support for Pakhtunistan is also based on the fact that in 1947 the Pakhtuns living between the Durand Line and the Indus were not, given the right or the opportunity to choose between independence and merger in Afghanistan. The Pakhtuns are a different and exclusive nation entitled to the exercise of the right of self-determination. The Pakhtuns fulfill many of the requirements of a nation. They occupy and govern a fairly well-defined territory from which they have successfully excluded other claims of authority; they possess substantial ethnic and linguistic unity, share the same religion, follow, the same customs, and have the, same family and clan structure. They have developed their own music, dance, and art forms.¹⁰

According to Pakistan, the Durand Line, despite its geographical and ethnic absurdity, constitutes an internationally recognized frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Treaty of 1893 was signed, according to Pakistan's interpretation, after a cordial discussion between Amir Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan and Sir Mortimer Durand. Abdur Rahman had even held a *darbar* to applaud the treaty. All the succeeding rulers of Afghanistan have accepted, the Durand Line as binding upon Afghanistan. The Durand Line has thus become the international boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan, being the successor state after withdrawal of the British

power from India, has assumed obligations and rights under the various treaties concluded between Afghanistan and the British Government in India.(The Afghans argue that Pakistan is not a successor state but a new state having been carved out of the British India.)

Pakistan holds that the Durand Line is no arbitrary line. The line generally follows the tribal boundaries. Moreover, Pakhtunistan as envisaged by Afghanistan would only comprise of Pakhtuns living in areas east of the Durand Line, and the Pakhtuns living in Afghanistan would still be separated from their fellow brethren. Pakistan does not accept that the Pakhtuns form a nation by themselves. They have never constituted a cohesive unit of any sort. The first loyalty of every tribesman has always been to his one particular tribe. Lastly, Pakistan claims that there are in-numerable instances where persons speaking the same language have formed part of more than one nation. Any major attempt to redraw boundary lines tribe-wise would lead to chaos. A redemarcation of boundaries on linguistic lines would, even cause the Afghan State to fall apart.

The first indication of Afghanistan's firm stand on the Pakhtunistan issue came when it opposed Pakistan's entry into the United Nations and thereby brought into sharp focus the tensions between the two nations. The Afghan representative, Hussian Aziz, explaining his country's position, stated: "We cannot recognize the North-West Frontier Province as part of Pakistan so long as the people of North-West Frontier have not been given an opportunity, free from any kind of influence, to determine for themselves whether they wish to be independent or to become part of Pakistan."¹¹

(Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan PP.88-89, Kalim Bahadur's article).



We live in an era of artificial political boundaries which cut through culture areas. Although politically expedient in a temporal sense, the boundaries offer only temporary solutions to permanent problems, and almost invariably increase political tensions, stimulated by either internal or external forces. Historically, all political boundaries are artificial, but we shall concern ourselves generally with the jigsaw hodgepodge boundaries drawn during the 19th century apogee of European imperialist expansion into Afro-Asia and the 20th century decline following the post-World War I breakup of the Ottoman Empire. The old processes of political fusion and continue today.

Asia contains a long list of troublesome boundaries: North-South Korea; Viet Nam-Viet Minh-Laos-Combodia; the two Bengals; the two Punjabs; the Duran Line; the MacMahon Line, Kashmir; the Arab-Israeli boundaries. In North Africa this modern mixture of fission and fusion includes: Nasser's dream of 'Umma al-Arab and the formation of the United Arab Republic; the three divergent provinces of Libya tossed together by the United boundary identification. At this writing, all Congo (ex-Belgian) is divided into six parts. Even post-World War II Europe is not, immune: East-West Germany, Poland's redefined boundaries, and the German-speaking areas of the Italian

(i) *Louis Dupree was a prominent American Scholar who contributed a lot in the history of Afghanistan.*

Tyrol, recently the subject of United Nations consideration. Periodic boundary flare-ups still occur in Latin America.² Other examples could be cited, but these suffice to show the magnitude of the problem.

The 19th century European colonial powers had a genius for drawing lines on paper of conferences without consulting the people most directly concerned- those who lived in the, areas divided. Modern nationalism's rise freed many colonial peoples in the 20th century but did not solve the problems left by these artificially drawn, politically expedient boundaries. An elderly Punjabi once told me, "The British are a just, balanced, and fair-minded people. They found India in chaos and after 200 years of occupation left her in the same plight."

I wish to examine with as much objectivity as possible one of the boundaries mentioned above, the Durand Line, which cuts through the Pushtun areas of Afghanistan and West Pakistan.

Pushtun origins are obscured by legend, but at least two possibilities exist:

- (1) THE Pushtuns were part of the great nomadic, conquering, Indo-European outburst of the mid-2nd millennium B.C.' or (2) they developed in the southern hills of Afghanistan and northwest West Pakistan relatively independent of, the early central Asian and south Russian Indo-European centers. Basically, they have long been a mountain people with permissive individual orientation within a framework of group responsibility and independence.

These mountain people, often operating as independent tribal groups, sometimes as tribal confederacies, resisted in turn the Achaemenian Persians, Alexandrian Greek and Macedonians, Mauryan Hindus, Kushans, White Huns, Muslim Arabs, Central Asian

Turks, Mongols, Moghuls, Persian Safavids, Victorian Britons, and Czarist Russians.

Seldom did the Pushtuns fight or cooperate as a united people. The few pre 1880 attempts to unite Pushtuns shaped afghan empires, not Pushtun nations; i.e. the Ghaznavid Empire (11th and 12th centuries) which extended from the Arabian Sea to the Gangetic Plain, and the empire of Ahmed shah Durani (1747-1773 A.D.), extending from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean. Internal dynastic struggles and outside assaults by the mergent Sikhs led by Ranjit Singh crumbled Ahmed Shah's empire. The Sikhs seized Peshawar in the early 19th century (1919), last date of effective Afghan rule on the southern side of the modern Durand Line. Neither of these empires consolidated the Pushtuns, who supported the foreign campaigns of the ruling dynasties, but remained independent in their own tribal areas. Although the Pushtuns followed the empire builders of Ghazna and Kandahar (Timur shah, son of Ahmed Shah Durani, moved the capital to Kabul), they almost never supported rulers from the Punjab or North India.

The development of the modern Afghan state began with the accession of Abdul Rahman to the throne in 1880. Political fission and fusion dominated the afghan scene until then. Several previous attempts by the able Amir of Kabul, Dost Mohammad (who reigned intermittently from 1834-63), and others to unite the major emirates of Kabul, Heart, and Kandahar met with failure because of tribal wars and two Anglo-Afghan wars (1839-1842-1878-1880).

The second British invasion of Afghanistan (1878-1880) occurred in response to the threat of continued Czarist expansion into Central Asia. Just before the end of the second Anglo-Afghan war the British government seriously considered proposals to maintain on Afghanistan divided into separate tribal kingdoms, the independence of each guaranteed by Britain, a policy similar to that the

British extended tribal Pushtuns south and east of the Khyber Pass. The continued partition of Afghanistan into tribal confederacies would have prevented the consolidation of Afghan tribes against British India, and opened the loosely-organized states to possible Russian penetration in spite of British guarantees⁴

3. Pushtun, preferred in Afghanistan, is used here. Pathan (a Hinduization), Paktun, Pushtoon, all refer to the same group.
4. Such penetration did take place in 1885, and the Afghans looked to the British for promised help. None came, and the Afghans lost Panjdeh Oasis in Yutkistan after a battle with Czarist troops; the British re-drew their line of commitment to defend Herat.

Into the 1880 confusion rode Abdul Rahman, who had been exiled to Russia twelve years before by his brother Shir Ali (former Amir of Kabul). Accompanied by several supporters and dressed in Russian uniform, Abdul Rahman seemed least likely to suit the British of all Afghan candidates for Amir of Kabul. The British decided to gamble, Afghan fashion, that Abdul Rahman would resist any Russian encroachments as fiercely as his fore fathers had fought the British. Abdul Rahman, recognized as Amir of Kabul on August 10, 1880, established patterns still recognized, but no completed, today: independence and neutrality became keystones of his foreign policy, although the British controlled all Afghanistan's relations with foreign powers until after World War I. Afghanistan's boundaries, drawn by non-Afghans (British, Russians, Persians), were completed during Abdul Rahman's reign (1880-1901). Internally, Abdul Rahman's attempts to unite Afghanistan under central government control continues under the present government.

THE DURAND LINE OF 1893.

Let us now look closely at our main bone of contention: the Durand Line. Why and how did it come into being? The British in India, happy at creating a no-man's land between themselves and Czarist ambitions, faced other problems. The Pushtuns, almost genetically expert at guerilla warfare after centuries of resisting all comers and fighting among themselves when no comers were available, plagued attempts to expand Pax Britannica into their mountain homeland. Many raids into the plains, supposedly protected by the British Indian Army, originated outside the range of effective punitive action. As early as 1877, the British began their consolidation of a forward wall of protective outposts by out-right bludgeoning of local Pathan rulers. In 1877 they simply informed Shir Ali, Amir of Kabul, that he had no claims to Dir, Swat, Chitral and Bajaur.⁵ At the beginning of the second Anglo-Afghan war, the British forced the Amir Yaqub, son of Shir Ali, to sign the Treaty of Gandumak (the Afghans call this the "Condemned Treaty"), under which "the British government will retain in its own hands control of the, Khaiber Pass and Michni Pass...and of all relations with the independent tribes, territory directly connected with the passes."⁶

Therefore, the treaty ceded large stretches of land in the, districts of Loralai, Zhob, Pishin, Quetta, and Nushki, giving legal justification for as much as then British could occupy and hold. In his illuminating Autobiography, Abdul Rahman repeatedly states he never considered these or any Pushtun areas as permanently ceded to the British. To delineate once and for all British and Afghan responsibilities in the Pushtun area a boundary commission under Mortimer Durand journeyed to Kabul in September, 1893. Abdul Rahman, beset by continuing tribal revolts in the Pushtun area, and worried by British road and railway

construction which pointed toward Kandahar and Kabul “just like pushing a knife into my vitals”,⁷ seemed to welcome the proposed divisions.

Before Durand left Kabul on November 14, 1893, both sides agreed on a boundary from “Chitral and Baroghil Pass up to Peshawar, and thence up to Koh-i-Malik Siyah in this way that Wokhan, Kafiristan, Asmar, Mohand of Lalpura, and one portion of Waziristan (i.e. Birmal) came under my rule, and I renounced my claims from the railway station of New Chaman, Chagai, the rest of Waziri, Biland Khel, Kurram, Afridi, Bajour, Swat, Bruner, Dir, Chilas, and Chaitral.”⁸

This last sentence tends to confirm Afghan acceptance of the Treaty of Gandumak no matter how distasteful it may have been. One might suppose from reading the above that the Afghan Amir found the 1893 agreement satisfactory, but further examination of the Autobiography and his papers indicates his opposition to the Durand Line as a permanent boundary. He insisted the boundary delineated zones of responsibility- and did not, draw an international boundary. Even Durand did not anticipate annexation: “Durand....did not propose to move forward the administrative border of India, but merely push for political control.”⁹ Numerous British writers, such as Barton and Holdich have commented on the Amir’s antagonism to the Durand Line and the lengths to which Durand had to go to get Abdul Rahman’s signature on the 1893 agreement. For example, the Amir’s subsidy jumped from 1.2 to 1.8 million rupees, plus increased arms and ammunition quotas, and Durand found it necessary to aim several veiled threats at the Amir.

The last paragraph in the final agreement of November 12, 1893, is vague and inconclusive:

Article 1, Paragraph 2: “The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan and His

Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territory lying beyond this line on the side of India.”¹⁰

“It is true that the agreement did not describe the line as a boundary of India, but as the frontier of the Amir’s dominions and the line beyond which neither side would exercise interference. This was because the British Government did not intend to absorb the tribes into their administrative system, only to extend their own, and exclude the Amir’s authority from the territory east and south of the line. In the international aspect this was of no account, for the Amir had renounced ¹¹ sovereignty beyond this line.”¹²

The Kabul negotiations were peaceful, however, compared to the experiences of the commission assigned to fix the boundary in the field. Antagonism greeted the commission in most areas, and tribesmen, especially in Waziristan, several times attacked the group. Local mullahs, some probably in the pay of Kabul, spread the word that the faranghi (British) planned to annex and occupy Pushtun lands on both sides of the line.

At other times the Commission treated its job as a pleasant hunting trip. When a village council could not decide on which side of the line it wished to fall, the British commissioners shouldered their Wesley-Richards bird guns and “went shooting,” asking that the villagers please make up their minds before they returned. ¹³ Split village loyalties resulted in several instances. On the other hand, several tribes were arbitrarily divided between Afghanistan and British India.

The Duran Line, designed to bring stability to the frontier regions, failed. The Line proved politically, geographically, and strategically untenable. Both Afghan and British Indian troops fought many bloody engagements with the fiercely independent border mountaineers.

Abdul Rahman and his son and successor, Habibullah, attempted to integrate the Afghan Pushtuns

into the Durani Kingdom; the British divided the cis-Durand Line Pushtuns of the North-West Frontier Province, founded in 1901, into the Settled Districts of the plains, and the Tribal Agencies of the mountains. Troops moved into garrisons in the Five Agencies (Malakand, Khayber, Kurram, North Waziristan, South Waziristan). They built roads, set up telegraph lines, and tried to maintain order. Warfare continually erupted, because the Pushtuns resented each new move, from either government, as a link in the chain of, eventual slavery.

The only relatively peaceful years on the North-West Frontier, and particularly in the Tribal Agencies, between 1893 and 1947, were during the two world wars, when Afghan neutrality from foreign wars penetrated across the Durand Line, emphasizing again that the pre-partition Pushtuns of the tribal agencies looked to Kabul rather than the plains of India for guidance, although they were tied to the British Raj by treaties-written and unwritten-and received annual subsidies from Delhi.

13. Pushtun informant in Peshawar, who prefers to remain anonymous.

Pakistan's initial reaction to the Afghans attitude to Pakhtunistan were very cautious. For one thing it was already involved in a war with India over Kashmir. Secondly it was not practicable to fight on two fronts. Thirdly Pakistan aspired to the leadership of all Muslim countries, including Afghanistan. It, therefore, took the initiative to invite Afghanistan to discuss the issue. These talks were held in December 1947 in Karachi. During the negotiations Afghanistan demanded that the Durand Line be scrapped. According to Najibullah Khan, the Afghan representative, Afghanistan wanted to persuade Pakistan to allow the establishment of Pakhtunistan, to allow n Afghanistan free access to the sea and to guarantee mutual neutrality in case of attack on either party.¹² Pakistan's stand on the Durand Line was made clear by Zafarullah

Khan, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan stated that Afghanistan had not understood the constitutional position of the provinces and that the tribes of the North-West Frontier had contributed in a great measure to the achievement of Pakistan. He also referred to Governor-General M.A. Jinnah's assurance that the Pathans of the frontier would enjoy equal and autonomous status within Pakistan.

Following the British, Pakistan adopted the Close Border Policy in the frontier areas from its very inception. It withdrew its army from South and North Waziristan. Afghanistan resented its efforts to assimilate the tribal states. Pakistan was aware of the dangerous potential of the issue and therefore spared no effort to suppress all those who might help the Afghan cause. The Faqir of Ipi, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai were dealt with severely. The Faqir of Ipi proved much more intractable than the others and posed a challenge to law and order in South Waziristan, which was inaccessible to the Pakistani military. Pakistan resorted to air attacks on the strongholds of the Faqir. Such incidents added to the strain in the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In June 1949 Afghanistan's National Assembly repudiated the treaties with Britain regarding the tribal territories and disowned the Durand Line.

(Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan Kalim Bahadur's article PP.90)

NOTES TO THE DURAND LINE 1893:

- 1- New York Times, October,24,25, 1960. Part of this research was sponsored a grant from the wener Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research.
- 2- New York Times, October 27,1960, for recent Ecuador-Peru Squabble.
- 3- Pushtun, preferred in Afghanistan, is used here. Pathan (a Hinduization), Paktun, Pushtoon, all refer to the same group.
- 4- Such penetration did take place in 1885, and the Afghans looked the British for promised help. None came, and the Afghans lost panjdeh Oasis in Turkistan after a battle with Czraist troops; the British re-drew their line of commitment to defend Herat.
- 5- Wilber, D., Afghanistan, New Haven, 1956, P.143.
- 6- Aitchision, C.B., Treaties, Engagements, and sanads Relating to India and Neighboring countries, Delhi, 1993 vol. 13 p.242 Also quoted by Dorethea Seele Franck, "Pukhtunistan- Disputed Disposition of a Tribal Land, " Middle East Journal, vol. Vi, No1, 1952, pp.49-68.
- 7- Abdul Rahman, life of Abdul Rahman, 2 vols, London, 1900. The author discussed the Persian text of this work with professor Ahmad Ali Kohzad, Preseident of the historical society of Afghanistan, in Kabul.
- 8- Ibid.
- 9- Sir Precy Sykes, The Right Honourable Sir Mortimer Durand, London, 1926, p. 219.

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- 10- Sir Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans: 550 B.C.- 1957 A.D.*, New York, 1958, P. 382.
 - 11- Voluntarily? At what point does coercion case to be legal?
 - 12- Caroe, *op. cit.*, p. 463.
 - 13- Pushtun information in peshwar, who prefers to remain anonymous.

Chapter-5

PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS DURING THE DAUD REGIME

Sardar Muhammad Daud Khan who strongly supported the issue of Pakhtoonistan for his personal political establishment did not realize that the state of independent Pakhtoonistan could not stand due to its land locked position.

Daoud's main reason for stressing the existence of the afghan-Pakistani dispute at the very outset of the republic was to stimulate a solution to the problems, which, in his view, had to be settled as soon as possible in order for the new regime to devote all, its energies to the overwhelming tasks of social and economic development. However, Daoud's initial references to Afghanistan's difference with Pakistan, conciliatory as they were, did not find a favourable echo in Islamabad. The Pakistani leadership, headed by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, reacted with unrestrained anger to what had been said by the afghan head of state. Instead of seizing the occasion to make a fresh start at solving the problem, the government of Pakistan was quick to denounce the new regime as anti-Pakistani and even anti-Islamic. A huge propaganda campaign was mounted by Islamabad, depicting Pakistan as the defenseless victim and Mohammad Daoud as the sinister predator bent on undoing Pakistan. Not long after, he was accused of being behind the new phase of the revolt

in Baluchistan that had started in the early part of 1973 and acts of sabotage in the NWFP.

Although the new regime in Afghanistan was recognized by Pakistan on July 22, 1973, it was clear that Daoud's resumption of power had very much upset Pakistani leaders. In their deliberate negativism toward the issue of Pashtunistan, they had always perceived of Mohammad Daoud as the most serious hard-liner among the Afghan leaders. The impression was being created by Islamabad that the Afghans in the latter part of the monarchy had toned down their declarations on the subject of the "Pashtunistan stunt" (as it was still called by the Pakistanis) and had ultimately shelved it altogether and that it was now the dangerous and irresponsible Daoud who was unnecessarily reviving that so-called issue for his own ulterior motives.

Very few influential foreign friends of Pakistan bothered to check the record of past Afghan declarations on Pashtunistan and compare them with Daoud's statements. Had they done so, they would have learned that Mohammad Daoud's initial pronouncements concerning the republic's policy toward Pashtunistan were no more stringent than those that had been made regularly by the king and his ministers. They would have been convinced that, during the monarchy, Afghanistan did not abandon the Pashtunistan issue. Even the "internationalization" of the problem of Pashtunistan by Afghanistan, a development that had chagrined the Pakistanis considerably, occurred during the monarchy, while Daoud had no say in the affairs of state. It was in 1968, during the twenty-third regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, that Abdur-Rahman Pazhwak, then Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations, put before the world body the issue of Pashtunistan and warned that it was one of those problems that, if left unresolved, would threaten peace and security in Asia. The problem of

Pashtunistan was subsequently raised often in the General Assembly by the Afghans, to the great disappointment of the Pakistani establishment, who considered this an immature and foolish act. Daoud did not "reopen and old wound " as was claimed by the London *Times*; rather, the wound had never healed.

After Daoud's policy statement on Pashtunistan, Pakistan's media and diplomatic apparatus attempted to convince those not well acquainted with southwest Asian realities of Afghanistan's desire to dismember Pakistan (with the assistance of India and the Soviet Union). They asserted that the Afghan rulers had created the myth of Pashtunistan to divert their people's attention from their daily miseries. They stressed that, under the guise of self-determination for the Pashtuns in Pakistan, with which the Pakistani Baluchis were now banded together, the Afghan rulers were in fact aiming to end the existence of Pakistan as an independent entity.

Pakistani officials eagerly explained to anyone willing to listen that India had engineered the severance of, Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971. What Afghanistan intended now, was to achieve the complete disintegration of Pakistan. Pakistani leaders also often stressed the vulnerability of their country, made up of a mosaic of different and often antagonistic peoples held together only by the cement of the Islamic faith. Those officials played on the fears of both their own people and Muslims at large by painting a gloomy picture of the future, in which, as a result of Afghan machinations, only the Punjab would, remain in Pakistan, until it was in turn swallowed by Hindu expansionism. As at the time of the creation of Pakistan, the appeal of Islam was once again used by Pakistani leaders to inspire support for their position, especially among the oil-rich Islamic countries.

(The Fall of Afghanistan PP. 110-111)

Russian's relations with Pakistan also featured in the country's frontier dispute with Afghanistan. From 1955 to 1965 Pak-soviet relations remained rather cold. President Ayub Khan expressed his anxiety that extensive road and airfield construction in Afghanistan might be used by the USSR as a springboard for its own possible southwards expansion to neutralize the danger *Ayub Khan* apprehended, he invited Afghanistan to join CENTO but it did not accept. This was followed by another series of raids on Pakistani territory by afghan *lashkars* in May 1961, which led to the termination of diplomatic relations.

Sardar Daoud, who was the main exponent of Pukhtoonistan, resigned in March, 1963 and was replaced by Dr. Mohammad Yousuf, a commoner. The change helped improve the atmosphere. Through the Shah of Iran's mediation diplomatic relations, were restored in May 1963. Zahir Shah visited Pakistan in 1968; his visit was reciprocated by Finance Minister, Muzafar Ali Khan Qazalbash in 1970 to explore the possibilities of increasing trade and economic collaboration.⁸

Sardar Daud overthrew Zahir Shah in July 1973 and became the president. As the general orientation of the coup was leftist the USSR was the, first country to recognize it. By now Soviet/Communist elements had deeply infiltrated into the afghan Army, media, educational institutions etc. There were 800 hard core Soviet trained officers in the afghan Army. At the same time resentment/resistance against communist influence was also increasing particularly from politico-religious entities. Daud cracked down on all opposition. *Gulbadin Hikmatyar* and *Burhanuddin Rabbani* both active resistance leaders, escaped to Pakistan and continued their resistance from there. Pakistan and Afghanistan were again at loggerheads as Daud encouraged nationalist insurgency in *Balochistan*, while *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto* used Rabbani and, Hikmatyar to destabilize Daud's government.⁹

Seeing increasing Soviet influence in his internal affairs Daud realized that irredentist policies towards Pakistan were doing Afghanistan more harm than good. As a result an exchange of visits between Bhutto and Daud took place. Bhutto agreed to release the National Awami Party (NAP) leaders, accused of supporting the Pukhtoonistan demand, while Daud agreed to recognize the Durand Line as the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, before the agreement could be signed Bhutto was overthrown in the July 1977 coup. A similar agreement was reached between Gen Zia-ul-Haq and Daud during the latter's visit to Islamabad in March 1978. But before this agreement could be finalized Daud was murdered in a coup by pro-Marxist revolutionaries and Soviet influence in Afghanistan increased further.¹⁰

Making an overall assessment of events so far, it can be inferred that Pakistan was always keen to have friendly, brotherly and co-operative relationships with Afghanistan, but the latter's hostile, non-co-operative and unfriendly attitude, illegal territorial claims, strong indo-Soviet backing, internal conflicts etc. prevented these developing. Pakistan-Afghanistan relations remained fluctuating. Because of this it was neither possible for a comprehensive Afghan policy to take shape or for solid developments to take place in any field. Pakistan's tactful handling of the Pukhtoonistan question can be considered a success of this period; it enhanced its security potential and made the----- Afghan leadership recognize the legitimacy of the Durand Line. It was just unfortunate that things could not get materialized.

*(Pakistan's Afghan Policy: An Evaluation.
Dr. Babar Shah PP.172-174)*

Chapter-6

THE SOVIET INVASION ON AFGHANISTAN

On December 1979, after the Soviet invasion on Afghanistan Pakistan realised a constant threat from Afghanistan. Pakistan, however, from 1980-19889, supported the struggle in Afghanistan and played a good diplomatic role in mobilising world community.

According to Babar shah:

At the same time Pakistan continued its diplomatic efforts to get the conflict resolved. It called upon the UNSC to condemn the soviet invasion but the resolution was vetoed by the USSR. This resolution was adopted by the UN general Assembly in January 1980, by 104 votes. Pakistan realised that the world community was overwhelmingly against the soviet invasion. From then on it became a test of Pakistan's international credibility to keep the number of votes increasing at each session. The number of votes rose to 123 in 1987.

In the none aligned movement's meeting in new Delhi in November 1981, though India and some pro-soviet countries try to play down the afghan crisis, Pakistan and its friends succeeded in making the NAM express grave concern over the continuing foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan. *Agha shahi* insisted on the insertion of a call for the withdrawal of soviet forces in the text of the final

declaration of the conference. 55 countries out of the 96 presented supported Pakistan.

Mr. *Agha shahi* requested the UN Secretary General to appoint his special representative as mediator. Pakistan proposed that Iran should be involved in the negotiations and Iran in turn insisted that unless the *Mujahideen* were include it were not participate. Finally the format of the talks was evolved and Mr. Kurt Waldheim appointed Mr. Perez de Cuellar as the special representative to act as a mediator between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Islamabad refused to recognise the post-invasion afghan regime and did not want to negotiate directly since that would imply recognition and confer legitimacy on it. The basis of negotiations was the four principals drawn up by the organisation of Islamic conference (OIC) in May 1980, these were:

1. Preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and nonaligned character of Afghanistan.
2. The right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government to choose freely their own political, economic and social system.
3. Immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.
4. Creation of the necessary conditions to enable to enable the Afghan refugees to return to their homes in honour and safety.

In June 1982 the hectic, indirect talks mediated by Diego Cordovez (Representative of new security General Perez de Cuellar) began at Geneva. In total ten rounds of talks were held and it took six years, full of ups and downs, to reach the final agreement. On April 14, 1988 the historic document was signed at Geneva. The accord was constituted of four instruments.

1. Instrument one was signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This pertained to the principals of mutual relations, in particular on non-interference and non-intervention in each other's internal affairs.
2. Instrument two was signed between the USA and the USSR and guaranteed that there would be no intervention and interference by them in the internal affairs of the high contracting parties.
3. Instrument three was signed in Pakistan and Afghanistan and concerned the voluntary return of refugees. This was a vital element for Pakistan but it would only come into effect if the proper environment prevailed in Afghanistan.
4. Instrument four was signed between Afghanistan and the USSR specifying the time frame for the withdrawal of soviet troops. The reduction was to commence on 15th May the same year. The withdrawal was to be completed in 9 months with one half leaving Afghanistan by 15 August 1988.²⁶

(Pakistan's Afghanistan policy: An Evolution. Dr. Babar shah, PP' 181-183)

After the Geneva accord the soviet intervention in Afghanistan came into end, but a destructive civil war in Afghanistan began. According to Baber shah;

Pakistan played a major role in bringing Afghanistan out of the leadership vacuum created when Dr. *Najibullah* resigned on April 16, 1992, and extensive factional/ethnic fighting meant there was no government at all in the country for one whole week. Major warlords such as Masood, Rashid Dostum and Hikmatyar etc, had there eyes on Kabul and massive bloodshed was apprehended. This was averted by Pakistan's timely mediation. Talks between the Mujahideen resistance leaders and Pakistan government began in *Peshawar*.

The forces of Hikmatyar and Masood were fighting even after the talks were underway. In their violent crossfire hundreds of people died. Large weapons such as missiles, tanks, aerial raids were used. The power struggle had become entirely intra-Afghan in character, with no heed being paid to any external counsel. At one stage the talks came to halt because of factional differences but Pakistan preserved a neutral stance. Because *Pukhtoon-non Pakhtoon* friction could have cast shadows on the NWFP and Balochistan in Pakistan as too. Pakistani officials withdrew after having done the necessary mediation. It was the Afghans who decided that an interim Afghan council would be established for the transfer of power in Kabul. All the parties' leaders excluding Hikmatyar signed the Accord on April 24, 1992. It was decided that for two months *Mujadadi* would be the acting President to be followed by Rabbani for four months. At the end of these six months a *Shura* would be held to choose the government for the next eighteen months, after which time elections would be held. The President was answerable to the council composed of Mujahideen party leaders. The government arrived on April 28, in Kabul and

proclaimed the establishment of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

The new government relied on Masood and Dostum's forces for military control of Kabul. Hikmatyar bombarded the city with rockets and denounced the government as a communist regime in disguise. At the same time fighting erupted between Iran-backed *Shia* and Arab-backed *Salfi* (Wahabi) Sunni groups. When Rabbani completed his 4 months term and the *Shoora* was to elect the President for next 18 months, he managed to convene a *Shoora* of 1335 members of his choice. Most of the parties boycotted it charging that it was manipulated Rabbani to get him elected the president and it did so. This was in December 1992. Afghan society was completely divided over the *shoora*. Hikmatyar maintained that it had no legality and termed it a declaration of war against other organizations. Leaders like Dostum indicated their forces would remain on alert. On assuming a virtual monopoly in the central government, Rabbani accelerated the shifts in alliances that had started taking place in the regional/international system. While the power struggle among different Afghan factions continued, criticism of Rabbani's *shoora-e-Hilal-o-Aqd* was growing strong. It was argued that most people were not even Afghan institution, was preferable because that was what majority of Afghans called for.

The UN and most of the international community had by now virtually dropped Afghanistan from their political agenda. On March 1, 1993, amid heavy shelling in Kabul, president Rabbani came to Islamabad on the then prime Minister *Nawaz sharif's* invitation. The latter had initiated new mediation efforts to enable the warring Afghan leaders to resolve their differences. The Saudi and Irani governments as well as all major Afghan groups were also invited in order to make it an all-round peace effort. A week of hectic efforts culminated in resolution of the

power-sharing problem. The major portfolios were defined as foreign affairs, Defense, National security and the premiership. However, it is important to note that even at this stage the question of refugees repatriation and rehabilitation and economic reconstruction of the country were not touched upon. This agreement reflected a sort of compromise, being a power-sharing formula between the President and the Prime Minister.

(Pakistan's Afghanistan policy An Evaluation Dr. Babar Shah. PP-186-188)

Chapter-7

THE GENEVA ACCORD

The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties.

Desiring to normalize relations and promote good-neighbourliness and co-operation as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region.

Considering that full observance of the principle of non-interference and non-intervention in the internal and external affairs of States is of the greatest importance for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the fulfillment of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Reaffirming the inalienable right of States freely to determine their own political, economic, cultural and social systems in accordance with the will of their peoples, without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever.

Mindful of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the principle of non-interference and non-intervention, in particular the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, of 24 October 1970, as well as the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, of 9 December 1981.

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Relations between the High Contracting Parties shall be conducted in compliance with the principle of non-interference and intervention by States in the affairs of other States.

Article II

For the purpose of implementing the principle of non-interference and non-intervention each High Contracting Party undertakes to comply with the following obligations:

- (1) to respect the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, security and non-alignment of the other High Contracting Party, as well as the national identity and cultural heritage of its people.
- (2) to respect and inalienable right of the other High Contracting Party freely to determine its own political, economic cultural and social to develop its international relations and exercise permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, in accordance with the will of its people, and without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever.
- (3) to refrain from the threat or use of force in any form whatsoever so as not to violate the boundaries of each other, to disrupt the political, social or economic order of the other High Contracting Party, to overthrow or change the political system of the other High Contracting Party or its Government, or to cause tension between the High Contracting Parties;
- (4) to ensure that its territory is not used in any manner which would violate the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and national unity

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- or disrupt the political, economic and social stability of the other High Contracting Party;
- (5) to refrain from armed intervention, subversion, military occupation or any other form of intervention and interference, over or covert, directed at the other High Contracting Party, or any act of military, political or economic interference in the internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party, including acts of reprisal involving the use of force;
 - (6) to refrain from any action or attempt in whatever form or under whatever pretext to destabilize or to undermine the stability of the other High Contracting Party or any of its institutions;
 - (7) to refrain from the promotion, encouragement or support, direct or indirect, of rebellious or secessionist activities against the other High Contracting Party, under any pretext whatsoever, or from any other action which seeks to disrupt the unity or to undermine or subvert the political order of the other High Contracting Party;
 - (8) to prevent within its -----raining, equipping financing and recruitment of mercenaries from whatever origin for the purpose of hostile activities against the other High Contracting Party, or the sending of such mercenaries into the territory of the other High Contracting Party and according to deny facilities, including financing for the training, equipping and transit of such mercenaries;
 - (9) to refrain from making any agreements to arrangements with other states designed to intervene or interfere in the internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party;
 - (10) to abstain from any defamatory campaign, vilification or hostile propaganda for the purpose of intervening or interfering in the internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party;

- 1) to prevent any assistance to or use of or tolerance of terrorist groups, saboteurs or subversive agents against the other High Contracting Party;
- 2) to prevent within its territory the presence, harbouring, in camps and bases or otherwise, organizing, training, financing, equipping and arming of individuals and political, ethnic and any other groups for the purpose of creating subversion, disorder or unrest in the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accordingly also to prevent the use of mass media and the transportation of arms, ammunition and equipment by such individuals and groups;
- 3) not to resort to or to allow any other action that could be considered as interference or intervention.

Article III

The present Agreement shall enter into forces on 15 May 1988.

Article IV

Any steps that may be required in order to enable the High Contracting Parties to comply with the provisions of Article II of this Agreement shall be completed by the date on which this Agreement enters into forces.

Article V

This agreement is drawn up in the English, Pashtu and Urdu language, all text being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

Done in five original copies at Geneva this fourteenth day of April 1988.

(Signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan)

Declaration on International Guarantees

The governments of the Union of soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America.

Expressing support that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have conclude a negotiated political settlement designed to normalize relations and promote good-neighbourlines between the two countries as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region;

Wishing in turn to contribute to the achievement of the objectives that he republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic republic of Pakistan have set themselves, and with a view to ensuring respect for their sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment;

Undertake to invariably refrain from any form of interference and intervention in the internal affairs of the republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic republic of Pakistan and to respect the commitments contained in the bilateral agreement between Pakistan on the principals of mutual relations, in particular on Non-interference :

Urge all states to act likewise.

The present declaration shall enter into forces on 15 May 1988.

*For the government
Of the Union of soviet
Socialist republics.*

*For the government
of the Union states of
America.*

***bilateral agreement between the republic of
Afghanistan and the Islamic republic of Pakistan
on the Voluntary return of refugees***

The republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic republic of Pakistan, hereinafter to as the High Contracting parties,

Desiring to normalize and promote good-neighborliness and co-operation as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region,

Convinced that voluntary and unimpeded repatriation constitutes the most appropriate solution for the problem of Afghan refugees present in the Islamic republic of Pakistan and having ascertained that the arrangements for the return of the afghan refugees are satisfactory to them,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

At afghan refugees temporarily present in the territory of the Islamic republic of Pakistan shall be given the opportunity to return voluntarily to their homeland in accordance with the arrangements and conditions set out in the present agreement.

Article II

The government of the republic of Afghanistan shall take all necessary measures to ensure the following conditions for the voluntary return of afghan refugees to their homeland:

- (a) All refugees shall be allowed to return in freedom to their homeland;
- (b) All returnees shall enjoy the free choice of domicile and freedom of movement within the republic of Afghanistan;

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- (c) All returnees shall enjoy the right to work, to adequate living conditions and to share in the welfare of the state;
 - (d) All returnees shall enjoy the right to participate on an equal basis in the civic affairs of the republic of Afghanistan. They shall be ensured equal benefits from the solution of the land question on the basis of the Land and Water Reform;
 - (e) All returnees shall enjoy the same rights and privileges, including freedom of religion, and have the same obligations and responsibilities as any other citizens of the republic of Afghanistan without discrimination.

The government of the republic of Afghanistan undertakes to implement these measures and to provide, within its possibilities, all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.

Article III

The government of the Islamic republic of Pakistan shall facilitate the voluntary, orderly and peaceful repatriation of all afghan refugees staying within its territory and undertakes to provide, within its possibilities, all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.

Article IV

For the purpose of organizing, coordinating and supervising the operations which should effect the voluntary, orderly and peaceful repatriation of afghan refugees, there shall be set up mixed commissions in accordance with the established international practice. For the performance of their functions the members of the commissions and their staff shall be accorded the necessary facilities, and have access to the relevant areas within the territories of the High Contracting Parties.

Article V

With a view to the orderly movement of the returnees, the commissions shall determine frontier crossing points and establish necessary transit centres. They shall also establish all other modalities for the phased return of refugees, including registration and communication to the country of return of the names of refugees who express the wish to return.

Article VI

At the request of the governments concerned, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will cooperate and provide assistance in the process of voluntary repatriation of refugees in accordance with the present Agreement, Special agreement may be conclude for this purpose between UNHCR and the High Contracting Parties.

Article VII

The present agreement shall enter into force on 15 May 1988. At that time the mixed commission provide in Article IV shall be established and the operations for the voluntary return of refugees under this agreement shall commence.

The agreement set out in articles IV and V above shall remain in effect for a period of eighteen months. After that period the High Contracting Parties shall view the results of the repatriation and, if necessary, consider any further arrangements that may be called for.

Article VIII

This Agreement is drawn up in English, Pashtu and Urdu language, all texts being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

Done in five original copies at Geneva this
fourteenth day of April 1988.

(Central Asia . NO-23 Winter, 1988, Peshawar.)

Chapter-8

AFGHANISTAN : JIHAD TO CIVIL WAR

ABDUL SATTAR ⁽¹⁾



Few other countries are closer to Pakistan in culture and history than Afghanistan. No country assumed graver risk or made greater sacrifices for the Afghan people in their struggle to recover their sovereignty and independence. Only Afghanistan has more to gain from an end to the internecine warfare. The high hopes Pakistan envisaged, of strategic depth and access to the lands of its roots in Central Asia, have receded. Instead, Pakistan continues to bear the economic and social burden of two million refugees, and proliferation of crime due to trafficking in narcotics and weapons, not to mention the embarrassment of facing accusations of interference in a neighbour's internal affairs, and the humiliation of the brutal assault on its embassy in Kabul. Even darker clouds loom over the region. Instead of being a bridge to closer relations with Central Asian republics, Afghanistan has not only become an obstacle but threatens to suck Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan into a competition in support of warlords controlling zones divided along ethnic and sectarian fault lines.

(i) *Abdul Sattar Kahn is a former foreign minister of Pakistan.*

Many questions arise Was Pakistan's policy misconceived? Were the Geneva Accords flawed? Are we helpless spectators of a classic tragedy, with the protagonists relentlessly driven by ingrained defects to their inevitable doom? Or, can Pakistan, by itself or in concert with neighbours, help promote a salutary change in the course of events? Can the United Nations, OIC and the great powers be galvanized to embark upon a rescue operation and save the Afghan people from their unending travel?

As always the roots of the problem were within Afghanistan. Lacking political consensus and legitimacy of government, the country got embroiled internal struggle, first between Sardar Mohammad Daoud and the USSR-backed people's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and then between the PDPA factions themselves. When the Soviet Union sent its forces, resistance to the intervention non mushroomed into a contest of the giants already engaged in proxy wars on the periphery of their spheres of influence in a global rivalry for power and ideological conquest. After the Soviet Union collapsed, the other superpower quickly engaged along with its allies. The purpose to checkmate the victims of the -----long war in the lunch. Although it appears that they got away scot-free appearances can be deceptive. The consequences of allowing the civil war in Afghanistan to fester may have yet to be faced. In an already poor country, with its economic and social infrastructure devastated by the decade-long war, a generation is growing up completely bereft of education and norms of a civil society, yet endowed by Providence with energy. They might have no alternative to a life of desperation and crime mat home and abroad.

Pakistan's Policy.

Pakistan did not want a confrontation with the regime of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan after it seized power in a coup on 27 April 1978, killing president Daoud and his family. No doubt it jaws disappointed because Daoud, realizing that the Soviet embrace had turned into a bear-hug, had decided to improve relations with Pakistan. But Pakistan was itself in disarray. The country's economy was bled white by the prolonged agitation against Prime Minister Z. A Bhutto following the 1977 elections, and General Zia ul Haq's military government was unpopular for reneging on his promise to hold elections within 90 days after Bhutto was toppled. Making the best of a bad situation, Pakistan was among the first countries to extend recognition to the PDPA regime. Zia went to Kabul to meet President Taraki in the hope of securing mutual accommodation.

The PDPA regime embarked on a suicidal course reforms which outraged the conservative people of Afghanistan. The party was also riven by rivalry between its predominantly rural, Pushto-speaking Khalq and urban Persian-speaking Parcham factions. Infighting led to Taraki's association in September 1979. His successor, Hafizullah Amin, got even more isolate, engendering fear in Moscow of a collapse of the "fraternal" regime in Kabul. On 26 October 1979. Soviet forces rolled across amu Darya, Amin was executed and Babark Karmal, leader of the Parcham faction, installed as president. It was a clear case of military intervention. When asked by a Pakistan foreign ministry official at whose invitation the forces were sent to Afghanistan, the Soviet ambassador replied "Babark Kamal", who was then in exile,(1)

The fateful; decision for military intervention was made, it was latter revealed by the aged and ailing Leonid Brezhnev under pressure of hard-liners in the Politburo of

the Communist Party. Ideological solidarity with the revolution in Afghanistan and a perception of threat from Islamic resurgence in Iran and other countries to Soviet control over Central Asia were said to be the factors in their calculation, as also an expectation that the world would acquiesce in the *fait accompli*. This assumption was soon to prove terribly wrong.

The horns of the dilemma on which Pakistan found itself impaled was made more difficult by internal weakness and international isolation. Bhutto's execution in April 1979 had polarized opinion at home as never before. Zia's decision to ignore appeals for clemency by foreign leaders and media antagonized almost the whole world. Relations with the United States, already strained by discriminatory American sanctions imposed in 1979 to penalize Pakistan for defying American law against uranium enrichment, nose-dived in November when a mob of youths infuriated by a false report broadcast by an unidentified radio station alleging US occupation of holy Kaaba, attacked and sacked the American embassy in Islamabad, leaving four staff members dead (2).

Islamabad decided on a middle course, (3) avoiding confrontation but raising a low-pitched voice of concern and protest. Its statement, issued two days later criticized the intervention but without mentioning the Soviet Union. The "induction of foreign troops" was described as a "serious violation" of the norms of peaceful coexistence and the principles of the UN Charter. Rather defensively, the statement explained Pakistan's "gravest concern" in the context of its links of Islam, geography and nonaligned policy with Afghanistan.

The United States, which had earlier treated Afghanistan with neglect and ignored the rise of PDPA to power, suddenly woke up to the dangers implicit in the advance of the Soviet power to "within striking distance of the Indian Ocean and even the Persian Gulf... an area of

vital strategic and economic significance to the survival of Western Europe, the Far East, and ultimately the United States “(4) Washington issued a strong condemnation of the “blatant” Soviet intervention (5) Calling it a “grave threat to peace,” president Carter proclaimed a boycott of the Moscow Olympics and suspended arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union West European countries joined the voice to denounce the intervention.

Still apprehensive of the dangers of involvement in the Cold War. Pakistan hitched its diplomacy to the hope of a political settlement of the crisis through the United Nations. At its request, the genuinely nonaligned countries that took exception to the Soviet disregard of principles of law took the lead in drafting a balanced resolution. When it maws vetoed by the USSR in the Security Council, the General Assembly was convened in a special session and adopt ed the same resolution 14 January 1980 by a vote of 104 in favour, 18 against, and 18 abstentions. It strongly deplored “the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan” and called for “immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops in order to enable its people to determine their own form of government and choose their own economic, political and social systems free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever.”

An extraordinary session of OIC foreign ministers held in Islamabad later in January took a m much tougher position. It proclaimed a strong indictment of the soviet intervention. The meeting decided to suspend Afghanistan’s membership of OIC, and affirmed solidarity wit the struggle of the afghan people to safeguard “their faith, national independence and territorial integrity.”

A great majority of the members of the non-aligned Movement, too, were critical of Soviet intervention in nonaligned Afghanistan. Out of 92 members, 56 voted for the General Assembly resolution. India joined a coterie of

Soviet friends of apologist in the NAM Coordinating Bureau to prevent the adoption of a resolution on Afghanistan. It did not, however, damage the afghan cause so much as it did the credibility of NAM itself.(6)

More critical to the outcome of the crises was the opposition to the Soviet intervention inside Afghanistan. The arrival of foreign troops to protect the PDPA regime transformed the resistance into a popular jihad. Pakistan increased clandestine assistance to the mujahideen. The decision, made automatically without foreign prompting, had complex motivations. Self-interest and solidarity with the fraternal Afghan people were certainly important considerations. President Zia liked the limelight in which he now basked.

Meanwhile, efforts to increase support in the United Nation were also pressed. To that end, the resolution proposed at the regular session of the UN General Assembly in 1980 was further toned down. It emphasized uncontroversial principals as the basis of a political solution: (i) immediate withdrawal of the foreign forces. (ii) preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and non-aligned status of Afghanistan, (iii) respect for the right of its people to determine their own form of government and economic system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint, and (iv) creation of conditions for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees to their homes in safety and honour. It further suggested international guarantees of non- use of force against the security of "all neighbouring countries." The resolution attracted greater support every year, votes in favour increasing from 111 in 1980 to 123 in 1987, and negative votes and abstentions combined declining from 36 in 1980 to 30 in 1987 (7) Every year the Soviet Union suffered a stinging blow to its prestige.

Revival of Pakistan-US Alliance.

Washington took the initiative to encourage Pakistan to support and assist the Afghan resistance. Within days of the Soviet intervention, and without even consulting Pakistan, President James Carter announced an offer of \$ 400 million in economic and military assistance for Pakistan. Zia-ul-Haq's scornful and undiplomatic rejection of Carter's offer as "peanuts" gave the wrong impression that all Islamabad wanted was a higher amount in aid. Actually, what it sought even more was a guarantee of American assistance in the event of a Soviet or Soviet-backed Indian attack on Pakistan. It asked for the up gradation of the 1959 executive agreement on defence cooperation into a binding treaty. The "credibility and durability" (8) of American assurances was low, founded on the widely held belief that at critical junctures, especially in 1965, the United States betrayed a friend and ally. Besides the aid package was "wrapped up in onerous conditions" which, Pakistan was concerned, "could affect the pursuit of our nuclear research and development." (9) As for the amount, Pakistan was prepared to accept \$ 200 million in economic aid, but not \$ 200 million for defence. Not only was it incommensurate with the enhanced risks of re-involvement in the Cold War, Pakistan resented the fact that the proffered aid level was determined by fear of Indian reaction, thus denuding it of relevance to our defensive capacity." The US refused to delink economic assistance from the defence component.

Non-acceptance of US aid in 1980 reduced the risk of plunging Pakistan back into the orbit of the Cold War. It also helped in projecting the Afghan cause in its genuine perspective of a liberation struggle. It served, moreover, to save Pakistan's relations with Iran from further strain. Iranian media perception of Pakistan as a proxy for US interests in the region was painful to Pakistanis who value Iran as a friend and a fraternal neighbour. The sincerity of

Pakistan's solidarity with Iran was illustrated again in April 1980 when Islamabad expressed "sock and dismay" at the US assault on Iran in an attempt to forcibly take out American embassy staff held hostage in Tehran, and "deplored this impermissible act which constitutes a serious violation of Iran's sovereignty,"(10)

After President Ronald Reagan succeeded Carter in 1981, the United States revived its offer of cooperation with Pakistan. The new package provided for loans and grants amounting to 3 billion dollars over 5 years (11). The amount of \$ 600 million a year for development and defence was a significant improvement over the Carter offer of \$ 400 million for 18 months. The five-year programme generated an aura of durability around the US commitment. The new offer still did not provide a satisfactory answer to Pakistan's security concerns as Reagan, too, found congressional opinion reluctant to support a formal security guarantee to Pakistan but the Reagan administration evinced a reassuring understanding of Pakistan's vulnerabilities as a front-line state. The clearance for the sale of 40 F-16 aircraft was seen as earnest of US concern for Pakistan's security.

On the nuclear issue, the two countries maintained their formal positions. Pakistan reiterating its intention to continue research, and the US proclaiming its non-proliferation concern. But Washington turned the pressure off Acknowledging past discrimination and expressing understanding of Pakistan's rationale. (12) It accepted Zia's assurance that Pakistan would not develop nuclear weapons or transfer sensitive technology. (13) The US administration had little difficulty in securing congressional approval for waiver of the Symington prohibition. Senators and congressmen who earlier targeted Pakistan for discriminatory strictures no longer commanded decisive influence.

Pakistan chose not to accept concessional loans of military states, and instead opted to pay the market rate of interest, so as to safeguard its non-aligned credential. Pakistan wanted also to return its credibility as an independent actor in the hope of persuading the Soviet Union to agree to a political solution of the Afghanistan question outside the cold war context. In the event, the sacrifice won no appreciation from either Moscow or New Delhi. They denounced Pakistan even though a year earlier India signed a deal with the USSR for the latest MIG aircraft, T-72 tanks and warships, etc. for a give-away price of \$ 1.6 billion on soft terms though its market value was estimated at \$ 6 billion. In respect, Pakistan's more-pious-than-the-pope posture seemed a costly pose, (14)

Geneva Accords, 1988

UN efforts to promote a political solution began in earnest with the appointment of Diego Cordovez, a senior UN official from Ecuador, as the personal representative of the secretary-general in 1981. He found the situation rather bizarre. Before he could convene the first Geneva meeting, Iran declined to participate arguing that the Soviet withdrawal should be unconditional, and Pakistan was unwilling to meet with the representative of the Afghan regime which it did not recognize. Cordovez had to persuade Kabul to agree to indirect talks. The Soviet Union refused to join talks taking the position that its force entered Afghanistan at Kabul's invitation and would be withdrawn when Kabul no longer wanted their presence, but it sent high-level officials to Geneva to be available for consultation.

Negotiations began in Geneva in June 1982 with exploration of the structure of a settlement that would integrate the components of the UN General Assembly resolution. An energetic, dedicated and persuasive diplomat of high calibre, Cordovez sidetracked controversy over the

past by proposing an agreement on mutual non-interference and non-intervention between Afghanistan and its neighbours as a means of obtaining a Soviet commitment to withdrawal of forces. To satisfy the Soviet demand for American commitment to non-interference, he conceived the idea of guarantees to be provided by both superpowers. Negotiations were not however, a serious undertaking at first. The Soviet Union was confident that its mighty forces equipped with the latest weapons would rout the ragtag mujahideen armed with antiquated rifles. It misjudged the situation as it could not pin down the mujahideen guerrills who were supported by the Afghan populace.

Hopes for a political settlement arose when Yuri Andropov succeeded Brezhnev as the leader of the Soviet Union. In a meeting with Zia after Brezhnev's funeral In November 1982 he gave "hint flexibility". Secretary-general Perez de Cuellar and Diego Cordovez who met Andropov in March received "new encouragement" for pursuing UN mediation. Andropov counted to them the reasons why the Soviet Union wanted a solution raising his fingers one by one he mentioned costs in lives and money, regional tensions, setback to détente and loss of Soviet prestige in the Third World (15)

Buoyed by the positive signals, Cordovez successfully pressed the two sides at meetings in April and June 1983 to agree on the components of a comprehensive settlement, including an agreement on non-interference and non-intervention, guarantees by third states, and arrangements for the voluntary return of refugees. Discussions made good progress. The Kabul side objected to the phrase "existing internationally recognized boundaries" (16) and suggested its substitution by the words "international borders" Cordovez did not think that Kabul would pursue the point. He was optimistic also that the Soviet forces would leave and envisaged their "gradual withdrawal" within a reasonable timeframe. But the Soviet-

Kabul side dragged their feet, indicting that the lard-liners marked time as Andropov was ailing. After he died, they reverted to the policy of a military solution, which continued under Konstantin Chernenko and also under Mikhail Gorbachev till the end of the summer in 1987.

The struggle in Afghanistan was unequal but the mujahideen demonstrated courage and resourcefulness in resistance, and did not wilt despite the increasing for city of Soviet pressure. "Then sacrifices and stamina drew deserved praise and tribute. Assistance to them increased so as to neutralize the Soviet induction of more lethal artillery, helicopter gunship and bombers for savage and indiscriminate destruction of villages to interdict mujahideen activities. The United States raised covert allocations for supply of arms to the mujahideen from \$ 250 million in 1985, to % 470 million in 1986 and \$ 630 million in 1987 (17). The American contribution was reportedly matched by Saudi Arabia. Also, China, Iran and several other countries provided substantial assistance. Pakistan calibrated the flow of assistance to the mujahideen cautiously so as to minimize the risk of expansion of the conflict, but it became bolder with time and experience. It realized that the Soviet forces could not be defeated but the policy now aimed to raise military pressures inside Afghanistan as well as economic and political costs of the intervention. Negotiations in Geneva were perceived as part of the strategy for increasing political pressure.

Diego Cordovez patiently kept the Geneva talks on track, however slow their pace. Altogether 12 sessions were held over 6 years. He and the Pakistani side occasionally discussed the question of a compromise between the Kabul regime and the mujahideen, but this subject was not on the agenda. UN resolutions referred to the principle of respect for the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and economic system, but this was not interpreted to require replacement of the regime installed by

the Soviet forces. Kabul and Moscow at first refused even to recognize the reality of internal resistance. They said "everything comes from outside" (18) Foreign minister Gromyko dismissed the idea of a broad-based government in Kabul as "unrealistic phantasies" Cordovez himself realized the need for a compromise among the Afghans but as he said, correctly for the time. "The UN is not in the business of establishing governments" (19) In 1983 when Andropov indicated a desire for settlement. Cordovez was inclined to favour role for former king Zahir Shah who offered to work for uniting afghans. The idea received enthusiastic support from Afghan exiles. A poll organized by Professor Syed Bahauddin Majrooh, a prominent Afghan scholar who was editing a paper from Peshawar, found that 70 percent of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan favoured Zahir Shah's return. But this view was rejected by the more powerful mujahideen parties. When Majrooh was later assassinated opponents of the kind were suspected of having organized the crime.

By late 1986 all issues were settled except two the timeframe for the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the wording of the reference to the boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The texts of the agreements having been all but finalized. Cordovez remarked "It (is) now true for the first time that the only issue remaining (is) the question of the timeframe" (20) That, however, was the crucial issue and the Soviet Union seemed non-serious. In 1986 it said that its forces would be withdrawn 4 years after the conclusion of Geneva accords. Pakistan asked for withdrawals to be completed in 3 months. The gulf was narrowed down by mid-1987: the Soviet Union wanted 18 months for withdrawal while Pakistan went up to 7 months. The issue was not to be settled until after the failure of the Soviet military offensive in the summer of 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev then finally decided to abandon the misadventure. By then the imperatives of democratic and

economic reforms at home necessitated an end to confrontation with the West.

In July 1987 Najibullah proposed a coalition offering 12 ministries and the office of vice-president to the mujahideen alliance. Gorbachev endorsed the idea of national reconciliation to facilitate the process of "constructing a new Afghanistan". The alliance leaders were, however, unanimous in rejecting a coalition with PDPA. In September 1987 Cordovez put forward a "scenario paper" envisaging a representative assembly comprising the seven alliance parties. PDPA and select Afghan personalities to decide a transitional arrangement. Aware of the alliance's views, Islamabad did not accord the idea much attention. When it was conveyed to them in early 1988, the alliance leaders ruled out any dialogue with PDPA. Engineer Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani and Maulvi Yunus Khalis also ruled out any role for the king. Pakistan did not pursue Cordovez's suggestion. Since resistance against the Soviet troops still commanded priority, it was considered inadvisable to press the mujahideen lest that should divide and weaken the alliance.

Gorbachev and his foreign minister Shevardnadze succeeded in winning endorsement of the party Politburo for the policy of terminating military involvement in Afghanistan (21) The costs of the policy in human lives and material resources and the obloquy it entailed even among Soviet Union's nonaligned supporters were glaringly disproportionate to any benefits that continued hold over Afghanistan might yield. The new generation of communists no longer shared the pristine ideological fervour of the founders or faith in the inevitability of Communism's victory. In fact, the Soviet system was faltering, the economy was in decline and the people were alienated. The cost of military confrontation and arms race with the West, occupation of Eastern Europe, tension with

China and, finally, of intervention in Afghanistan had "ruined"(22) the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev announced at a press conference in Washington on 10 December 1987 that the Soviet forces would withdraw from Afghanistan within 12 months of the conclusion of Geneva accords and, further, that during that period the forces would not engage in combat. Gorbachev also delinked the question of withdrawal from an internal settlement in Afghan. Though he reaffirmed support for "a coalition on the basis of national reconciliation and the realities of the situation ", (23) Moscow was no longer prepared to allow the resistance alliance's projectionist attitude to obstruct its decision to extricate the Soviet Union from the Afghan quagmire. Nor was it willing to undertake the removal of the Kabul regime and hand over the government to the alliance.

The 12-months timeframe was close to a "single digit" which was acceptable to Pakistan and other supporters of the struggle in Afghanistan. But just as prospects for the conclusion of Geneva accords brightened, dark clouds suddenly appeared on the horizon in Pakistan. President Zia took the position that the conclusion of the accords should be postponed until after agreement was reached on the formation of a government in Kabul with the participation of the mujahideen. took prime minister Mohammad Khan Junejo completely by surprise heretofore Pakistan 's refrain was that the only outstanding obstacle to the conclusion of Geneva accords was a reasonable timeframe for the withdrawal of Soviet forces Besides, making the formation of a coalition government a precondition for the conclusion of the accords seemed a recipe for delaying the withdrawal of the Soviet forces because the mujahideen alliance was known to be averse to the idea of a coalition with P DPA. Now the Soviet Union was no longer prepared to wait. When on 9 February Zia pressed the visiting Soviet first deputy foreign minister Yuli

Vorontsov for postponement of the final Geneva round, his comment was withering to the point of insolence. He said: "For eight years you have been asking us to leave Afghanistan. Now you want us to stay. I smell a rat"(24)

The logic of Zia's eleventh-hour *volte face* was never explained. Pakistan's foreign friends were as mystified as the Junejo government. It was evident that Moscow had decided to pull out of Afghanistan. Pakistan could block the Geneva accords, but it could not prevent the Soviet Union from withdrawing from Afghanistan either unilaterally or pursuant to an agreement with the Kabul regime. In comparison with these alternatives, withdrawal under the accords was decidedly more advantageous. The Soviet Union would be internationally bound to withdraw its forces completely, within a prescribed timeframe and under UN monitoring. It would be legally bound also to refrain from intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan, too, would receive Soviet and US guarantees of respect for principles of non-interference and non-intervention. In contrast, unilateral withdrawal would entail no such commitments.

For Moscow the residual consideration now was the manner of disengagement so as to avoid disgrace to the Soviet Union and danger to their retreating forces. It prized the Geneva accords because contained in them was a commitment to observe the principles of non-interference and non-intervention. Pakistan and the United States would be under an obligation to discontinue assistance to the mujahideen. That might save Soviet friends from massacre. No less important was their symbolic value. A UN sponsored agreement would provide a fig leaf to cover the Soviet defeat. Pakistan could only gain by cooperating in sparing Moscow the humiliation. That would open the possibility for Pakistan to improve relations with this superpower.

The Soviet preference for the Geneva accords was not unknown. Islamabad used the leverage to obtain significant modifications in the texts. Two of these were suggested by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. An engineer by training, he seemed to grasp points of law better than some diplomats did. He pointed out that Pakistan's signature on an agreement with Afghanistan would constitute recognition. Secondly, the agreement would require discontinuation of arms supply to "rebels". He was right on both points. It was decided to take up these points with Vorontsov when he was in Islamabad in February 1988 in a spirit of candour. He was informed that Pakistan would publicly state that the signing of the agreement would not constitute recognition of the Kabul regime. A diplomat of world class, confident in his understanding of his country's policy and decisive in negotiations, he instantly agreed not to make this matter an issue. Nor did he contest the logic of the view that peace in Afghanistan required all sides to discontinue arms supply. But, he convincingly explained. Moscow could not go back on its existing commitments to Kabul. "Negative symmetry" was not feasible but when told that in that event "positive symmetry" would ensue, and the mujahideen, too, could continue to receive supplies, he did not make an issue of the matter. The discussion served to preclude subsequent misunderstanding between Islamabad and Moscow.

The final Geneva round began on 2 March 1988. The talks proceeded at a slow pace because the Pakistan delegation did not have authorization to finalize the accords. On its part, the Soviet Union conveyed its agreement to reduce the timeframe for withdrawal to 9 months. The Kabul representatives tried to create an obstacle by haggling over the wording of the reference to the boundary between the two countries in order to safeguard the Afghan position of non-recognition of the Durand Line. It was an artificial issue, the Geneva talks were not convened to settle the

boundary problem. Pakistan had no difficulty accepting the neutral phrase requiring the two states to refrain from the threat or use of force so as "not to violate the boundaries of each other".

The replacement of the Kabul regime was never a part of the Geneva negotiations but, as Diego Cordovez said in a statement issued on 8 April, "it has been consistently recognized that the objective of a comprehensive settlement.... Can best be ensured by a broad-based Afghan government" and to that end he agreed to provide his good offices. But that time Zia realized that the formation of such a government could not be made a precondition for the conclusion of the accords.

The Geneva accords marked the first time for the Soviet Union to agree to withdraw from a "fraternal" state. Gorbachev acknowledged that the intervention was a "mistake". A Soviet journal blamed "an inner group of a few politburo members headed by Leonid Brezhnev (who), discounting the likely opposition of the Muslim world, China, the United States and the West, decided to take the fateful decision " (25) Over 13,000 Soviet soldiers were killed and 35,000 wounded (26). The financial drain was estimated at 100 billion rubles. A classic example of "imperial over-stretch." (27) The Afghanistan misadventure could well be considered the proverbial last straw that broke the camel's back. To say that, like the United States in Vietnam, the Soviet Union lost the war in Afghanistan due to pressures of domestic and international opinion is by no means to undervalue the courage and heroism of the mujahideen, and the fortitude and sacrifices of the Afghan people.

The Afghan people suffered grievously in the struggle to recover freedom. A million perished and some six million had to take refuge outside their country. The economic and human infrastructure of Afghanistan was devastated on a scale with few parallels. Already one of the

least developed countries, it suffered fearful damage to agriculture, irrigation system, roads, transport, educational institutions—indeed its entire infrastructure. Nor did its travail end with the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. The regime Moscow installed under Najibullah fought on for nearly three more years. When it finally collapsed in April 1992, a struggle for succession began among the mujahideen parties. For their epic sacrifices, the Afghan people deserved a better fate than the long nightmare of internecine fighting, political disintegration and economic collapse in the wake of victory.

The mujahideen started on a hopeful note of unity after Najibullah's fall. At a meeting in Peshawar on 24 April the alliance leaders reached an agreement. An Islamic council headed by Sibghatullah Mojaddedi was installed for two months after which Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani was to become president for four months. A transitional government was then to be formed for two years. Mojaddedi abided by the accord, but Rabbani refused to yield power when his term expired. Fighting broke out among the parties. Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia joined to promote another accord among the Afghan leaders. The agreement they signed at a meeting in Islamabad on 7 March 1993 provided for the formation of a government for a period of 18 months, with Professor Rabbani continuing as president and Engineer Gulbuddin Hekmatyar assuming premiership. Although the Islamabad accord was signed by the Afghan leaders again during visits to Saudi Arabia and Iran, it was not implemented. The cabinet to be "formed by the Prime Minister in consultation with the President" was not agreed upon. Prime Minister Hekmatyar felt too insecure to enter Kabul. The accord soon broke down. Hekmatyar attacked the capital and though he was repulsed, the attractive by which had largely escaped destruction during the jihad was severely damaged as a result of the intra-mujahideen fighting.

In 1994 a group of students of religious schools-Taliban- rose in revolt against the mujahideen warlords who "brought sufferings on the Afghans and violated Islamic teachings,"(28) Rising in Kandahar, the Taliban rapidly gained control over the southern provinces, restoring law and order and gaining the support of the mujahideen commander Ismail fleeing this western city without any fighting. They continued to march northward as local mujahideen either joined them or fled northwards. Even Hekmatyar, who controlled territory south of Kabul, decided to withdraw from his headquarters at Charasiab. The Taliban were then stalled for almost a year.

Pakistan was accused by the Rabbani regime of interfering the Afghanistan's internal affairs by promoting favourites, first Hekmatyar and later the Taliban. The charge was not substantiated by facts. Actual, Pakistan in collaboration with other friends of Afghanistan had tried its best to promote unity among the mujahideen leaders. The Islamabad accord, brokered by three countries and not Pakistan alone, provided for a government acceptable to all the Afghan leaders. Its breakdown, as that of the Peshawar accord, was a product of rivalry amongst the mujahideen leaders themselves. Their internecine squabbling bred country-wide-disgust which gave rise to the Taliban phenomenon. No foreign-inspired movement could arouse the overwhelming response that greeted the Taliban.

Pakistan's expectations for friendly relations with the government of Islamic Afghanistan received a shocking setback on 6 September 1995 when its embassy in Kabul was sacked by a government-sponsored mob. One employee was killed, the ambassador and 40 officials were injured so badly as to require hospitalization, the building was burned down and its records reduced to ashes. Never before was a diplomatic mission subjected to such safe attack. Nevertheless, Pakistan exercised patience and refrained from retaliation. When Hekmatyar joined

Rabbani's government as prime minister in early 1996. Pakistan welcomed their reconciliation, expressing the hope that it would be a step towards the promotion of a broader consensus among regional leaders leading to national unity. In May 1996 a visiting delegation of the Kabul government acknowledged liability for the reconstruction of the embassy though it pleaded lack of resources to discharge the responsibility.

The United Nations representative for Afghanistan, the secretary-general of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and governments of Pakistan and Iran continued with spasmodic efforts in 1995-96 to promote compromise between the government in Kabul and its opponents but little progress could be achieved. Seemingly personal to start with the gulf between Afghan factions opened up along ethnic and regional fault lines. The process of polarization intensified in September 1996 when the Taliban burst forth again to extend their control over all the Pushtoon provinces. They succeeded in persuading the local commanders in the eastern provinces to join them. The governors and local authorities melted away. Jalalabad, the main town on the route from Kabul to Peshawar, fell to the Taliban without a fight. The triumphant Taliban then pushed toward Kabul. On the way they met some resistance from Hekmatyar's forces at Sirobi but their momentum seemed unstoppable. President Rabbani and the forces loyal to him fled Kabul without a fight. On the dawn of 27 September the Taliban drove into the capital. The populace of the city seemed to welcome the peace and order restored by the Taliban but the better educated denizens of this island of relative modernity in the sea of conservative and tribal countryside were appalled by the stringent version of the Islamic Sharia laws imposed by the Taliban, in particular the closure of schools for girls and ban on employment for women outside their homes.

Russia and Iran reacted strongly to the Taliban takeover of Kabul. Expressing apprehension of a Taliban threat to the security of the bordering Central Asian republics. Moscow convened an immediate meeting of the leaders of these states in Almaty. Kazakhstan, to decide on measures to oppose the Taliban. Tehran denounced the Taliban for imposing rough laws that brought bad name to Islam. The Islamic Republic of Iran was concerned about the safety of the Shia population in Afghanistan, even more, about the threat of being hemmed in by the United States and Saudi Arabia which were perceived to be supporting the Taliban.

The Taliban continued their euphoric advance to the north, taking over Bagram military base and the road up to the southern entrance to the Salang tunnel. As suddenly, however they were stopped and pushed back. Unorganized and thinly spread over the large territory they seized, they could not cope with the counter-attack by the forces of the legendary mujahideen commander. Ahmad Shah Massoud. He had evidently stockpiled weapons in the Panjsher Valley, and successfully mobilized the former government forces. Retaking the Bagram base, he was poised in mid-October for an attack on Kabul.

The resurgence of fighting triggered fresh diplomatic initiatives for peace in Afghanistan. At Russian initiative the UN Security Council held a meeting on October 17 to consider a call for an end to fighting and external interference in Afghanistan. Pakistan circulated a draft resolution by the Council which, besides demanding a cessation of all armed hostilities and respect for the principles of non-interference and non-intervention, would impose an embargo on supply of arms to Afghanistan. A Pakistani minister visited Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif and persuaded the Taliban and Abdur Rashid Dostum's representatives to open a dialogue for reconciliation. The president of Pakistan undertook an urgent visit to Tashkent

for a meeting with the president of Uzbekistan on October 19, after which the two leaders joined in declaring support for the formation of a broad-based government in Afghanistan, including representatives of all ethnic and religious groups.

The prospects for peace and unity of Afghanistan seemed uncertain, however. The country stood divided into three zones, largely along ethnic lines. Ahmad Shah Massoud controlled the largely Tajik north-eastern provinces of the country. Abdur Rashid Dostum, former Soviet and Najibullah ally, backed by his Uzbek militia, ruled over six provinces north of the Hindukush, and the Taliban exercised authority over most of the rest of Afghanistan's 32 provinces.

Pakistan's interest as a neighbour as indeed that of others, is above all in an end to the civil war and restoration of Afghanistan's unity, which are highly desirable objectives for the Afghan people themselves. Only peace in Afghanistan can relieve Pakistan and Iran of the burden of Afghan refugees. Some two millions of them are still in Pakistan, suffering themselves and burdening Pakistan's economy. Peace is a prerequisite, moreover, for the opening of transit facilities without which cooperation with Central Asian republics remains blocked.

A more sinister legacy of the Afghan crisis for Pakistan is the "Kalashnikov culture" and increased production of narcotics. Modern weapons from Afghanistan have proliferated across Pakistan. Dacoits now have more lethal weapons than the police have. Hundreds of foreign citizens who came to join the jihad stayed behind in Pakistan, and some of them have indulged in acts of terrorism. The bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad in December 1995 was attributed to them. Also, agents of the Rabbani regime have been accused of perpetrating acts of sabotage in Pakistan. A car-bomb

explosion in a Peshawar bazaar killed over 40 and wounded a hundred innocent persons in December 1995.

The Russian people are rightly critical of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as “a great mistake” (29) Afghans can similarly blame their communist leaders for the disaster that befell their country. Pakistanis alone have few scapegoats. ‘They generally backed Zia’s policy of support for the Afghans. In an emotional milieu few foresaw the consequences of involvement, and the grave problems that emerged in the wake of the conflict. Western supporters of the resistance, rightly critical of the warring factions, have walked away. Pakistan once praised for “shouldering great responsibilities for mankind.... (and its) courageous and compassionate role, “(30) finds itself left in the lurch, saddled with the burden of refugees and the consequences of the strife next door.

Might-have-been of History

Was Pakistan’s policy misconceived? In retrospect the answer is easy to give but, alas, humans are not gifted with prescience and policies have to be devised- and can be fairly judged- in the context of the time and contemporary knowledge. Given the history of Soviet expansionism, Islamabad’s sense of alarm in 1979 was not a figment of its imagination. Pakistan was neither in a position to challenge the Soviet superpower nor could it ignore the intervention without peril to its security. An alternative to the middle course it pursued seems difficult to conceive. Success and failure can be a measure of policies but human struggle cannot be appraised in isolation from the nobility of the cause. The Soviet intervention was morally wrong, the Afghan resistance was right. Pakistan’s decision in favour of solidarity with the fraternal people of Afghanistan was not only morally right but also based on its enlightened self-interest.

Could the consequences of the protracted conflict in terms of the Kalashnikov culture and narcotics proliferation be anticipated and obviated? Actually, these as well as malfeasance and venality were obvious during the struggle in Afghanistan. Surely, these could have been minimized if not precluded.

Were not the Geneva accords flawed in that they did not provide for transition to peace and the formation of a government of unity for Afghanistan? The account that has been given above brings out the fact that from the beginning the Geneva negotiations had only the limited aim of getting the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan. All the parties agreed that the formation of government was entirely an internal affair of Afghanistan, and the Afghans alone had the right to decide this matter to the exclusion of the Soviet Union, Pakistan or any other country. The United Nations was understandably reluctant to undertake this task. Unhappily the need of the Cold War it avoided assumption of a role for the promotion of reconciliation or consensus in any embattled country. Moscow and Kabul were first dismissive of any suggestion for a role for the mujahideen in the government of Afghanistan except on Kabul's terms. When they later offered accommodation, the mujahideen rejected any truck with the Soviet-installed rules. Pakistan as well as other friends and supporters backed the mujahideen position. President Zia alone changed his view for reasons that remain obscure though his unjustified and unlawful dismissal of prime minister Junejo in May 1988 provides circumstantial evidence of a personal power motivation. In the event even he was unable to persuade the mujahideen to meet Diego Cordovez in pursuit of his mission of promoting a government of unity in Afghanistan.

It was probably too much to expect the mujahideen leaders to reach accommodation with the surrogate regime after the Soviet Union withdrew thought that might have

saved the country from fragmentation. More tragic was the rivalry for personal power among the mujahideen leaders that prolonged the nightmare for the afghan people. Also; as a result, the mujahideen themselves had been sidelined by new forces in the country, whether the Taliban will succeed in bring unity and reconciliation to the war-ravaged country remains to be seen. Also to be watched is the effect to the Taliban success on Pakistan's relations with Iran which believes that Pakistan wields sufficient influence with the Taliban to ensure accommodation for all the afghan ethnic groups in the future government of Afghanistan. What is obvious by now is the futility of a King-maker role on a part of outsider. Even a superpower failed in its attempt to impose a government on the afghans. It would be arrogant for any neighbour to presume it might fare better. Meanwhile, the opportunity for large-scale foreign assistance for the reconstruction of Afghanistan has probably been lost for ever.

NOTES AND REFERENCE

1. Agha Shahi, *Pakistan's Security and Foreign Policy*.p.6.
2. statement by Pakistan information ministry, 21 November 1979, *Documents*, ed. Arif, p.366. For cost of rebuilding the embassy Pakistan \$13.94 million. In addition, US claimed 57.245 million for other property lost. Statement by US state department. 12 November 1981, *Document*, ed. Arif, p.366,
3. Agha Shahi, *op. cit*, p.8
4. President Carter's statement, 21 January 1980, *Document*, ed. Arif, p.372.
5. Statement by US department of state. 26 December 1979.*American Foreign Policy-Batik Documents 1977.80.*
6. Riaz M. Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot,p.18.20(This work provides authoritative information on Pakistan's policy on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and, especially, the UN-mediated negotiations leading to the Geneva accords in April 1988).
7. For detailed table see Riaz M.Khan, *op.cit*.p.40
8. President Zia in NCB-TV "Face the Nation" interview with Walter Cronkite, 18 May 1980. *Documents*, ed. Arif, p.394.
9. Statement by foreign affairs adviser Agha Shahi, 5 March 1980. *Document s*, ed Arif, pp 388.90.
10. Pakistan Foreign Office statement, 25 April 1980. *Documents*. Ed. Arif, p.392
11. The package included \$ 150 million sales credits for the period ?Fiscal '83-Fiscal '87.

12. In testimony before a congressional committee on 27 April 1981 deputy assistant secretary of state Kane Coon acknowledged the injustice of past US policy saying that sanctions were "applied in the case of one country-Pakistan" A few weeks later, assistant secretary of state James Buckley exuded understanding of Pakistan's perception that the threat to its security "could not be met by conventional and political means" For texts of statements. See *Documents, ed. Arif*.
13. US Department of State, 16 September 1981. *Documents, ed. Arif, p.457*.
14. The interest differential was initially 8% on \$ 300 millions a year. Interest rates, however, declined in subsequent years, and the package which was carefully negotiated so as to increase the grant component for economic support funds did not prove "back-breaking". The follow-up agreement which remained in force only for 3 years until 1990 at a level of \$ 700 million a year provided for military sales credits at a concessional rate.
15. Riaz M Khan. *Op.cit.* p.107
16. This phrase was derived from the 1981 UN Declaration on the inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States.
17. Seling Harrison, *Inside the Afghan Talks*. p.31. also, Bennett R. Rubin. *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan- From Buffer State to Failed State*, pp.63.65 and slightly different figures in Riaz M. Khan. *op.cit.* p.88
18. Quoted by Diego Cordovez, Barnett R. Rubin *op.cit.* p.40
19. Bennett R. Rubin *op.cit.* p 43.
20. Press briefing by Diego Cordovez. 9 December 1986, quoted in Bennett R. Rubin, *op.cit.* p.77

21. Shevardnadze told US secretary of state George Shultz on 16 September 1987. "We will leave Afghanistan.... I say with all responsibility that a political decision has been made "Quoted from Shultz. *Turmoil and Triumph*.p.1090 in Bennett R.Rubin. *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan*. p.83
22. Statement by foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze in a meeting of the Central Committee of CPSU after cataloguing the thousands of billions of rubles USSR spent on occupation of Eastern Europe, creating defence infrastructure on the border with China, and in Afghanistan. Author's memory.
23. Riaz M.Khan. op.ct.p.234
24. Literaturanya Gazeta, Moscow.17 February 1988. quoted in Agha Shahi.op cit....p.93.
25. K.M. Arif. Working with Zia.p.327, based on statements by General Alexei Lizichev and Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov.
26. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers.
27. Mullah Mohammad Umar, Taliban leader, quoted by Rahimullah Yusufzai.The News.4 October 1996.
28. K.M. Arif, op.cit, p.327.qouting Edward Shevardnadze's statement in Izvestia of 19 February1989.
29. President Ronald Reagon, speech welcoming president Zia to Washington,7 December1982. Documents.ed.Arif.p.481.

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Chapter-9

AFGHANISTAN: PESHAWAR ACCORD AND AFTER

·AMERA SAEED⁽¹⁾

April 1992 saw some momentous developments in the Afghan situation. Internally, the Mujahideen guerillas had made notable advances and were in possession of most of the countryside outside Kabul. In the face of the Mujahideen advance, armed tribesmen, who had stuck it out for fourteen years in difficult war conditions, along with disaffected government troops, switched allegiance to the would be victors. Close allies of the besieged President Najibullah who had changed loyalties included the Uzbek General, Abdul Rashid Dostum, who controlled the important stronghold of Mazar-i-Sharif, which came into the hands of the Mujahideen. On April 16, following an aborted attempt to flee the country, President Najibullah resigned more suddenly and less bloodily than most people, had foreseen.”(1)

Ironically enough, with victory within their grasp, the Mujahideen groups found themselves totally unprepared to take over the leadership of the country. They had no interim plan ready with which to step in and take over the task of governance and, what was more important, ensure that civil strife did not take place. The substance of

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an economic reconstruction programmer of their war-ravaged country totally eluded them, as well as any stop-gap arrangement to meet the immediate needs of the populace in the face of a ruined infrastructure. The result, was that for an entire week following Najibullah's resignation, the country was without a government, while hectic activities were underway amongst the Mujahideen groups in exile, notably the Peshawar-based ones, to thrash out the shape of an interim administration.

On April 24, the Peshawar Accord was signed among nine Pakistan-based Mujahideen groups, preceded by much bargaining over power sharing. Suddenly, from their refugee status, these groups acquired a representative authority for the Afghan nation and, that too while, they were still physically based abroad. Two Mujahideen guerilla groups, who had partly forced the situation to take this turn through their military pressure on the besieged Najibullah regime, were now facing each other in and around Kabul more in confrontation than with any idea of cooperation.

(Established and based in Peshawar) Of the two, Masood had stuck to his mountain fastness, traveling just once abroad, and that too for a day's sojourn. In Pakistan in early 1992 to meet with the Mujahideen leaders. He presented the image of a warrior, who also possessed great administrative ability, amply reflected in the way he had managed the survival not only of his forces but also the population of the areas under his control. Hekmatyar had the clout of an organization behind him which had carried out a successful propaganda on behalf of, the Afghan cause abroad, and was considered to be a hardliner in contrast to the more moderate Masood. Despite their armed strength, neither Masood nor Hekmatyar tried to grab any stop-gap role during this crucial one week when either could have usurped power.

For any person or a group wanting to take over power, the ground reality of Afghanistan had changed, both in its internal and external environment. Within the country, an entire array of new factors had reared up above the debris of a fourteen-year war, all demanding immediate resolution: the fate of former President Najibullah and his associates in the government and armed forces; the composition of an interim administration and its tasks of governance; the long-standing rivalry amongst the Mujahideen groups whose origins pre-dated the 1979 Soviet invasion; the war-ravaged economy unable to provide the wherewithal for the many immediate needs of the people and requiring a massive economic reconstruction programme just to put the administration on the rails; the conflicting interpretations of "Islamic values" of the definition of an 'Islamic state' and the role of an 'Islamic government' the repatriation programme of refugees from Pakistan, Iran and other countries; the ten million mines the Soviets left embedded, mostly in what were once agriculturally productive areas; The assertion of all ethnic identities for participation in decision appeared, all were inextricably interlinked, and all had assumed a critical importance.

External Factors.

The external situation was equally complex. Afghanistan found itself like the burdened heart of a troubled region, embroiled in its own numerous crises. At the time of the 1979 Soviet invasion, Afghanistan had bordered only four states- Iran, Pakistan, USSR and China. Following the soviet Union's collapse, it acquired three more immediate neighbors, namely, the republics of "Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, in place of the USSR, Two new factors had emerged which the rest of the world would have to come to terms with. The landlocked status of Afghanistan had acquired a new dimension, since alongwith the six Central Asian Republics it now accounted

for a bloc of seven landlocked states,, sharing many mutual concerns and close cultural, religious, historical and ethnic affinities. Their natural routes to the outside world lay across Afghanistan and through the neighboring Muslim countries of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. The second factor was that in this contiguity of new and old states, all were Muslim majority countries of which Kazakhstan possessed a vast nuclear arsenal and two others-Iran and Pakistan-were credited with nuclear capabilities.

Two other determinants were present on the Afghan scene which figured per se. As the repository of the sovereignty of the nations of the world, the United Nations has over the years acquired a certain fundamental legitimizing states, ensuring that its future role in Afghanistan would remain. With the various afghan Mujahideen organizations it has enjoyed a measure of acceptability as a relatively neutral body. On many occasions, if a development so warranted, Mujahideen groups would uphold some UN measure as being in their interest. But on other occasions they would denounce those measures they did not agree with, holding them to be against Afghan interests. The future Afghan approach to the UN is likely to continue to that same pattern.

The second factor was the nature of the internal conflicts, fused along Shia-Sunni, linguistic, Pushtoon-versus-non-Pushtoon and ethnic lines, with historical affiliations in the adjoining regional countries. These historical links were revived with actual contacts once the refugee exodus took place and acquired a more live symbolism. The Persian speaking Tajiks and Uzbek Afghans, with their linguistic and cultural affinities with Iran, would therefore be affected by developments within Iran, in terms of what can be applicable to their situation as well. Similarly, the Sunni afghan Mujahideen organizations, with their Al-Azhar University connections, cannot remain unaffected by developments in the Arab

world. However, these links would be put into effect in the afghan context and not outside it. Pakistan, as a neighbour, presents the same religious mix and would also in some measure reflect its own public responses to what happens inn its neighborhood. It is to be borne in mind that at one level of the afghan conflict throughout 1992 the Pushtoon-versus-Persian-speaking controversy had always been in evidence.

The political tussle for power underway does snot seem to be a matter of a few months. It is not likely that one dominant group will be allowed to figure to the exclusion of others. The environment is more suitable for a dominant alliance and that is the power configuration that is being sought. The problems are not only multi-dimensional but of massive proportions, ensuring that the period of instability will be that much longer. Afghan developments will therefore compel world attention, if only because of the concern of the world governments to remain sufficiently abreast of these developments, so as to be in a position to do timely 'crisis management' should there be spillover effects.

Western Concerns.

A Western media comment, significant for the fact that it was made shortly before the signing of the Peshawar Accord highlighted the areas of concern. Raising the pertinent question of why outsiders should have an interest inn Afghanistan *The Economist* of London postulated three reasons. One was based '*partly* on basic humanity' without which no new world order could claim respect, namely, to help mitigate the miseries arising out of the war-homelessness, unemployment, economic collapse and land mines. The outside powers notably America, Russia. Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, according to this comment, could not escape, the blame for the damage, nor,

the moral obligation to help repair it, having 'nourished' the war with arms and money.

The second reason was self-interest. If the 'patchwork' of Afghanistan's different ethnic groups, languages and religious practices were to come apart, the disintegration could spread beyond Afghanistan: The Pathan and Baluchi tribes would look to their kinsmen in Pakistan; the Hazara tribes to Iran; the Turkmen, Tajiks and Uzbeks to the new Muslim states of the former Soviet Union. Follow a path of ethnic strife and ultimately the integrity of Pakistan, Iran and even India might be threatened..."(2)

The third reason was the ,dismal prospect that Afghanistan's next regime might impose a harshly fundamentalist form of Islam: "imagine a fundamentalist Afghanistan next door to a fundamentalist Iran- and then imagine the fears of the Russians and other non-Muslim minorities in Central Asia..."The British Weekly further warned against any direct intervention to make or keep an Afghan peace, other than an intervention with the "weapons of diplomacy and economic pressure ".(2a) To what end it did not state, nor did it give any example in our times where diplomacy or economic pressure had induced lasting stability. Internationally, too, the response to the developments within Afghanistan has been vaguely defined, since the specter of an Islamic fundamentalism, which while clearly perceived to be a factor, has also defied any attempt to be a factor, and has also defied any attempt to be explained in any specific terms. The irony is that until the collapse of the Soviet Union, fundamentalist Islam in Afghanistan did not seem such a worrisome factor as to cause stoppage of aid from the outside world.

The objective of this study is to assess the developments that led to the signing of the Peshawar Accord and those that ensued, both related to the provisions of the Accord and independent of it. It discusses their impact on

the internal situation and how it developed, in the short term, and highlights the surfacing of those factors, whose interplay is likely to shape events in the longer term. The period covered is from the eve of the signing of, the Peshawar Accord to Professor Rubbani's convening of the Shoora Ahle-Hal-o-Aqd which elected him as President in end-December 1992, a role he formally assumed in January 1993.

THE PESHAWAR ACCORD: APRIL 1992.

The Peshawar Accord was signed, as its name suggests, in Peshawar, on 22 Shawal of the Muslim calendar, which corresponded to April 24, It immediately led to speculations that Pakistan had stage-managed the whole, show, and compelled, the afghans, whom the whole world found intractable, into some sort of a consensus.

A look at the provisions of the Accord (see translated version at Annex "A") is sufficient to show that it was entirely an Afghan exercise. There were twelve clauses altogether dealing with the structure and process for a provisional period to last for only six months, following which a 'Transitional Government' would be installed for a period of two years. Afghanistan was specifically described as an "Islamic state". The first provision established a 51-person body which would "establish power in Kabul." It would be headed by Sibghatullah Mujaddedi who would also be President for, the first two months, or up to the end of June 1992. After this period this body will remain as Interim Islamic Council along with the Transitional State and its chairmanship will be held by Hazrat Sahib"(as Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddedi was addressed in the ,document- author's note).The period of this Council will be four months", or up to the end of October 1992.

When the initial two months of the period of establishing power have elapsed, a "Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan" would come into effect with

Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani as its President, as well as the head of a Leadership Council that would also come into being. It was felt necessary to specify that Professor Rabbani's tenure would commence when the two months of the transfer of power had elapsed, or from end- June 1992 to end-October 1992. The third provision was a significant sentence standing all by itself: The above mentioned period will not, be extended even by a day." It was indication enough of the intense power struggle that had gone into ensuring that these two apparently important positions, for which there were obviously other contenders, did not remain too long within the same hands to become an exclusive preserve.

Clause 4 provided for a second level of administration-a Prime Minister" and members of the Cabinet" to be constituted from the" second grade members of the Tanzeemaat" (or the Mujahideen organizations, emphasis added), by the discretion of their respective heads. Clauses 5 to 10 mentioned the important portfolios and assigned them to some of the Mujahideen groups. The Prime Ministership was given to the Hezb-e-Islami, Afghanistan. There were three deputy Prime Ministerships with concurrent portfolios, namely: the Ministry of Interior to Ittehad-e-Islami; the Ministry of Education to the Hezb-e-Islami of Maulvi Khalis; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the National Islamic Front. The Ministry of Defence was assigned to the Jamiat-e-Islami. These were to be the executive and judicial arms of the Leadership Council, whose task included making a division of appointments in the Ministries; as well as to determine Ministries for Hezb-e-Wahdat, the Shura-e-Etala'f (or the Council of Coalition), Maulvi Mansoor and other brothers". The specific mention of, these persons and groups again testified to the fact that intense bargaining was conducted over the sharing of power.

Clause 12 specified a time-frame for these entire process-six months or up to the end of October 1992, by which time a "Transitional Government" was expected to have been installed for a period of two years, or up to the end of October 1994. The significant part of this clause was that it would be by a "unanimous decision" of the Islamic Council. In other words, no unanimity, no transitional government. In the light of this qualification of unanimity, the insertion of clause 3 assumed significance, and its inclusion at the position where it is, seems to have been an after-thought to check growing ambitions. Thus an extreme contradiction was woven in, best understood, by framing the question: if at the end of six months, not to be extended by a single day, there was no unanimous decision, what then?

The Accord was equally significant for the details, and aspects, it ignored to mention, even if they might have been discussed as the negotiations. There was no mention in the Accord of who would, make up the 51-member body, and what its specific steps would be to establish power". No mention was made of Ahmad Shah Masood or Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who had been described as possible claimants to power by the world media. No economic priorities were mentioned, given the scale of the devastation and the likely immediate needs of the people. No mention was made of any programme whatsoever for the repatriation of refugees to their respective areas. Moreover, following then signing of the Accord, it was not, until four days later that the caravan of the new Government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan started its journey to the capital. What had happened in the meantime was the outbreak of civil war in the city, between the forces of Ahmed Shah Masood and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. More of this later.

PROFILES OF PERSONALITIES AND PARTIES⁽³⁾

A look at the profiles of the personalities and parties mentioned in the Accord would be in order, as an understanding of them would make it possible to assess the nature of this strange Accord, and the subsequent developments.

Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, nearing seventy, assumed the President ship of the multi-party government, and faced a daunting task of restoring some measure of normalcy, somehow. Instead, even as the Accord was signed, civil war broke out in Kabul, with tank and heavy artillery attacks, leading to heavy casualties. So intense did the new phase of the power struggle become, that diplomatic missions and UN agencies evacuated their personnel to Pakistan. It was apparent that the choice of Professor Mujaddedi for this important post arose out of the influence he wielded and which was considered likely to forge unity. He belongs to one of the most prominent religious families of Afghanistan, influential since over a century, holding the religious leadership of the Naqshbandiya Sufi order, with adherents not only in Afghanistan but all over, the Subcontinent and Central Asia as well. His prestige as the leader of this order made him a force to be reckoned with. Thirty members of his family were executed under the Taraki/Amin regime. He himself was imprisoned under Daoud and when freed, left to live in Copenhagen, Denmark, where he was received by the Muslim community as their religious leader. Another important connection was his training as a theologian at Cairo's Al-Azhar University and later as professor of Islamic law at Kabul University, which has been in recent decades the nursery of many political activist groups of varied leanings. Following the 1978 coup, he returned to Pakistan and established the Jabba-e-Milli Najat-e-Afghanistan-the National Front for the Rescue of

Afghanistan-or National Front for short,. His party orientation has been described as traditionalist- nationalist, with a leaning towards the traditional institutions of pre-communist Afghanistan.

Identify those strands of events which would most likely intertwine into significant developments to bring about major directional changes.

Burhanuddin Rabbani

Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, of Tajik back ground, was born in 1940 in Badakshan. He also graduated from the Al-Azhar University, also taught at Kabul University as professor of Islamic law, and became known through his writings on religion and literature. When the Muslim Brotherhood (the Ikhwanul Muslimin) branch was established in Afghanistan, he was one of its leading figures. He was originally also one of the educated Muslim activists who helped form the Hezb-e-Islami, alongwith Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. After Daoud's crackdown on the Muslim intelligentsia, he left Kabul in 1973, and inn 1978 established the Jamiat-e-Islami, Afghanistan. Later, like many others, e left the Hezb, as sits strong centralized organizational structure irked those who subscribed to the traditional Afghan social system, based on individual freedom and equality.

Rabbani was the first to break away, after which many followed in his footsteps, notable among them being, at that time the relatively unknown Ahmed Shah, Masood (4). When Rabbani formed the Jamiat-e-Islami, most of his followers joined it, and it soon became the most prominent party of northern Afghanistan. It held special appeal for the Tajiks and other non-Puhstoon minority ethnic groups, as well as some Pushtoos of the north. Many resistance groups of the northern and western areas of the country also switched connections to the Jamiat. The Jamiat's position with the tribes, however, was weaker and for that, reason it

found, it difficult to establish itself in the south. Harket followers joined it in the west because they found their own organization too soft. Hezb followers in the northeast and, the, south, finding their own party too ruthless, also switched to the Jamiat. The Jamiat thus was able to provide a dynamic political framework, which was more favourable to modern guerilla warfare, than did the Harket, and without breaking tradition as the Hezb did (5) Furthermore, the, Jamiat's influence was greatly enhanced by the exemplary reputation of its commanders in the north, notable among them being Ismael Khan (operating between Herat and Maymana), Zabiullah, martyred in 1984, who was based in Mazar-e-Sharif, and Ahmed Shah Masood who operated throughout the, northeast. Seven major Soviet offensives carried out against Panjsher between 1980-84 failed and turned Masood into a living legend. (6) Long, before Taraki's coup. Rabbani had recognized the absolute necessity of not allowing himself to be cut off from the tribes., He worked hard for a process of adaptation within the party to accept the reality of tribes and to win them over.

Though the party orientation in the beginning was a radical-revivalist Islam, similar to that of the Hezb, it became more moderate by 1984, by which time the heroic exploits of Ahmed Shah Masood in the Punjsher Valley against the, might of the Soviet army, brought the party into the international limelight. As it captured much of the military and political influence of the Hezb, the Jamiat created hostility which has intensified over the years, and remained one of, the major causes of the Resistance failure to devise a common programme of action. The Hezb hostility persists till today.

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

The Hezb-e-Islami is more identified with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar than with any of its other founding

members. The original Hezb split into two major factions, while some others broke away to form new formations. The factions took on the names of their leaders; thus Hekmatyar's faction became the, Hezb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar) and the other the Hezb-e-Islami (Khalis. It is significant that the Accord mentioned the Khalis Hezb specifically by name, while, the important slot of, the prime minister was assigned to the "Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan". The power of the Hezb rested on its approach which regarded the ultimate Islamic revolution as more important than the war directed at gaining complete control over the entire Resistance movement. (7) It came into conflict with other Afghan Resistance parties over this approach right from the beginning. Its organizational structure was too centralized for the traditional Afghan to accept, even though Hekmatyar has had his band of die-hard supporters. Hezb (Hekmatyar)'s support base thus grew on the dogmatic followers devoted to the party, or the peasantry living, in extreme poverty. It remained the only party to understand the importance of the mass media. It may be recalled that in 1980 the international press had considered the Hezb as the backbone of the Resistance.(8) Following 1981, the Hezb's policy of stepping up sabotage activities lost it much of its international support. When in 1983 there was a crisis between Hekmatyar and Sayyaf, the former reportedly also lost his privileged position with the Arabs who preferred "sayyaf. (9) The inner intra-party politics revolves around the controversial figure of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar himself.

Engineer Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Kharruti Pushtoon from the Baghlan province, was in his mid-forties when the Accord was signed. He first studied in Kabul's military academy, then switched to the engineering faculty of the Kabul University, and became the leader of the afghan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood pent four years with the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan

(Najibullah was one of the, founding members of this organization), before adopting radical Islamic politics. In 1972 he fled to Pakistan with others and founded the Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan, and instigated the abortive anti-Daoud insurrection in Panjsher in 1975. Since 1979, his base has remained in Peshawar, though he subsequently established a branch organization in Iran with the leftist Iranian Revolutionary Guards, called, the Jundullah. After the Soviet invasion, the controversy around his role increased with the passage of time. The Kabul regime dubbed him a CIA agent, while the Resistance leaders accused him of secret collusion with the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) regimes and the Soviets. Hekmetyar. is widely feared and his only ally of convenience seems to be Abdul Rasool Sayyaf, leader of the, Ittehad-e-Islami. His party's orientation is towards radical-revivalist theocratic institutions, revolving around, the concept of a centralized religious leadership. He is considered to be very skilful in dealing with the, international press.(10).

Other Leaders.

Maulvi Mohammad Yunus Khalis dominates his faction of the Hezb-e-Islami. A Pushtoon from the Nangrahar province, he was trained as a mullah in the traditional Afghan religious schools and eventually became a university lecturer and the editor of a journal. He, is widely respected for his forthrightness. When the Soviet invasion took place, he was in his sixties, but went to Afghanistan regularly to fight in various battles. His son was executed by the Soviets. The Hezb (Khalis) is considered less radical than some of, the other Islamic parties, closer in its political orientation to the groups headed by Pir Sayed Ahmad Gilani, Professor Mujadedi and Maulvi Mohammadi's Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami Afghanistan. The Hezb (Khalis) is tribally based, better

organized, with influence in strategic areas, though in terms of membership it is smaller than others. Maulvi Khalis left Hekmatyar in 1979, blaming him for avoiding combat, and, was immediately followed by his entire tribe (the Khugiani of Nangrahar). Throughout, the duration of the war his party was well prepared for combat. His own participation in the battlefield and, the exploits of his commanders, notably Abdul Haq, added prestige to this Hezb faction, and from 1982 onwards its appeal went beyond Nagnrahar and Paktia as far as Kandahar.(11).

The Ittehad-e-Islami emerged in 1980 under the leadership of Abdul Rashid Sayyaf, to reunite six Afghan Resistance groups based in Pakistan since the Soviet invasion of 1979. Sayyaf, a Pushtoon, was also originally a ranking member of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, as his deputy. The Ittehad was organized on the principles of an Islamic Shoora, which envisages that all power be vested in the religious leadership. Sayyaf, who speaks fluent Arabic, has good contacts in the Middle East, where he is one of the better known Afghan leaders. He was really responsible for a steady flow of substantial aid from the Middle Eastern countries. However, he began channeling aid of favourite groups on the basis of personal loyalty to him, led to disenchantment factionalism and eventual breakaways. Sayyaf has been described as ambitious and not troubled by too scruples". Initially he joined Hekmatyar to reduce the influence of Khalis and Rabbani in the alliance. He then created a rift in the Hezb. (12) Finally, Sayyaf converted the short lived Ittehad into a party.(13)

The National Islamic Front, or the Mahaz-e-Milli Islami Afghanistan, or Mahaz for short, is closely identified with the image of its founder, Pir Sayed Ahmed Gilani, who is a religious leader of international importance in the Muslim world Like Processor Mujaddedi, Pir Gilani is also the hereditary head of a religious order, the Qadiriya Sufi

order, with an ancestry going back to the twelfth century. His followers include many Afghans, especially Pushtoons on both sides of the border. Before the 1973 coup, he was a religious adviser to King Zahir Shah. The Mahaz is a big party, well organized and effective. Its political orientation has been described as traditionalist-nationalist, favouring a government incorporating Islamic law and Afghan tradition, with a parliament based on free elections.

Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi heads the Persian speaking Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami Afghanistan (Movement for the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan), Hakmat for short. Mohammadi, a Pushtoon, and combines religious authority with political experience he, too, is a theologian from the Al-Azhar University, who established and headed an influential religious academy. He is considered to have a considerable following among tribal leaders and mullahs in the Kandahar and Helmand regions, as well as support from the urban middle class. In 1980, the Harkat was a major party, but in 1981 most of its local committees in Heart and Faryab joined Rabbani's Jamiat. This switching of allegiance was based on language divisions, because the Pushtoon-speaking Harkat committees of the, same area did not defect, and this happened in certain other areas as well. Because of its loose organizational structure, the Harkat was exploited by infiltrators using it as a cover. It continued to remain a force in the south.(14)

Though still a large party, it remains more loosely organized than others, running Afghan-style on the basis of local leadership belongs to the same generation as Professor Muhjaddedi or Pir Gilani with a similar political. Orientation toward a traditional, nationalist dispensation based on Islamic law but not theocracy or radicalism, and stands for a popularly elected government based on the traditional Loya Jirga.(15)

Maulvi Mansoor is a prominent mullah leader of Gardez and Ghazni, who formed part of the 'coalition of seven'. Earlier, he was part of the Harkat. He leads a faction that split from Maulvi Mohammadi's Harkat, called the, Khudam, al-Furqan, and was also one of the leaders based in Peshawar.

Among these leaders the most intense conflict of interest and approach was between Burhanuddin Rabbani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Rabbani attracted the moderate element, especially among the Persian speakers. Hekmatyar drew the radical Pushtoons towards him. Rabbani sought the broadest possible coalition of all Muslims, whatever their political attitudes. Hekmatyar's Hezb imprecated its opponents. Rabbani's personal prestige was greater not only in the madrassas, but also with the Sufi brotherhoods in the west, the literary circles and, the Persian speaking Islamist intellectuals. Hekmatyar, with his undoubted talent and charisma, had greatly influenced fellow students and led most of the demonstrations from 1965 to 1972. Rabbani emphasized the necessity of accommodating liberal intellectual circles and even opposed the elitist views of the Jamaat of Pakistan. When the Hezb split between Hekmatyar and Khalis, Rabbani and Khalis shared the same views on political Islam.

POLITICAL ISLAM AND AFGHANISTAN.

The very term 'Islamic state' used as the new denomination for Afghanistan conjured up visions of fundamentalism, as if such a condition had never existed before. Throughout history and in comparison with other Islamic countries, Afghanistan has been the more continuously conservative Islamic society. A degree of modernism was ushered in by Amanullah Khan but was quickly checkmated by the more traditional leaders. This has been the pattern and is likely to continue. "Islamic ideology" has its own connotations for the Afghan society.

Observers like Roy.(1988) have analyzed that the term has provided the same intellectual points of reference, namely, the Qur'an, the Sunnah and the Shariat, for both the Islamist intellectuals, and the fundamentalist ulema-both sections with the power to influence other, sections of the populace. The difference was that whereas the Islamist intellectuals had absorbed Western thought while rejecting its irrelevances, the ulema had simply not come into contact with it. (16)

The Soviet invasion introduced a radical change when it forced hundreds of thousands into exile in foreign lands where the Afghans came across varying notions of sovereignty and the state, of concepts and practices of democracy, and the, revolutionary changes that had been brought about by technological advances. Thus sustained, fourteen-year long exposure to other systems was a phenomenal one, in as much as it brought about perceptual changes in the Afghan psyche. Roy (1988) observed: The contribution of Western thought has not been in the form of new concepts but in the provision of the very notion of *an autonomous political sphere.*" (emphasis added). The traditional thought of the ulema earlier did not recognize politics as an autonomous realm. They dealt with political problems by looking for analogous instances in the Quran and the Sunnah.

The Islamists, on the other hand, began to ask questions on abstract notions such as the nature of society and power. They looked towards the principals of, 'ijtejad' (personal interpretations), 'qiyas' (reasoning by analogy) and 'jima' (consensus, usually understood to be by doctors of law). The revolutionary mass struggle redefined social changes which may ultimately herald reforms in a monumental way. The scarifies and the jihad involved the entire nation, leading to a desire for similar participation in the decision-making of their future by the generality of Afghans, as is borne out by the statements of those who are

neither Islamist intellectuals, nor ulema, nor the leaders or followers of the various Mujahideen groups presently holding the power to dictate.

The struggle over who should form part of the Islamic government may not entirely be what it appears to be—cleavages within cleavages. The Afghan society may well present the world at large with a more cohesive decision-making apparatus and a pragmatic common programme of action through an “Islamic ideology”, since every Afghan owns this ideology as personally as he does his weapons of war. While the ulema’s social base is not likely to diminish, it is equally possible that the ‘ijma’ base will expand to include the wider community of believers for consensus-making. As Roy (1988) noted: The rise in the influence of the ulema does not mean that the Afghan society is under the thumb of the clergy.”(17)

The Ittehad experience served to bring into the open the religious sources of conflict between the leaders with their distinct religious backgrounds. Mujaddedi, Rabbani and Sayyaf are theologians educated at Al-Azhar; Khalis and Mohammadi are mullahs trained at the traditional mosque schools; and Hekmatyar and Sayyaf personify the militant members of the Muslim Brotherhood. This led to a religious/nationalist polarity within the Afghan society in accordance with the leanings of the religious leaders themselves. One section favoured the ‘shoora’ system based on Islamic religious law under a centralized religious leadership. The other supported the nationalist and traditionalist political system upheld by the ‘jirga’, (18) At the Mujahideen’s Peshawar base, the polarization was projected as being more in favour of the ‘shoora’ system, but within Afghanistan there was clearly a public demand for the ‘jirga’ system, supported by large sections of Afghans abroad.

DEVELOPMENTS FROM APRIL 1992 TO DECEMBER 1992

1. Crystallisation of New Forces.

The Peshawar Accord signed in April 1992 had an immediate back ground which provided the context in which a number of factors interacted to influence the course of events that unfolded in the post-Accord period. Just as some factors saw the logical termination of their relevance, the same period provided the basis for new elements to emerge, which will have an impact in the period that lies ahead, both internally in Afghanistan, and regionally.

Following the signing of the Geneva Accords on 14 April 1988, the Soviet Union introduced the longer-range Scud ground-to-ground missiles, stationed 30 MiG-27 fighters at the Shindand airbase in the autumn of 1988, and gave additional supplies of Russian arms; in early 1989, it signed 2000-allthis under the umbrella of bilateral treaties. In December 1991, the Soviet Union was dissolved. The Geneva Accords had enabled the Soviet Union just before its demise to change its image internationally from an "aggressor" power to a "guarantor" power, and this with the full concurrence of the United States. The Russian Federation, accepted by the USA as successor state to the Soviet Union in all matters, inherited this happier image. Russian foreign policy can be expected to use, this as the, basis of its future relationship with the new Afghanistan, where its presence is likely to figure again, now and that it has under taken to repay war reparations.

The Soviet withdrawal, completed by February 1989, provided the watershed event culminating in the Afghans facing each other the period 1989 to 1992 was dominated by this Afghan-versus-Afghan struggle. It was internationally expected that the Najibullah regime would collapse within days. On the contrary it outlasted the Soviet

Union. In turn, the Kabul regime managed to turn the international limelight on to itself for its survivability.

The same period saw significant changes in the regional environment of Afghanistan. Notable among these was the emergence of three more states (of Central Asia) on its northern borders. Adjacent to it, there was intensification of state repression in the Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir, and the corresponding rise in Kashmiri militancy was not an isolated phenomenon, given India's own polytechnic character. In Pakistan, swift government changes added to its internal uncertainties. And in the Middle East, the, US-sponsored Gulf War was launched against the Saddam regime. All these factors ensured that arms supplies would not be easily available for Afghans from the traditional sources. Yet there was no dearth of small arms or heavy armament at the disposal of the warring factions.

As long as international aid kept coming in, the refugees were not overly pushed to return home. The reasons were many. The leadership tussle for control was underway, ensuring further unstable conditions within the country. Ten million mines left behind by the departing Soviets were a major concern and continue to be so. There was no motivating political direction from any quarter, rather an increase in factional infighting. Without the focus provided by the presence of the Soviet troops, the Afghan Resistance became disoriented, fractious and divisive, falling back upon clan loyalties. However, even this aspect of kinship had undergone a profound change.

Since the, war lasted for as fourteen years, it in itself became an agent of changing perceptions. It moulded Afghan self-awareness, as surviving families split by going in different directions in search of survival. The point to note is that wherever the Afghan refugees went they seem to have adapted themselves easily to the new environment. This was because their 'cosmopolitan' outlook was ever

present-both because throughout history the Afghans stood at the crossroads of caravans, conquerors and migrations, and because they themselves were always on the move, as conquerors in India and Persia, as labour migrants, scholars, wandering traders and pastoral nomads.(19) the harsh conditions within their country fostered self-reliance and an individualism which is all-pervasive and colours all societal relations. While this 'ideology of individualism' was effective for guerilla actions against military power its inherent weakness was the inability to think a problem through in collective terms. It has been assessed that Soviet infiltration in 1978-79, leading upto the actual invasion, was based on this deeper knowledge of the Soviets that each clan and district would only react when directly provoked.

Nor has the division along tribal lines deprived the Afghans of the ability of decision-making when the final crunch came. One observer states that through centuries, having known change, they have been aware of alternatives. Similarly, the deeply ingrained religious orientation which gives the Afghan an "Islamic fundamentalist" appearance, is at the same time pragmatic and secular in approach. The "ulema" and the "spirituals" have more often been a unifying factor, being outside the tribal system, and therefore able to bring tribes and communities together without threatening the parity of clans and ethnic groups. In settling disputes, the tribal traditions of jirga proceedings prevailed over religion.(20)

A similar consciousness pervades the Afghan notions of a state. While Afghanistan has been at the centre of empires, extending well into India, even kingship was never a centralized system. Kabul's control of its provinces depended more on mutual goodwill. The jirga provided a highly decentralized forum for the collective wisdom of, "individuals". The Marxist rhetoric with its notions of equalitarianism was therefore easily understood by a

society which had already practiced it for centuries. Its unacceptability as a system lay in its godlessness.

The Soviet invasion provided the catalyst of change in a monumental way. Its first major offensive was an attack on the Afghan code of hospitality-feeding and giving protection to any one who seeks it. The Soviets bombed entire stretches of the countryside, reducing the populations ability to support itself. They then took over the government administration and began performing roles traditionally belonging to the tribe or the ulema. This led to a spontaneous uprising and a flow of refugees abroad for long stretches of time. The result was that the afghan population imbibed values at grass root levels through wide exposure which the Afghan society had never experienced before on such a large scale or in such a sustained manner. The ideas which it has shaped, in the Afghan consciousness will figure in the coming days.

2. The Rise of Regional Concerns.

When the Geneva Accords were signed on 14 April 1988, a German scholar observed that there was no clear political solution forthcoming "on the basis of a settlement of all concerned". In the course of the negotiations, particularly in their final phases," too many problems were either set aside, remaining unsolved, or, in the circumstances and within the framework conditions that applied, defied solution." (2) alongwith the super powers, USA and USSR, the two regional countries which had played host to five million Afghan refugees for 14 years, Pakistan and Iran, also signed the Accords. The factor of the Afghan nation, represented by Mujahideen organizations and the Afghan refugees abroad, who together made up one-third of the population of Afghanistan, was entirely missing.

When the Peshawar Accord was signed on 25 April 1992, the reverse happened. The Mujahideen

organizations thrashed out an accord amongst themselves, excluding everyone else, but, as in the Geneva accords, they too set aside difficult problems. On the face of it, the fizz seemed to have gone out of the afghan jehad once the focal point of a common external enemy disappeared. Yet it is this four-year period between the two Accords, which saw the emergence of those elements directly shaped by the Afghan Resistance, and which in turn are likely to have a direct bearing on the course that Afghanistan takes in the decade of the Nineties. An event of immediate importance was the emergence of a new regional environment.

Regional development of far-reaching consequence were taking place. The intensification of the rivalry and actual confrontation between the various Mujahideen Resistance groups viz-a-viz each other and against the Najibullah regime, sprang from increasingly Afghan considerations, independent of external influences. Both Pakistan and Iran, having played host to millions of Afghan refugees, were themselves becoming hostages to international indifference, leading to withholding of aid. The larger humanitarian aspect of the United Nations seemed to follow more the logic of the "asymmetry clause" between the USA and the USSR, than the pleas of Pakistan and Iran that international aid was necessary to ensure both the survival and return of the Afghan refugees. Success in cutting the USSR down to size seemed to have landed the US administration in a state of a becalmed euphoria. It was only the rapid collapse of the Soviet Union that jolted it back into reality. Of the two superpowers, it was the "aggressor" Soviet Union that has left behind, the image of greater consistency. Till the very last it recognized the Kabul regime, which it had all along supported, as the sole legal representative government of the Afghan state. It continued to honour bilateral treaties up to the very period leading to its demise. This was accompanied by a gesture change in Kabul to give the

appearance of a transitional government being set up in response to general expectations. In June 1988, a coalition cabinet was installed headed by Mohammad Hasan Sharq, though the 4 key posts remained in PDPA's control, itself headed by Najibullah. The United States, on the other hand, was unwilling to upgrade the Mujahideen organizations' representative status through an official recognition. The reason was the anti-American stance of the Resistance leaders. This situation gave the Afghan Resistance as well as the Kabul regime their perceived right to feel under no treaty obligations with respect to the Geneva Accords, which both sides consistently ignored.

Pakistan's Role and Responses.

The seeds of the Geneva Accords were sown in Pakistan, as also those of the Peshawar Accord. Pakistan remains the one country in the most direct range of developments in Afghanistan. However, the all-party consensus on the occasion of the Geneva Accords was the positive political signal that Pakistan sent internationally. Despite internal political instability and earlier border tensions with Afghanistan, as well as the current political discord over the how and whys of the Peshawar Accord, the sheer pressure of change and the need to respond positively will dictate that Pakistani politicians subsume their personal and party ambitions within the wider national interest to provide another political consensus on Pakistan's Afghan policy.

The fact is that Pakistan's regional foreign policy remains under great pressure to evolve a response that allows it to fit in with the changed environment. The USA has distanced itself from long-standing Pakistan concerns over developments in Kashmir. The Soviet Union no longer poses a threat and, like the USA, has become a distant national geographically speaking. Pakistan has to find its own solutions and the evolving Afghan scenario may well

provide it with some answers. Having played the generous host to Afghan families, it needs to maintain these links.

Despite the levels of, many conflicts in the Islamic World, and its own image of an "Islamic state", Pakistan has the opportunity to forge some positive regional directions on the basis of the Afghan developments. The fact that Pakistan's mission in Kabul never shut down despite coming under direct bomb attacks was an act of solidarity likely to pay dividends in the long run. The Pakistan government, the present one or the future ones, bears the greater onus of responsibility continue to work towards a consensus, no matter how arduous the task or how long it takes. Having played host to the refugees for fourteen years, it can do so for a little longer while turmoil within their country prevents them from returning. It would thus win the confidence of the, non-political sections of the Afghan population. At the same time, it needs to find its own indigenous solutions and to initiate its own responses independent of UN aid or Western assistance.

The emergence of, the Central Asian states has given Pakistan an expanded regional economic dimensions, which it can develop to good effect with well thought out strategies. At the ECO conference held in Islamabad were enlisted as members. It was a positive and significant development. For Pakistan to remain alive to opportunities and to consolidate its position vis.a.vis Afghanistan, it has to remain abreast of, the developments by careful, sustained, detailed monitoring of Afghan developments both officially and unofficially, with more parliamentary attention being paid through informed debates in the assemblies. Areas where Pakistan can presently assist are medication .services to various Afghan organizations over the question of Russian POWs, assistance in economic reconstruction, etc.

Pakistan's efforts to secure a permanent recognition of the Durand Line should be pursued till the issue is

resolved. The Durand Line issue was raised by the leader of the opposition, Ms. Benazir Bhutto, during Professor Mujaddedi's first official visit to Pakistan, soon after he took over as interim afghan President. The Pakistani leaders suggested that Pakistan should move towards the "formalization" of the Durand Line, now, that a friendly Afghan government was installed in Kabul. The Pakistan media has noted that the Mujahideen stance on the border remained ambiguous. Even during tense periods of Pak-Afghan relations, it remained a porous border. Smuggling activities continued at all times and the seasonal migration of nomad groups took place regularly. While there is much in the case to establish an official formal border, the fact remains that border outposts have existed all along on both sides, suggesting some median line where the sovereignty of one country ends and the other's begins. The Pushtoonistan issue, kept alive by the Soviet Union and past, Afghan governments, is no longer central to afghan foreign policy. Contrary to most opinions, this study proposes the thesis that it was the massive afghan refugee exodus which established formally the existence of a Durand Line. Pakistan its part substantiated it by its laudable reticent role; at no stage did it unilaterally try to adjust what it recognizes as the Durand Line to its own advantage. While the present uncertainty in Kabul unfolds under its own momentum. Pakistan's Foreign Office should go into the minutiae of the issue, so that it is well prepared when the time comes to negotiate a formal end to a festering dispute. (22).

Iran, while sharing some situational similarities with Pakistan—for instance its alignment with the 7-party alliance on its soil, namely, the Hezb-e-Wahdat – has also taken initiatives which, while arising out of its own national interests, complement rather than contradict Pakistan's foreign policy objectives. Compared, with Pakistan, it offers greater continuity of its historical role in the area.

This in no way poses a competitive regional role, as is being suggested in the Western media. Iran's revolution has given it the cutting edge as it were, and greater note is taken of, its statements. In a recent visit to Indonesia, in May 1992, Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati spoke about the natural Iranian role in Central Asia because of its geographical contiguity and its old historical and cultural links. Iran offers Pakistan alternative access routes to Central Asia other than the more direct ones through Afghanistan, even though these are longer routes. Mujahideen groups based in Iran and Pakistan often in conflict with each other, have indulged in counter accusations, alleging direct involvement of these two host countries in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. It is imperative for both the Iranian and Pakistan governments to cooperate closely till the last Afghan refugee returns from their soil to his home land. This could be done through some joint governmental strategy to coordinate their responses over this specific issue, so as not to allow any misunderstandings to develop on the basis of religious sensitivities by some of their own political parties. There have been media speculations of the two countries being unwittingly drawn into the Persian-speaking versus the Pushtoon-speaking controversy.(23)

India, while not an immediate neighbour, lies in the immediate neighbourhood, and is greatly concerned with the emergence of what it sees as a vast "Islamic block" to its west, especially after the establishment of Central Asian states from where the original 'Islamic' invasions into India took place. Though Indian government spokesmen have continued to stress on traditional friendly relations between India and Afghanistan, the official media has noted with concern the fact that the new Afghan interim government, which took over in April 1992, "was trying to create an Islamic society". One immediate development was that the state-run Afghan TV ended a decades old, tradition of,

showing Indian movies on Thursday nights.(24) All-India Radio (AIR) has repeatedly broadcast the Indian government's official concern arising out of Afghan developments. It quoted a news report alleging the "heavy presence of afghan Muhjahideen on the Indo-Pak border along the line of control".(25) Another AIR commentary, however, expressed the view that transforming Afghanistan into an Islamic fundamentalist state would be difficult because the, "country's Islamic foundations are very weak and the people mostly believe in mysticism instead of the basic Islamic principles of Iran and Arab states". (26)

3. The Intricacies of Afghan Polices in the Period 1989-1992.

For the entire duration of the Afghan jehad against the Soviet Union, and amidst direct manifestations of concern by the UNO, the USA, the Western powers, the regional countries and various blocks, Afghan politics went ahead with its intricate inner tussles, independent of all external considerations. It used them where expediency dictated and ignored them where they went against perceived Afghan interests. The shifting alliances, which to outside observers seemed to reflect inconsistent unstable behaviour on the part of the Afghans, were ingrained responses to get the best out of the most adverse situation, sometimes for sheer survival. It was initially the, intra-Afghan struggle which provided a favourable ground situation for Soviet intrusion and subsequent invasion. Then, the Afghan-versus-Afghan confrontation form the next 14 years enabled the Soviet forces to remain entrenched and to conduct their devastating war strategies. Currently, it is the continuing Afghan tussle over power that has possibly killed a greater number of Afghans in the six months following the Peshawar Accord than in the preceding two years. The Afghan internecine war remained an ever-present phenomenon.

Where the vast refugee exodus took place, it took along with it the various features that characterized clan loyalties and kinship ties additionally, in recent decades, Afghan society has witnessed as its modernist phase the growth of associations reflecting group interests, which again mirrored the ingrained individualistic approach to balance social cleavage. Thus, in Pakistan when the massive exodus of Afghan refugees took place, there were initially 80 Resistance groups operating in Peshawar. Eventually by 1982, the Pakistan government was able to force this disunited Resistance to coalesce into seven major groups- the 'Ittehad'. This new denominational arrangement was not entirely representative of all the various Afghan groups, reflecting more the large groupings who followed leaders for their religious scholarship and associated status or inn shared experience as dissidents. Thus the Peshawar Alliance in itself became exclusivist in its membership on account of such followings. At the same time 'Pakistani officials, in charge of the wide-ranging Afghan operations discriminated inn military and other forms of assistance in favour of the more radical Islamic Resistance factions and cooperated in curtailing the activities of their more moderate traditional competitors. The Shi'ite parties and non-religious-oriented Afghan national parties were, in effect, excluded from the Peshawar (Ittehad) alliance (27) Arriving refugees had to become affiliated with one of these recognized resistance groups to qualify for aid. Hekmatyar's better organized Hezb-e-Islami managed to register the greater number of refugees and thus received 20-25 per cent of US supplied arms during the ate 1980's. Otherwise, observers of the period noted that Hekmatyar had a limited popular base. On the other hand, were the Resistance forces in Afghanistan engaged in constant warfare with the Soviet forces? Ahmed Shah Masood had 12,000 men under his direct command, and more than any other commander had

managed also to create a regional government infrastructure in areas under his control. But he was practically ignored. The repercussions of this period of Resistance politics are being felt today.

By 1988, the Peshawar Alliance took a more formal shape once the Geneva Accords were signed, even though vis-a-vis each other the constituent groups remained fractious. With prospects of a complete Soviet withdrawal by 19789, this fragmented Alliance formed the afghan Interim Government (AIG) under Pakistani pressure. What the Pakistan government hoped for was a broad-based arrangement likely to provide a friendly government in Afghanistan. An observation merits a recall;” Limited understanding of afghan traditions led Pakistan’s policy makers to believe that it would serve as a decision-making, conflict-resolving body, when, at best, it allowed for leaders; expression of views and ratification of decisions essentially already made..... belatedly the Pakistani realized that the AIG structure, because it was viewed as a Pakistani creation, would, always have a legitimacy problem. “(28) Without the inclusion of field commanders or the Iran-based Shi’ite resistance parties, the AIG could not claim to be truly representative. The Bhutto government’s short-lived tenure from December 1988 to August 1990,, was unable to devise fresh political approaches. The AIG effectively ended when, following an ongoing tussle between two of its components-Rabbani’s Jamiat-e-Islami and Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami, the latter walked out of it. (29)

The period 1990 to 1991, following the end of AIG, saw Resistance politics develop towards alliances. The Peshawar based Alliance led to the formalization of the Iran-based Shi’ite groups into Hezb-e-Wahdat. The media at large focused on the swift changes occurring in the Soviet Union, heading towards its collapse. With the emergence of the Central Asian states, the ethnic basis of

Afghan nationhood was strongly under scored. Against this background the year 1992 saw the, unfolding of momentous developments.

4. The Peshawar Accord and Related Developments.

The tough resistance against Mujahideen onslaughts put up by the Najibullah regime, and his survivability against coups, made Najibullah himself a factor to consider in the events shaping up. 1991 was marked by intensified efforts on the part of the United Nations, with special envoys to the Secretary General shuttling between New York and Tehran, Islamabad, Peshawar and Kabul, to bring about an agreement to end the internecine war in Afghanistan and to install an acceptable representative government.

The Benon Sevan Plan

In March 1992, special envoy Benon Sevan presented his formula which reportedly had the broad support of all major elements directly concerned, namely, the Najibullah regime, the Peshawar-based Alliance, the Tehran-based Alliance, and in the Pakistani and Iranian governments. The Benon Sevan formula envisaged the assembling in Vienna of 150 Afghan leaders representing all political and religious viewpoints, all ethnic groups, all tribal divisions, and former King Zahir Shah. These 150 notables would choose 35 representatives who would summon a Loya Jirga to decide on the shape, and composition of, a transitional government, which would conduct elections by early summer. The group was expected to convene by mid-April 1992 and elections to be held by the end of June, 1992 under UN auspices. This formula was endorsed by Pakistan, Iran, the Kabul regime, USA and Russia. Several rebel groups also expressed interest in participating but others denounced it as an

attempt to thwart the establishment of an Islamic state in Afghanistan.

The Benon Sevan formula, for the certainty it offered of prospects of peace almost within grasp, brought about a virtual avalanche of radical shifts in alignments, claims to representation and mini rebellions. It will require the perspective of time to see the interlink ages where they existed. A month away from the expected target date of the Vienna assembly, accusations and counter-accusations saw the emergence of yet newer alliance.

The focus shifted onto Najibullah. The man who had survived as the head of the Kabul government for six years, became central to political talks of determining the future course of events. Mujahideen Resistance leaders spent valuable time stressing their unwillingness to include Najibullah or any member of his government or former associates of the non-Islamic, communist parties. There was a shift in Pakistan's own policy, indicated by its willingness to talk to Najib. Commanders of the Resistance groups based in the north and belonging to several ethnic groups, with 40,000 well-equipped, battle hardened troops under their command, formed their own alliance to claim representation in any future government set-up. The "ethnic" generals named in this connection were General Dostum, an Uzbek (based in northern Jaujan province), General Momin (based in Haratan, the gateway to Central Asia) and Syed Mansoor (leader of the Ismaili Militia in the north). A report stated: "The ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, Ismailis and Hazaras and other minorities accuse Najibullah and his entire Pushtoon allies in the Kabul government of trying to establish Pushtoon dominance in Afghanistan prior to the peace talks". There were reports that Najibullah had opened private talks with Hekmatyar, also a Pushtoon, about a possible, alliance against the minorities. Najibullah and his allies denied these charges, and called it a sabotage of UN talks by fanning ethnic fears. More specifically, Najibullah

accused senior party members of the Watan Party, belonging to ethnic minorities, of stirring up troubles. Others blamed Najibullah for, doing the same to hold, on to power, even though in an interview he stated he would, abide by the, will of, the majority of the afghans.(30) The fact remained that the Watan Party (the renamed PDPA) headed by Najibullah had itself split into three factions. The hardliners wanted a tough line against both the rebel groups and their own party factions. One section stood for working out an alliance with the Mujahideen groups and their own rebels. The liberals supported the Benon Sevan formula and wanted a moderate, democratic state to come into being even if it meant the end of the Watan Party and Najibullah's exile. (31).

At the same time inter-factional warfare erupted within and outside Kabul. Anyone with a gun it seemed fought anyone else with a gun. New alliances sprang up, confounding confusion. The UN-sponsored peace plan came under severe criticism. Fat was issued by its opponents and against all those who favoured the Benon Sevan peace plan. Maulvi Khalis totally rejected the peace plan and accused Benon Sevan of wanting to undo the Islamic struggle of the Resistance and to hand over power to "anti-Mujahideen and pro-Western Afghans at the behest of USA and other enemy forces." It was announced that Professor Sayyaf's Ittehad-e-Islami and Maulvi Khalis's faction of the Hezb-e-Islami would adopt a single, unified political and military policy "to fight against regional and international plots". (32)

Hekmatyar demanded that Najibullah voluntarily hand over power to the Mujahideen, and that the Afghan people be allowed to decide their own future "rather than authorizing the UN and aliens to choose their government". He opposed any role whatsoever for Zahir Shah in any

transitional government.(33) Hekmatyar declared that his party would never agree to those who had either backed Najibullah's regime or were ever known to be supporters of former monarch Zahir Shah.

Power Vacuum After Najib



The next jolt came when Najibullah suddenly resigned on 16 April 1992, seemingly in response to the Mujahideen Resistance's demand that he surrender power. His resignation tendered to the UN was in exchange for safe passage abroad. As he tried to leave the country, he was not allowed to do so by his own armed groups who had turned against him. He then sought refuge in the premises of the UN building. Najib's decision took every one by surprise. His resignation found the Mujahideen groups, who had been clamouring for his ouster, totally unprepared to take over power.

Following Najibullah's resignation, military control of Kabul by the Mujahideen forces became the first imperative. Administratively, there was a total vacuum as thirty senior officers of the government and the military also resigned with Najibullah. A military council comprising four generals assumed power as the "Revolutionary Council", assuring allegiance to any configuration that took over power according to the will of the Afghan people. Before his sudden resignation, Najibullah had agreed to hand over power to UN-sponsored 15-member 'Neutral Council' for this pre-transitional phase, to be nominated by the Peshawar-based Mujahideen groups. However, differences among the latter delayed the setting up of this Council. Before his failed bid to flee the country, Najibullah reportedly pleaded with the Pakistan government to expedite the process so as to avoid a chaotic power struggle in Kabul, and said that he himself could not hold on under the circumstances. Most of the generals on

the Revolutionary Council were those who had either refused to obey Najib or had arrived at some sort of an understanding with the Mujahideen regional area commanders. New alignments led to strategically important areas and locations going out of the direct control of Kabul and into the control of the militia and armed units present within them, such as Mazar-e-Sharif the Bagram Airbase and Ghazni. Deals had been struck between units of such militias, Mujahideen and commanders of regional garrisons, quite independently of their respective central commands. The Revolutionary Council pledged to continue support to the UN peace plan and to defend national integrity.

This alliance forming was a factor of importance. In the unpredictable situation all over the country, quicksilver changes were underway. In the northern areas of Afghanistan and Kabul itself, a strategic arrangement was arrived at between the commanders of Jamiat-e-Islami and the Persian-speaking rebel military and militia units with anti-Najib sections of the ruling Watan Party as well as with some of the more moderate Mujahideen groups. The Council controlling Kabul would, naturally look to this new consensus as the one coalition to talk to especially since it was present within Afghanistan and was thus within reach.

Masood-Hakmatyar Rivalry

Another factor of importance had also become operational. Jamiat-e-Islami forces under Ahmed Shah Masood and Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami forces, bitter rivals since long, were then engaged in obstructing each other's efforts to reach Kabul first. Neither leader was at this stage inside Kabul. Masood was towards the north of Kabul, and Hekmatyar sat astride the Kabul-Jalalabad highway.

It was this intra-group rivalry and the absence of any wider consensus which set the scenario for a power

vacuum to be filled. Noting that peace prospects seemed foredoomed, observers of these developments stated that peace in Afghanistan could only be predicated on a grand consensus among the most divergent and mutually exclusive sections of society, including all parties without exception, otherwise Afghanistan would divide along ethno-sectarian lines under numerous warlords. (34) The only ray of hope according to other pinions, was the UN peace plan, otherwise a civil war would threaten national integrity. It may be recalled that Iran and Pakistan had fully backed the UN peace plan. Fears were also expressed that a sudden collapse of the Kabul administration and the disintegration of its army, in view of the Mujahideen groups' unwillingness to deal with what they considered were remnants of the Soviet invasion, would create a counter-productive political vacuum. Pakistan too was addressed for ensuring that Afghanistan's fragmentation did not take place, even if it meant calling an emergency session of the Security Council and asking for the stationing of a UN peace-keeping force.(35)

Pakistani observers of the Afghan scene held the Afghan Mujahideen groups responsible for the ferocious divisions among them, and criticized the hardliners for thwarting the UN peace efforts. They warned against elements on both sides of the border—"the self-styled standard-bearers of Islam"—bent on misguiding the Afghan people. They also warned the Pakistan government to steer clear of the "plots" of those very groups which it had previously pampered and which were no longer in a mood to cooperate. It was advised to deal strongly with the more recalcitrant of the dissidents, and warned against potential dangers because "far too much of arms and ammunitions were in irresponsible hands." (36)

Also of concern was the fate of the associates of the former regime and the role the United Nations could and ought to play in the prevailing confusion. Nothing that the

genuine good of Afghanistan would lie best in the hands of moderates, an editorial opinion observed that these moderate elements had themselves become targets of, the hardliners, both "the remnants of Najib and the cohorts of the mullahs. Neither mean well for the people, being insatiably hungry for power." There were proposals that an effective general amnesty would ensure speedy repatriation of, refugees which was an essential precondition for the election of a genuinely representative government.(37) Hekmatyar is on record as saying that in so far as amnesty for Najibullah was concerned. "It is not our job to put conditions for the inclusion or exclusion of a certain party from the electoral process. It is upto the people to accept or reject a party.(38)

On 18 April 1992, a Foreign Office spokesman confirmed newspaper reports that Dr. Najibullah had sought refuge and was lodged in the premises of, the United Nations building, and that Kabul was under the control of, the former Afghan Chief of the army Staff, General Nabi Azimi. The Pakistani official position was that bloodshed must be avoided in Afghanistan. It fully supported its territorial integrity and stood for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power to a council enjoying the support of Afghan Mujahideen. The Pakistan government was also engaged in conducting negotiations with the Peshawar-based Mujahideen organizations to bring about conditions conducive to a speedy consensus over some sort of a body to take over the Kabul administration. The point that needs to be stressed is that Pakistan was not doing this in isolation, but in coordination with Benon Sevan and the Iranian government, as well as the Saudi government. Special Iranian emissary, Ambassador Mir Mehmud Mousavi, was present in Islamabad for negotiations during this critical juncture.

Hekmatyar's U.Turn.

The notable development of this period was the visible, U-turn Hekmatyar seemed to take. He not only adopted a milder stance on the issue of a general amnesty, but also appeared to be more amenable to the proposed peace plans-even though every time he made a concession, it was generally with attached conditions! Though he enjoyed the full support of the Pakistani Jamaat, representing the hard line approach in Pakistan it had become clear that this approach itself had no takers left especially since the Mujahideen groups had begun a power struggle amongst themselves, thus irreparably diffusing the focus of unity. There was a shift in Islamabad's earlier afghan policies it gave full backing to the UN peace formula. The Pakistani press had earlier reported that certain officials had carried out operations independently, contrary to the official policy of restraint. The shift in Pakistan's posture in turn necessitated a review by the Mujahideen groups of their own strategies-at least in the short term-in view of international pressure and widespread support for a political settlement in the light of UN peace efforts. Even the Saudis counseled peace moves. The Saudi intelligence chief, Prime Turki al-faisal visited Peshawar on 9 April 1992 and met with the Mujahideen leaders. The Mujahideen leaders knew that whenever the next phase of settling down began, they would, require some level of Saudi financial assistance. No less in importance was the factor of refugees, particularly those who had lived for fourteen years in refugee camp conditions and who were articulate in demanding a broad-based government able to look after their interests as well.

Another factor shaping up was the Masood-Hekmatyar confrontation. Shortly before the signing of the Peshawar Accord, around 18 April 1992 it was reported that Hekmatyar had told the Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami chief (unilaterally conducting his own mediation efforts) that he

would not allow Ahmed Shah Masood's forces to pass through Hezb controlled areas. Reportedly, Commander Masood sought Qazi Husain's intervention and, the Jamaat chief was reported to have made efforts to help remove the differences. This confrontation seemed to have grown initially around the issue of, which group be entrusted with the security of Kabul.(40) It eventually enlarged into which group would control Kabul. Hekmatyar once again donned his hard-line armor. Events in Kabul, according to him, were a conspiracy to sabotage Hezb-e-Islami plans. He criticized Generals Nabi Azimi and Asif Dilawar of the Army Council in control of the Kabul administration for showing partisanship by allowing the airlifting of troops of a particular Mujahideen group....from the north to prevent the fall of Kabul city to the Mujahideen of his party. He charged that the same generals had also held negotiate Pakistan.(41)

It was generally considered that it was Commander Masood who held the key to Kabul's fate. The Army Council in control was willing to negotiate with him in preference to Hakmatyar. Throughout the, jihad, Masood had displayed no vengeful streaks or actions. His role, other than ensuring law and order, did not suggest any power ambitions on his part. He had even sent a wireless message to Peshawar to urge the Mujahideen leaders to reach an agreement soon.(42)

On April 19 news came of an Islamic Jihad coalition having been formed in Kabul, headed by Ahmed Shah Masood who had reached the outskirts of Kabul. Important negotiations were underway simultaneously in many areas but world attention was caught by those taking place in Peshawar amongst the Mujahideen leaders, and between Ahmad Shah Masood and foreign minister Abdul Wakil on the outskirts of Kabul. Observers saw no linkage between the two, but they did wonder at Masood's seemingly independent initiatives. Wakil told foreign

journalists that they would not enter the city until a Mujahideen government was in control there. The world media was quick to note that in this changing pattern of power a majority of the northern forces deployed outside Kabul were not from the dominant Pushtoon ethnic community. So a Pushtoon counter-reaction' was expected. Reports of "minor skirmishes" were normally between the non-Pushtoon Jamiat to which Masood belonged and the Hezb-e-led groups which were predominantly Pushtoon. Gulbaddin Hekmatyar had reportedly made an unscheduled dash to Afghanistan on April 18, leaving the crucial peace talks underway in Peshawar, in a bid to stake his claims and establish areas under his control in the fast developing situation in Kabul. At the same time the Hezb had also begun accusing Masood's men of joining hands with the Kabul administration so as to undermine the Mujahideen struggle. Masood's forces were also joined by defecting militia commanders-Abdul Rashid Dostum, Sayyed Jaffar Naderi and General Abdul Momin, forming a powerful military nucleus. It was the same group that had earlier, in January 1992, mutinied against Najibullah this Masood, become the "nerve centre" of the power struggle.

Meanwhile, the Army Council in Kabul freed a number of prisoner, including political detainees, such as the leading party and military leaders who had staged as unsuccessful coup against Najibullah in March 1990, led by the former Defence Minister Shah Nawaz Tanai.(43) Hekmatyar's Hezb had also managed to free some of its imprisoned activist from a jail where some leading figures had been imprisoned form years. Kabul-based diplomats feared that these developments, all hinting at greater confrontation, had rendered the UN formula irrelevant.

Independent analysts pointed to the sea change that had occurred within a week and stated that Afghanistan had now entered an unpredictable phase. There appeared to be only two options-direct negotiations based on flexible

compromises or a prolonged factional war, of which the latter seemed more certain. At this stage of unfolding events, Kabul was divided into four parts, each under the control of a different ethnic military command. As one observer noted in hind sight, this stage of affairs had been reached because of the lack of direct communication among the parties involved in the Afghanistan issue, including the governments of Pakistan and Iran, with the rulers of Kabul.” (44) The western media also pointed to another factor-the emergence of the newly independent Central Asian states, who had also built up contacts with rebels especially in northern Afghanistan. And the problem was further complicated by the fact that “thanks to the superpowers, which learned nothing and achieved nothing, the country was armed as never before”. (45)

Accord Talks Begin.

Talks began in Peshawar between the Pakistan government, and the Mujahideen Resistance leaders against this background. The Afghan side included the following leaders: NIFA chief, Pir Sayed Ahmad Gilani; Jamiat-e-Islamii chief, Professor Burhanuddinn Rabbani; Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's, deputy Engineer Qutabuddin Hilal, represented the Hezb-e-Islami faction; son of Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, Dr. Najibullah; deputy leader of Ittehad-e-Islami, Commander Musa; Qazi Mohammad Amin Waqad; Shura-e-Etalaf chief, Anatullah Maohsini and Hezb-e-Wahdat spokesman, Javed. Four leaders were absent, being represented only by their spokesman, Prof Mujaddedi, Prof. Sayyaf, Maulvi Mohammadi and Maulvi Younas Khalis, in spite of their presence in and near Peshawar,, did not attend the meeting. This was a significant signal of their independence of action. Though media opinion saw some measure of conflict between Masood's Islamic Jihad Council announced two days previously from Kabul and the proposed Afghan

Mujahideen Council, what they missed was that the Afghans were now dealing with their differences quite independently of any external counsel. The immediate interest of Pakistan and Iran lay in being properly aligned with the developments taking shape, without being embroiled in the conflict. At this stage, Pakistan announced that it would cooperate with the UN in trying for a safe passage for, Najib out of Afghanistan.

Non-Pushtoons in charge.

The Peshawar Accord, even as it emerged as a consensus agreement out of a tough contention for power, led to instant surfacing of further differences. On an immediate basis, the major development that it shared in was a transitional arrangement was in the hands of non-Pushtoons. Najibullah's resignation and his subsequent refuge in the UN premises was accompanied by the killings of some of his prominent associates. It was specifically noted by the news reporters that the killings of these Pushtoons had been at the hands of the non-Pushtoon officers of the erstwhile Watan Party. Even in the Revolutionary Council, which overthrew Najib, and was in control of Kabul, awaiting the outcome of the talks in Peshawar, the top positions were in the hands of the Persian-speaking non-Pushtoons. This was a novel factor in the light of the recent history of Afghanistan in which for the preceding two and a half centuries, power holding authorities in Kabul and the provinces had been variations of Pushtoon configurations.

Afghan sources based in Peshawar speculated that it was Babrak Karmal, a non-Pushtoon, who was behind all these events leading to the ouster of Najibullah and the subsequent onslaught against the Pushtoon officers of the Afghan army. They accused him of trying to divide the country along ethnic-linguistic lines and thus to take

revenge from the Pushtoon-dominated Khalq, which had earlier been behind his own downfall. (48)

In the three days previous to the signing of the Peshawar Accord, it was reported that Pushtoon governors of the former regime, in some Pushtoon-dominated areas, had sided with the Pushtoon Mujahideen belonging to the Hakmatyar and Khalis factions of the Hezb, against their former associates in Kabul whose ethnic alliances were with the Tajik, Masood. In Peshawar, the Afghan Mujahideen sources alleged that the USA and other Western countries were conspiring to bring Masood into power through the backdoor. Their new world order, they said, espoused the disintegration of Afghanistan to save the newly established Central Asian states from what they perceived to be the increasing wave of an Afghan style Islamic fundamentalism. (49)

Pakistan's neighbour status, as well as its fourteen-year sanctuary role, itself stood threatened by this evolving scenario, since there was an entire history of a "Pushtoonist" issue in its relations with Afghanistan. Moreover, any further violence on the "Pushtoon/non-Pushtoon" lines was likely to arouse Pushtoon sentiments in its provinces of Balochistan and the NWFP, quite independent of the earlier echoes of this issue within its internal politics. The media cautioned that "Islamabad must at all costs retain its neutral position between the infighting Mujahideen that it had sheltered in Pakistan for so long. Since Afghanistan has a seat in the General Assembly and the next agreed government has to occupy it, the United Nations is still the best intermediary for the formulation of the government in accordance with the wishes of the Afghan nation," (50) Observers of the Afghan scene warned against the consequences of allowing yet more circulation of arms, drugs and refugees. Media critics blamed the government for delay in ensuring the full implementation of the Benon Seven formula and for

ignoring signals sent by Najib shortly before his resignation for a quick agreement over some sort of a transitional body to take over the Kabul administration. The Pakistan media, by and large, warned its government against getting involved in the growing sectarianism. For Pakistan's own integrity it was important to ensure the survival of Afghanistan as a multi-national state by not deviating from the UN formula.(51)

On 27 April 1992, a statement issued by a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman reported that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had successfully mediated a ceasefire agreement between Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah Masood, via telephone persuasions, and urged upon the Mujahideen parties to promote their peace talks through timely actions. All Mujahideen parties had reportedly agreed to bring hostilities to an immediate end. The Foreign office spokesman also stated that the Peshawar Accord had received further backing from Hekmatyar's Hezb, as well as from the Iran-based seven-party alliance, the Hezb-e-Wahdat. Meanwhile, in Peshawar, the Interim Council which had been established under the provisions of the Peshawar Accord decided to send a five-member delegation headed by interim President, Professor Mujaddedi, to take over power in Kabul. By the end of April 1992, they were still not in Kabul, because Hekmatyar, from his stronghold outside the city, had threatened to shoot down any aircraft landing at Kabul airport (which was in the control of Masood's force, thus reiterating his earlier condemnation of the Interim Council as "an exercise in futility". The situation was tense enough for the Pakistan government to put its own air force on alert. Professor Mujaddedi's entourage had to go by road, reaching Kabul on 1 May 1992.

Professor Mujaddedi's first announcements included his government's offer of general amnesty for all troops and other personnel of the former regime. This

ostensibly covered the controversial figure of Najibullah himself, and thus turned into a highly contentious issue even though Professor Mujaddedi's pronouncement had not mentioned Najib's name specifically. It was immediately exploited as an issue by all those who stood in opposition to the Interim Council, large because they had been left out of it. Najibullah's fate thus got tied up with this politics of confrontation. While announcing his cabinet, Professor Mujaddedi named Ahmed Shah Masood as the Defence Minister, a development which did not go down well with Hekmatyar.

Meanwhile, Hekmatyar had forwarded three conditions for honouring the ceasefire agreement he had temporarily agreed to. He demanded that all militia units be expelled from Kabul. This, in effect, meant the non-Pushtoon units, particularly the Uzbek militia under General Dostum's command. He urged that all Afghan forces be screened and placed under the direct control of the Mujahideen government, and that the entire responsibility of protection and security of Kabul city be handed over to the joint command of the Mujahideen. All these conditions amounted to a reduction of Masood's influence.

Representatives of the important Mujahideen groups appeared on Pakistan Television to announce their support to the Accord and the ceasefire agreement. Representatives of the Iran-based groups also appeared on TV and endorsed the agreement.⁽⁵²⁾ Later, Professor Rabbani was to appear on the screen to state that the ceasefire agreement had been reached unconditionally.

Mujaddedi in Kabul.

When Professor Mujaddedi's entourage reached Kabul on 1 May 1992, the ground realities already stood exposed, which would dominate his own two month tenure, and well beyond the six-month period envisaged under the

Peshawar Accord Difference armed and militia groups controlled different parts of the city, independent of the larger Masood-Hekmatyar confrontation, with the former forces of Najibullah fighting on both sides! Direct clashes followed by ceasefires, incurring heavy human casualties, because a regular pattern between the known and unknown armed contenders. (53) The role of the United Nations became a controversial issue among the Afghan groups, while it received full backing from the governments of Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Benon Sevan continued his lonely shuttles from trouble spot to trouble spot, meeting all personalities who mattered, including General Dostum in his Mazar-e-Sharif headquarters. (54) Secretary General Boutros Ghali himself arrived in Teheran and later flew to Islamabad in an effort to prevent the situation from worsening. External factors of immediate importance to Afghanistan were Pakistan, Iran and Central Asian states, particularly in the light of its own growing Pushtoon-speaking versus Persian-speaking confrontation, leading to speculation that linguistic and ethnic considerations were affecting the foreign policy moves of these neighbouring countries. For instance, one of the leaders of the Iran-based Hizb-e-Wahdat, Abdul Haq Shafaq met the UN Secretary General in Teheran and insisted that his organization be given a role on the basis of population and influence. (55)

Hekmatyar's Hezb, on other hand, rejected the Council's authority because "Small parties were given by ministries". (56) Hekmatyar and his various spokesman were persistent in their criticism of an international conspiracy against the establishment of an Islamic government. They maintained that along with some neighbors. Western countries had encouraged Masood to go to coalition with remnants of the Najib regime. They consistently rejected the composition of the interim Council's "put together in a hurry by foreign intelligence service in the order to sabotage the peaceful transfer of

power". Calling the alliance in Kabul a "communist coalition", Hebz spokesman asserted that their party was bound to fight against communism, and punish persons like Dostum and Najibullah who had massacred hundreds of peoples. Interesting episodes happened abroad showing hoe confused the afghan themselves were. The afghan Embassy in Delhi announced its intelligence to Ahmed Shah Masood, on the reasoning that his forced controlled the Foreign Ministry! (57) Amongst the non-Mujahideen sections there was reportedly a greater leaning towards Masood.

Deepening Hostilities

Prof. Mujahideen's arrival in Kabul and his installation in the presidential palace for two months saw the deepening of hostilities. Law and order in Kabul was non-existent. There was no administration. Yet Kabul radio reported that delegations from various parts of the country visited Kabul and met with Pro. Mujahideen, Pro. Rubbani, Pir Gilani and Ahmed Shah Masood. Invariably, the delegation's composition was described as consisting "commanders, ulema and elders" of that area. Their choice of which leaders to call upon strongly suggested their own leanings. What seemed their outside world to be rather a fluid state of Affairs was, from the afghan point of view, a period when afghan leaders assessed their own range of influence and formed re-alignments and strategies for a days ahead. Mujahideen's tenure ended on schedule and towards the end of June 1992, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani took over his four-month tenure as the head of the leadership Council and the Transitional Government, with the limited objective of holding elections and transferring power to the next "transitional" phase. The Leadership Council was in effect the continuation of representation accorded to various Mujahideen groups, as per the Peshawar Accord's provision.

Mujaddedei's brief tenure saw his administration battling with a worsening law and order situation. There was utter confusion as to which armed militant groups came under which command. A Defense Ministry broadcast ordered troops who had earlier been the regular units to join Mujahideen groups and reports on duty by May 16. All those who failed to comply would be dealt with under 'Islamic Shariah law'.⁽⁵⁸⁾ Around the same time the role of journal Dostum's Uzbek Militia became a factor of importance. In April, they had reportedly been involved in widespread looting and Kabul residents said to be apprehensive, with posts being manned by youthful Mujahideen.

The other major issue related to the changes the new 'Islamic government was including'. A news broadcast, quoting a government official describing the return to normalcy, said: "Even women had come to bazaars because of an announcement of Pir Sahib who has observed that the women also have the right to take part in political and social fields within an Islamic framework. Students can study in co-education but within an Islamic framework." ⁽⁵⁹⁾

Hezb-e-Wahadat which was in control of important section of Kabul city and much of the central provinces of Afghanistan, continued to pressurise the new administration to give a fair share of power to ethnic minority groups. Since no reliable census had been undertaken in Afghanistan for many years, the figures of the ethnic make-up varied according to different groups. Hezb-e-Wahadat's claim was that the Shi'ites constituted 25 per cent of the total population, mostly the Hazaras of the Hazarajat area. The Hezb-e-Wahadat demanded a federal system of government which could give formal recognition to the growing ethnic consciousness of minority groups, who had contributed significantly to the success of the jihad.⁽⁶⁰⁾ Radio Kabul announced that

under the leadership of the Islamic government of Afghanistan, "all afghans – Pushtoons, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks or Pashias- will live like brothers in a pride-worthy manner. They will solve their problems through intra-afghan dialogue and understanding, keeping in view the national interests of their country".(61)

Mujahideen chaired a jihad Council meeting in which it was decided that a high command of police and other internal security units be re-activated, new identity cards issued and prior approval of the jihad Council sought for all issues of national importance. Significant was the expectation that all members will attend all meetings of the jihad Council, "or decision will be taken without them and would be final." (62) radio Kabul's major theme was the national and international significance of the Islamic government taking over from the "Soviet-installed communist regime" which had caused "irreparable losses to the social and economic structure of Islamic Afghanistan. The infidel regime put everything of the transform the afghan society into a communist society..... The afghan Muslims' unprecedented sacrifices to make the holy war against the communist infields was a great success. The communist black era has come to an end...." (63)

The delegation of foreign mission who called on professor Mujahideen were mostly those from Islamic countries offering solidarity and assistance. Of significance, for a future role to be played by them, were the immediate reactions of India and Russia. On 15 May 1992, an Indian foreign Ministry spokesman had announced that India would supply foodstuffs to Kabul by asking Kazakhstan to re-route the food supplies meant for India to Kabul and that Delhi would pay for them. India's good relation would continue as well as economic aid. (64) All-India radio also reported social developments within Kabul reflecting its concern. It noted that the decades-old "tradition of Thursday night Indian movies had ended on the state-run

television, women had been asked to be purdah, alcohol had been banned and government employees to pray at midday". (65)

Jamiat-e-Islami spokesman. Dr, Najibullah Lafrai, confirmed as much in a press conference that he held in Peshawar during a visit. He recounted the "Islamic steps" taken upto that point of time, which include a decree for observing Islamic "hijab", ban on liquor, and ban on Watan party, and removal of anti-Islamic books from libraries. It was also decided that all members of the ruling Leadership council would address Juma congratulations at Al-Fatah Mosque in Kabul, 8th Saur was declared Independence Day and 14th Saur was to be observed as martyrs' day. A commission was established to formulate institution were re-opened. The Dsotum militia forces were merged into the 51st Division of the Afghan armed forces.

Maulvi Younas Khalis, addressing a huge gathering of Afghans, reiterated support to the Islamic government, and described the conflicts which had erupted in the Mujahideen groups as a conspiracy hatched by the enemies of Islam. He accused Iran of interfering in the "religious affairs" of the Afghans through its support to Shia Mujahideen groups. (66)

The Russian Foreign Minister visited Kabul amidst this official propaganda against "Soviet infidels". The importance of this visit was reported by the international media. The assessments were that the Russians wanted to continue friendly relations with any new government in Kabul, as Afghanistan continued to be of importance to Moscow, where the policy of expansionism no longer existed. As the legal successor to the Soviet Union. Russia felt morally and legally bound to help in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and pay "war reparations". There was also the major issue of the return of Russian POWs kept in various Afghan camps. (67)

Najibullah's fate had also become a major divisive issue. In an interview given to an Indian television programme, Prof. Mujaddedi said that Dr. Najibullah should be included in the general amnesty. Professor Rabbani, on the other hand, felt he should be tried as a traitor. The fact remained that Najibullah too had suffered shattering personal losses, with more than a hundred members of his clan being killed during the 'jihad'. Mujaddedi's stress was that since Najibullah, too, had forgiven all those responsible for these killings, the general amnesty should be extended to him also. Rabbani, on the other hand insisted that some limited number be brought to trial, including Najibullah, and also demanded that the UN should not interfere in the matter. (68)

Maulvi Khalis was adamant in his opposition to any form of Russian assistance, and demanded that Prof. Mujaddedi send back the assistance that the Russian Foreign Minister had brought with him. Referring to the war crimes perpetrated on the Afghan nation, he asked how could Moscow be considered a friend. (69)

Rabbani Talks Over

On assumption of power, President Rabbani's immediate actions included the setting up of a commission for holding elections, by convening the widest possible representation of Afghan commanders, ulema, intellectuals, elders and anyone else who held a representative status. He appointed Syed Noorullah Emad, of his own Jamiat-e-Islami, as its chairman. His job consisted in sending out delegations, each headed by a judge, to all nooks and corners of the country to meet notables and bring back a list of delegates for the proposed grand gathering to be eventually held in Kabul for selecting representatives who would then hold free and fair elections.

This process came up against immediate problems. With millions of refugees yet to be repatriated, it posed the problem of how the delegates were to be chosen and on what population basis. The latest census in this connection was the one held by the UN in 1987. This was proposed as the basis but failed to muster unanimous support. The convening of the grand gathering invited further controversy over its terminology. The proposed "Shoora-e-Afghan" improvisation. There were demands for convening the more traditional Afghan Loya Jirga. This Shoora versus jirga issue deepened as Rabbani's four-month tenure drew to a close towards the end of October 1992. It must be said to his credit that he ensured that the commission's delegations did go out in various directions. However, genuine difficulties hindered their progress, including difficulties of communications. The result was that as Rabbani's tenure came to its end on 28 October 1992, the grand gathering had not been convened and elections of delegates for the next phase remained as distant as before. The infighting had continued. Realignments had taken place. Hekmatyar's opposition to Masood now extended to rivalry with Professor Rabbani as well, whose authority and actions he had refused to accept all along.

Rabbani, however, had managed to build up sufficient credibility, so that when his four-month tenure ended, the Leadership Council held an extraordinary meeting in Kabul on 31 October 1992, and approved an extension of 435 days in his tenure. Rabbani's mandate was to convene the proposed gathering by 15 December 1992, failing which, power would be transferred to the Leadership Council to elect a new President. (70) The meeting was attended by Pir Sayed Ahmed Gilani (National Islamic Front), Professor Abdur Rab Rasool Sayyaf (Ittehad-e-Islami), Anatullah Fazil (representative of Hezb-e-Wahdat), Prof. Sibghatullah Mujaddedi (National Salvation Front), and Maulvi Mohammad Nabi

Mohammadi (Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami). Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami also had a representative. (Hekmatyar had indicated his willingness to attend only if the meeting was held outside Kabul). Maulvi Khalis's Hezb did not participate because according to him the Leadership Council did not follow its own principles. He also regretted that the Council had recently granted membership to two members of the Harkat-e-Islami and the Hezb-e-Wahdat without taking other members into confidence. (Both are Shia organizations).

Rabbani under Fire.

There was no dearth of criticism against Rabbani's failure to carry out his task. The Hezb -e-Islami criticized him through a spokesman for having spent "four months, in vain and completely failed in all his programmes". Moreover, he did not honour his commitments to the Leadership Council with regard to the pullout of the militia and removal of communists, formation of the Ahle-Hal-o-Aqd Shoora, setting up of a commission for the formation of an Islamic army and holding of meetings of the Leadership Council: "Unfortunately, he did not succeed in accomplishing his task during four months. [he] should have convened the meeting of the Leadership Council during the past two days without any delay, but unfortunately he did not do so because either Professor Rabbani is not interested in it or he wants to extend his rule in one way or the other.(71)

The more substantive criticism was on the question of statistics. Repatriation had not been done in many areas. Even the accuracy of the UN census report was questioned since it, too, was conducted during wartime and therefore could not possibly be comprehensive. Rabbani's critics, with some justification, questioned the utility of delegations going out to conduct their surveys in "woleswalis" (wards) when in some areas people had not

been given identity card, and in other areas they had as many as four each" Rabbani's proposals, given out on 26 October 1992 were that a district of 30,000 people would be eligible to have two delegates, with a provision for one more delegate if there was a minimum extra population of 18,000. A sub-district of 15,000 would be eligible for one delegate. He proposed that the 1987 UN census be used as the basis of population figures, and the UN monitor the elections of the members to the Shoorā. He recommended that the new President be allowed to select five per cent of the delegates and the Leadership Council fifteen per cent. (72) This came in for strong condemnation by the Hezb as another way of extending his tenure.

There was continued criticism of the suggested Hal-o-AQD Shoorā. Most people, it was argued, were not even familiar with this name. The Loya Jirga, as an afghan institution, was preferable because the majority of the afghan demanded it.

UNHCR sources, meanwhile, reported that about 1.3 million refugees had returned to the Khost, Ningarhar and Kunar areas. First a few family members returned, reconstructed the damaged homes and then brought the rest of there families, with UN providing cash and foodstuff. UN teams were busy in mine clearing, having completed it in Kunar province. The UN teams were also assisting in the restoration of the agricultural system and construction of roads the Ningarhar areas. There were problems: for instance, in the absence of the refugees, lands in some areas had been sold off. There were also flickering rays of hope. In Jalalabad, life was fast normalizing under the charismatic Governor Haji Abdul Qadir Khan, heading a functioning multi-party Shoorā, with Hezb-e-Islamic (Khalis) comprising 25 percent Ittehad-e-Islami 19 percent, and the remainder constituted by smaller groups. (73)

Hekmetyar Flexes His Muscles

Rabbani began his extended tenure amid grave apprehension whether the Shoora would infect be Convened, and mounting criticism over his suggestion. The new factor was that the northern areas demanded more representation. By October 30, a fresh exchange of fire broke out between the Masood and Hekmetyar forces. As one observer lamented, the two had both a great constructive and destructive potential. A greater understanding between the two could have brought the Tajiks and Pushtons together, something that Afghanistan desperately needed. The fiery Tajiks and Uzbeks had a well organized military forces estimated at 70, 000. Around this time there were report of General Dostum un-official visit to Pakistan and then onwards to Saudi Arabia. (74) Throughout these developments, Pakistan was in the forefront of media attention for its speculated, actual, potential or planned rules. Some of it arose out of the comings and goings of various Mujahideen leaders either to Peshawar and Islamabad or via Islamabad to other countries. On October 30, clashes broke out between the supporters of Hekmetyar and Rabbani, leaving 2300 dead in a single offensive, describe as the highest single consaulty toll during the entire jihad. It was reported that Moulvi Nabi Mohammadi, Professor Sayyaf and Maulvi Khalis had joined hands with Hekmetyar. Khalis had at once stage criticized both Hekmetyar and Rabbani for pursuing polices contrary to afghan traditions and interests, and now he found himself in alliance with one against the other. Meanwhile, a fresh influx of refugees arrived in Peshawar, this time mostly from Kabul and consisting of professionals, so vitally needed for the reconstruction of their war-ravaged country. (75)

Professor Rabbani's extended tenure of 45 days remained precarious and was marked by growing differences over the shape of Hal-0-AQD Shoora. Afghans

interviewed by the media expressed skepticism over the possibility of any Shoora or jirga convened, given the ongoing conflicts between the Masood and Hekmatyar, and the fact of approaching winter, which would make communication difficult. Nor was there any apparent consensus over a presidential candidate unanimously selected, or possible candidates to contest elections. At leadership Council meetings, some important leader or the other was generally missing. Hekmatyar remained absent consistently, though some representative of his was always present to register the Hezb's dissident position over some point or the other. At the military level the Hezb objectives were to capture key routes so as to be in a position to control food and fuel supplies.(76) this led to intermittent conflicts, followed by ceasefires. Hekmatyar's opposition to extended to include Dostum as well. Dostum had meanwhile established his own party- the jumbish-e-Milli-Islami Afghanistan – abroad-based movement consisting of political and military representatives entirely of the northern areas. Dostum demanded a seat for himself on the leadership Council and adequate representation in the jihad Council. Mujahideen was no of his supporters on this particular point.(77) Towards the end of the November 1992 Rabbani announced his candidature for the afghan presidency.

December 1992 was significant as it marked the formal end of the Peshawar 'Accord, ushering in portentous developments. The events seem to follow some distinct patterns. A fortnight before the end of Professor Rabbani's extended tenure, the forces of Hekmatyar, General Dostum and other militias entrenched in different parts of Kabul city, were all involved in separate battles against the Defence Ministry forces under Masood. Their efforts were to achieve as many of their objectives through a show of force as was possible, so as to be in a better bargaining position. The efforts of the Rabbani administration were to

ensure that the Shoora be held at any cost. In view of winter conditions, the Defence Ministry had announced that it would airlift the Shoora delegates from different parts of the country. The Leadership Council remained at loggerheads and utterly divided over the selection of candidates, even as almost everybody criticized Rabbani's announcement of himself as candidate on. Grounds that he had set the stage to ensure his continuation in power.

Further complications were added to the already complex situation. A close aide of Hekmatyar threatened that his group would execute prisoners of war from the former Soviet Union if Moscow did not stop printing money for the Afghan government. The Hezb contended that without a gold reserve to back up the currency, this, too, was a conspiracy to destabilize Afghanistan's already shattered economy. He also accused the interim government of using the money for military purposes and political payments, buying loyalties of commanders for the forthcoming council elections. The majority of the Russian POWs were said to be in Hezb's hands. The Russian Embassy in Islamabad issued an immediate statement appealing to the UNO and other states to help guarantee the safety of their POWs. (The Russian Embassy in Kabul, which also represented the interests of the CIS, had evacuated its personnel after the Hezb's August offensive, which had resulted in heavy casualties.) (78).

General Dostum's bid for power was the next major factor of tension. He airlifted fresh militia units from his well organized base at Mazar-i-Sharif who occupied strategic points around the capital. His increasing role as power broker had become evident at all crucial stages-the ousting of Najibullah, the mobilization of his forces in Kabul at the fag end of Mujaddedi's two-month tenure, signaling that he had to go. A week before the end of Rabbani extended tenure he took measures to reinforce his position and place his demands. It was not clear who

supported Rabbani at this stage and who did not. There were speculations that Pir Sayed Ahmed Gilani had joined forces with Dostum and the Hezb-e-Wahdat against Rabbani. Dostum's fresh manoeuvres led three parties to issue a joint communiqué in Rabbani's support. These were Professor Sayyaf Ittehad-e-Islami, Maulvi Khalis's Hezb, and Maulvi Mohammadi's Harkat-i-Inqilab-e-Islami with their common opposition to any undue Shia influence in any Afghan government. (79)

Rabbani Convenes Shoora

Rabbani also announced that he would relinquish power only if the Leadership Council agreed to a successor. He also insisted that his government would hold the Shoora as promised to elect his successor. (80) Observers forecast that most Mujahideen parties and the bulk of the Afghan population were unlikely to accept the verdict of the Shoora, even as it was being convened. A day after his tenure ended, President Rabbani, still in power, issued a statement that he would transfer power only to a council of elected national representatives. He refused to answer questions as to why he was not handing power back to the Leadership Council. The fractious leaders of the Leadership Council, while supporting the Shoora in principle, alleged that Rabbani had bribed delegates. Rabbani announced that Shoora members from Kandhar, Badghis, Ghor, Farah, Paktia, Paktika, Logar, Kunduz, Takhar, Partwan, Kerpisa, Urozgan, Zabul, Herat, Helmand and Nimroz provinces had already been flowing in, and some more from other areas would follow. (81) His opponents demanded that he step down immediately and hand over power to Vice President Maulvi Nabi Mohammadi to avoid a showdown and a political vacuum. They further suggested that Maulvi Mohammadi convene the Shoora within a month and elect the new President. Meanwhile seven Jihad groups issued a joint statement asking the Leadership Council to delay the

Shoora session. These were: Hezb-e-Wahdat, Harkat-e-Islami, Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami, Hezb-e-Islami (Khalis), National Salvation Front, and Hezb-e-Mahaz-e-Milli. (82)

The United Nations special representative, Mr. Sotiros Mousouris, having taken over from Benon Sevan, issued a statement which said that the Interim Afghan government had invited the UN as observer to the Shoora proceedings, as well as for financial assistance. Donor countries, according to this statement, were willing to help out with funds provided the Shoora was representative in character. The UN was anxious to avoid getting involved in further controversy, in view of the earlier debacle when its peace plan was sabotaged. The UN's cautious statement stressed that the Shoora must have the support of the entire Afghan people, representing all segments regardless of religion, gender, ethnicity or language. (83)

On 19 December 1992, Radio Kabul announced that 1000 Shoora members met and began their deliberations in Kabul amidst tight security measures. Shoora members interviewed by the BBC seemed hopeful of fruitful results. President Rabbani appealed to the opposition to help make the Shoora a success by honouring their earlier promises. The participants of the Shoora, it was announced, would have the power to legalize political decisions taken by the country's big institutions as per Afghan traditions and in accordance with the collective religious and tribal interests of the masses, "after the expiry of the communist era." (84)

The Afghan society in Kabul was completely divided over the Shoora. Hekmatyar maintained that it had no legality, and that it amounted to a declaration of war against other organizations. The khateebis and imams of Kabul city reportedly urged upon their congregations the importance of the Shoora-e-Ahle Hal-o-Aqb. Leaders like Dostum indicated their readiness to accept the Shoora's representative status provided it recognized and gave

representation to the northern movement; meanwhile their forces would remain on the alert.

President Rabbini was re-elected President of the transitional government for a period of two years. With the convening of the Shoora, it could be said that the Peshawar Accord came to the logical end of its limited course, as it had begun, inconclusively. The uncertain responses at the time of its signing had crystallized into factors whose interplay will mould the Afghan scenario in the period that lies ahead. The curtain had come down on one phase of intense fratricidal conflicts. The next scene may bring further power tussles, turmoil and human tragedies. (85)

CONCLUSION: The Changing Environment.

The fourteen-year Afghan struggle ushered in changes which are bound to transform the Afghan society in a significant way. The Afghans now stand on the threshold of a new era, which portends periods of instability ahead. Beset with a legacy of massive problems, some acquired as a consequence of the war against the Soviet Union and some accumulated as social customs, the Afghans are confronting the issues of the present and the uncertainties of the future, and finding that the garb of tradition is proving an inadequate security cover. The internal turmoil that preceded and followed the Peshawar Accord is in itself indicative of this new struggle, revolving around what irrelevancies of the past to shed, and how to give practical shape to the new Afghan consciousness forged out of a momentous struggle which involved the entire nation. The Afghans are now in search of appropriate political structures to reflect their national awareness as well as to safeguard their nationhood. Some observers argue that this latter aspect is merely a notion, that there is no Afghan nation-state.

What are the challenges the Afghan society faces and what are the trends, can at best only be suggested. The

decades ahead will see the process shaping into some more tangible phenomena. The basis for that however, exists and this analysis of the Peshawar Accord and its related development has made attempts to catalogue those factors which have relevance in the decade ahead.

The jihad experience encompassed in its sweep both the non-tribal and tribal zones, both the urban centers and the cast rural countryside. The Soviet intrusion upset the traditional social balances, agitated the social passivity in which the Afghans lived out their simple lives and provided the threatening jolt which made them think of a unified resistance to the Soviet invasion. This factor of a united approach was novel in that it encompassed the lengthy and breadth of the country, and provided a common focal point—the throwing out of an external aggressor. Afghan history does not provide a comparable example of such an all-country outlook. This became the first instance of its kind.

The current contention for power between the two major orientations in the country today, namely, the traditional forces of 'fundamentalist' Islam led by the ulema groups, and the more forward-looking 'modernist' Islam led by the non-ulema groups, has many dimensions. These two major groupings represent the extremes as it were. In between there is an entire range of aspirations which have not yet crystallized into any viable political organizations. This period of development lies ahead. The ulema are seen as upholders of the status quo ante, their concept of unity resting on an exclusive ecumenicalism, which rules out the need for political structures. (86) the non-ulema Afghan organizations are the protagonists of representative political structures, which the ulema leadership is unable and unwilling to provide. In the current contention for power, the background is provided by this broad 'ulema' versus 'non-ulema' tussle for control of the decision-making process. Moreover, the number of organizations among the ulema and non-ulema sections

shows the many differences of approach that exist. Clearly, the need is for some leadership to provide a programme and a platform that encompasses them all. The non-ulema organizations provide the newly emergent challenge to the status quo ante but entirely within the Afghan context. Their demand for representative and responsive political structures would not be an external superimposition but evolve out of their own experiences.

POSTSCRIPT—As this study goes to print, a new phase in the intra Afghan tussles for power has been set in motion. On 7 March 1993, another accord was signed by most of the signatories of the Peshawar Accord, preceded, accompanied and followed by sensational positioning by the Afghan leaders. The venue was Islamabad. Hence it has come to be known as the Islamabad peace Accord (See Annex 'B').

The eventual impact of the Accord can only be adjudged with the passage of time. But it is possible to identify, even at this early stage, some of the factors which could worsen the ground situation before allowing better prospects to appear. For one, the old rivalries will not easily fade away. For another, the festering ethnic friction may not be effectively contained. At the outset, however, it must be said that the Islamabad Accord provides a more balanced framework, giving hope once again that amidst the din of rocket attacks by the warring leadership, sanity may yet prevail and the Afghan people's desire for peace may eventually materialize.

On 1 March 1993, amidst heavy shelling in Kabul, President Rabbani arrived in Pakistan on the invitation of Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who initiated mediation efforts to enable the warring Afghan leadership to negotiate their differences in Islamabad. The Pakistan media reported that the invitation included talks with Pakistani, Saudi, and Iranian government as well as an all-round effort to bring peace to the war-torn country. The

media further reported that the preliminary spade-work on a power-sharing framework had been done and agreed to by the leaders separately through informal talks. The Islamabad meeting was to enable them to iron out any remaining differences.

A breakthrough was achieved by the Prime Minister's initiative when all Afghan leaders, including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, arrived in Pakistan. It was announced that two representatives of General Abdul Rashid Dostum would also participate. To be followed by Dostum himself. Hez-e-Wahdat was included as a participant. One significant omission was Maulvi Yunus Khalis who refused to attend or send a representative because he opposed the inclusion of both Dostum's party and that of the Hezb-e-Wahdat. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran insisted that the inclusion of both these parties was crucial.

A week of hectic talks followed with hopeful development being announced at one time and dismaying each main party would get a single major was power sharing in which each main party would get a single major portfolio. The major portfolios were defined as Foreign Affairs, National Security, Interior, Defence and Premiership. (It is pertinent to note the even at this stage the return of the refugees and their rehabilitation, and the economic reconstruction of the country, did not compel the need for specific portfolios.) The compromise of the President and the Prime Minister (see Annex 'B'). However, the television coverage of this historic event failed to hide the frosty equation between the Prime Minister-designate and the President with whom he is supposed to consult.

The Agreement was signed on March 7 in the presence of Prime Minister Sharif, Saudi Prince Faisal and the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister. The signatories were President Rabbani (Jamiat-e-Islami); Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

(Hezb-e-Islami). Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammedi (Jabha-e-Nijat-e-Milli). Pir Gilani (Mahaz-e-Milli); Ahmad Shah Ahmad-zai (Ittehad-e-Islami); Sheikh Asif Mohsini (Harkat-e-Islami); and Ayatullah Fazil (Hezb-e-Wahdat)

The Islamabad Agreement, in comparison with the Peshawar Accord, is a more substantive document. It does offer a framework that can set Afghanistan on the path to the much needed peace provided it is followed in letter and spirit. Both Ahmed Shah Masood and General Dostum have separately issued statements of cooperation and support to Hekmatyar and his future Cabinet. However, Ahmad Shah Masood also made some highly provocative remarks about Hekmatyar. The latter has suggested that Masood (who is at present in charge of Defence) be considered for the post of deputy premier and Defence be taken away from him and made a joint responsibility. Given the personality clashes, cooperation regarding Defence matters is likely to follow an explosive course.

On March 8, all the signatories accompanied by Pakistan's Prime Minister flew to Saudi Arabia for a joint Umra. Further consultations followed which were rounded off by an agreement among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran to act as guarantors of the Islamabad Accord. They then went to Tehran. It was announced that the Prime Minister-designate Hekmatyar had called an all-party meeting at Jalalabad on March 16. Most of the invitees to the Jalalabad meeting scheduled for the 16th did not turn up as per schedule. (Some of them were still abroad). Meanwhile, on March 15, fresh rocket attacks at different points in Kabul killed another hundred citizens, and wounded many hundreds more; and on March 16, General Abdul Haq Uloomi of the former Kabul regime who had joined forces with Ahmad Shah Masood was killed—the two events shattering the “permanent” ceasefire agreed upon just a week earlier. Even by April there were no signs of a new Afghan cabinet. The outlook, therefore, remains clouded.

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2. Ibid, Editorial; "Awkward Afghan" , pp 13-14.
- (a) Ibid.
3. The profiles of personalities and parties has been largely drawn from the following sources:-
 - (1) Klass, Rosanne; ed,;" Afghanistan the Great Game "Freedom House, New York. See Appendices II and III for "who's who in Afghan Resistance and "who's who in the DRA and PDPA", respectively.
 - (2) Roy, Olivier; "Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan", Cambridge University press, 1988
 - (3) Miscellaneous newspaper sources. The Mujaddedi family had also been active in public affairs. One of its members was instrumental in the overthrow of King Amanullah in 1929.
4. Klass, Rosanne, op.cit,The reason initially for Rabbani to break away was that when the group fled to Pakistan, he was assigned an unimportant position in the Hezb-e-Islami Office.
5. Roy, Olivier, *op.cit.* p.132
6. *Ibid*,p.131
7. *Ibid.* p.133
8. *Ibid*,p.138
9. *Ibid.* p.134
10. Klass, Rosanne, *op. cit* carries details attributed to some Resistance sources who charged Hekmatyar

with undermining military operations against the Soviets. Additionally, Hekmatyar has been accused of the killing of many commandos, political opponents, defectors and the disappearance of many others. Private Hezb prisons were also reported. A Western media comment stating that Hejkmattyar's ambition was to form a fundamentalist Islamic regime, also noted as the hallmark of his party. "Whose supporters are wont to throw acid in the faces of unveiled women." For this comment, see *The Economist*, London 25 April 1992: Awkward Afghans". P.14

11. Roy, Olivier, op.cit.P.128
12. Ibid. p.22
13. Klass,Rosanne,op.cit
14. Roy, Olivier, op.cit.p.129
15. Klass, Rosanne, op.cit.
16. Roy Olivier,op.cit.p.124
17. Ibid., p.79
18. Barth, Frderik; in Rosanne Klass; ed."Afghanistan: the Great Game Revisited". Freedom House,London.1987, in the, chapter entitled "CulturalWellsprings of Ressistance in Afghanistan."p.180.
19. Ibid,?AbdulRashid:"The Afghan Resistance", p.204
20. Zim,Karlenst; "An interim report on the, situation in Afghanistan, in Aussen Politik, German Foreign Affairs Review; Vol.40No.1: pp.41.45.
21. *The Frontier Post*, Lahore, 25/9/92. "The Durand Line Issue", see also Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Recognizing the Durand Line" in *The News*, Rawalpindi, 29 May 1992.
22. A BBC Urdu commentary, the 'Shabnama; broadcast on 18/5/92, quoted a Delhi news report saying that the Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati's visit to New Delhi at that time was to seek Indian

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- government's support on Tehran's stand, that the Shi'ite Afghan population be given more privileges as they constitute 25% of the total Afghan population.
23. All-India Radio (AIR) broadcast this concern as a news item in its English news on 15/5/92.
 24. AIR quoted at PTI report published in the *Hindustan Times* in its Urdu programme 'Jahan Numa', broadcast on 15/5/92.
 25. AIR: 'Jahan Numa' comments, broadcast on 16/5/92.
 26. *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.45, Winter, 1991 see Weibbaum, Marvin G., "War and Peace in Afghanistan: The Pakistan Role." pp.70-85. 27.
 27. Ibid.
 28. Ibid. p.80
 29. Weinbbaum's assessment on Pakistan's role was written after his field research conducted during 1990 in Peshawar. It carries pertinent insights on the positive and negative aspects of Pakistan's role in the light of its own security concerns, and provides an apt backgrounder to some aspects of the current phase of the power tussle.
 30. See Steve Coll: "Fear of Ethnic War in Afghanistan", in *The Ness*, Islamabad 17/3/1992.
 31. *The Muslim*, Islamabad, 25/3/1992. An article by Edward A.Gargan.
 32. *The Muslim*, Islamabad, 8/4/92, "Sayyaf, Khalis to join hands."
 33. *The Frontier Post*, Lahore, 18/4/92. Editorial: "Post-Najib Situation."
 34. *The Nation*, Lahore 18/4/92. Editorial: "Najib's exit and after". The editorial noted the role Pakistan ought to play. "If the short-sighted Afghan factions do not comprehend the folly of, unleashing a scramble for power and pave, the way for its

eventual 'Balkanisation', they should be told in unequivocal terms that Pakistan will have no truck with such a recipe for disaster for, the entire region."

35. *The Muslim*, Islamabad, 18/2/92: "Pakistan stresses territorial integrity of Afghanistan."
36. Ibid.
37. *The Muslim*, Islamabad 18/4/92. Editorial, "Pragmatism paves the way."
38. *The Muslim*, Islamabad. 19/4/92 "Hekmatyar to
39. *The Muslim*, Islamabad ,18/4/92 "Hekmatyar to block Masood from reaching Kabul".
41. *The News*, Islamabad, 19/4/92
42. *The Muslim*, Islamabad .20/4/92: "Islamic Jihad Council formed: HJekmatyar, others excluded- Masood set to take over Kabul" Among those freed were Ghulam Dastgir Pansheri and General Mohammad Hashim.
43. *Dawn*. Karachi, 20/4/92 sees Hasan Akhtar. "Intra-afghan Dialogue". See also Derek Brown: "The fall of Najibullah" in the same issue for a Western analysis of the issues of importance which surfaced out of Najibullah's abrupt resignation.
44. Ibid.
45. *The Nation*, Lahore, 20/4/92: "Peshawar meeting fails to achieve consensus". *Jang* an Urdu daily from Rawalpindi further reported on 20/4/92 that the venue of the meeting was the Governor's
46. See Annexure 'A' for its text and pp.7-10 for a discussion of its provisions.
47. Babrak Karmal is credited with a deep knowledge of tribal affinities and ethnic sensitivities and it said to have exploited them successfully during his tenure. See Qaiser Butt's report: "Kabul: legal authority not in sight " in *Frontier Post*. Lahore 21/4/92.

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48. bid.
49. *The News*, Islamabad, 21/4/92: "Benazir reps Nawaz for losing initiative on Afghan Issue."
50. *Frontier Post*, Lahore 21/4/92 Editorial: "Dumping it on Benon Sevan".
51. Azizuddin Ahmed, "Peace prospects recede in Pakistan", in *The Nation*, Lahore. 21/4/92. The writer posed, the question: "Is IJI, or the ruling alliance more important than the long-term interests of Pakistan" For actual battle details and situation around Kabul and other parts of Afghanistan see the following.
The Nation, Lahore, 21/4/92, Ahmed Rashid; "Kabul airport in the hands of Masood's new Shoora' and Shamim Shahid. "Talks to decide Jalalabad's fate continue", How far Pakistani policy making circles were from the ground reality can be judged by a statement of the former chief, Lt.Gen. (reted) Hamid Gul who "predicted no clash between the supporters of Ahmed shah Masood and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as both leaders were patriots and had political wisdom" see *The Nation*, Lahore, 22/4/92.
The Muslim, Islamabad 22/4/92 : "Pakistan, Iran asked not to dictate to Afghans."
The Nation, Islamabad, 22/4/92. "Nabi speculated to be head of Afghan Council".
52. Voice of America (VA) broadcast the Pakistani mediation aspect on 27/4/92 Radio Australia news broadcast of the same date dwelt more on the increased basis of support to the Peshawar Accord.
53. BBC commentary, 'shabnama' of 27/4/92 carried an exhaustive survey based on some important interviews.

54. *The Frontier*, Lahore, 22/4/92 Editorial "Ethnic in Afghanistan.
55. *The Nation*, Lahore 22/4/92 "Sevan holds talks with 50 commanders".
56. *BBC*, 'Sairbeen,' commentary in Urdu, broadcast on 27/4/92.
57. Hezb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar) spokesman Nawab Salim's interviews to VOA and BBC were broadcast on 27/1/92, giving these positions.
58. BBC, news of 15/5/92 quoted the Defence Ministry broadcast
59. BBC, World Today, 15/5/92
60. BBC, *News Desk*, 15/5/92.
61. Radio Kabul's Pushto commentary on 15/5/92.
62. Radio Kabul's Pushto News, 16/5/92.
63. Radio Kabul, Pushto commentary, 16/5/92
64. BBC news of 15/5/92.
65. An AIR commentary on 15/5/92.
66. VOA, Pushto Commentary, 16/5/92
67. VOA, a radio report in Pushto, 16/5/92.
68. BBC, *News Desk*, 16/5/92 *Radio Masco* in a broadcast on the same date i.e. 16/5/92, gave the figure of 183 Najib kinsmen killed.
69. Maulvi Khalis issued a statement in Peshawar, which was reported by *VIRA*, Pushto News, 17/5/92.
70. Radio Kabul broadcast this news on 31/10/92
71. The Hezb-e-Islami spokesman was Qareebur Rehman Saeed.
72. BBS reported in its Pushto commentary on 31/10/92 the views of persons who had held positions of power formely, such as Azizullah Wasifi, a former Afghan minister and head of Loya Jirga. He went on to state that, 'the Leadership Council had no shariat base. Undoubtedly they had tendered services in the Jihad in a big way and

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- accomplished their jobs with foreign assistance. But they should have left the issue of the leadership to the nation. "He was also against the shoora Hal-o-Aqd as it had no history or precedent in Afghanistan, and the people would not agree to it as a replacement for the Loya Jirga.
73. The Muslim, Islamabad, 27/10/92.
 74. *The Muslim*, Islamabad . 28/10/92
 75. See *Khalid Akhtar* " Pakistan can turn out to be the biggest loser' in The Muslim, Islamabad, 26/10/92.
 76. See The Muslim, Islamabad, 26/10/92 ."Differences prevail over shape of Hal-o-Aqb Shoora'andibid, 2/11/92. "Khalis explains reason behind absence."
 77. "The Frontier Post, Lahore 13/11/92," Hekmatyar meets Mujaddedi, Dostum demands share in power.
 78. *The Frontier Post*, Lahore, 20/11/92., Hezb threatens execution of ex-soviet POWs.
 79. Rahimullah Yusufzai's report in *The News*, Islamabad, 8/12/92
 80. See Kamal Matinuddin.: "Afghanistan. A house still divided. In *The news*, Islamabad, 8/12/92, for a resume of, developments upto this Stage. See also Rahimullah Yusufzai's report "Rabbani says he will not step down until Shura meets' in *The news*, Islamabad, 15/12 92.
 81. *The News*, Islamabad 17/12/92
 82. *The Muslim*, Islamabad, 18/12/92
 83. *The News*, Islamabad, carried Rahimullah Yusufzai report.
 84. Radio Kabul, 19/12/92.
 85. See editorial comments of Pakistan papers in which the hopes of the Pakistani people and government were expressed, as well as their apprehensions that the very nature of the Afghan struggle suggested that it would be a protracted one.

Dawn, 18/12/92, Editorial: "A phase in a protracted power struggle".

Nation. 17/12/92, "Afghan power struggle'

86. Roy, Olivier, *op.cit.* 1088.p.125

(Courtesy; *Regional Studies. A Research Journal of the Institute of Regional Studies Islamabad.*)



**NEW WORLD ORDER OR
DISORDER: ARMED STRUGGLE
IN AFGHANISTAN AND UNITED
STATES' FOREIGN POLICY
OBJECTIVES.**

HAFIZULLAH EMADI ⁽¹⁾

Foreign policy has been regarded as a reflection and application of a country's domestic politics to the international arena. Factors that influence and shape decision-making processes in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy issues include national interest, ideology and security. With the consolidation of the International Capital the capitalist state pursues policies intended to expand capitalism and its corresponding ideology, culture and politics internationally.

An effective implementation of such a policy requires that the capitalist state articulates its vital interest, defined in terms of power and the ability to protect and expand its spheres of influence. Well-known scholars in the

(1) Hafizullah Emadi Prominent Afghan Scholar a writer and development consultant in Washington.

Realist and neo-realist discourse postulate that foreign policy must be guided by self-interest. Prominent among them are Hans J. Morgenthau, George Kennan, Reinhold Niebuhr and Henry Kissinger. Morgenthau writes that:

If we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to all of them.... In dual sense: we are able to judge other nations as we judge our own, having judged them in this fashion, we are then capable of pursuing policies that respect the interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those of our own. Moderation in policy cannot fail to reflect the moderation of moral judgement.

and Tariff (GATT), etc. paved the way for globalist ideology of liberal capitalism.. Anti-communism constituted a prevalent theme guiding United States aid policies prior to and following World War II. It provided economic, technical and humanitarian aid to developing countries with the intention of containing the spread of socialism. United States' aid assumed different forms and directions depending on its short- and long-term objectives and changes in the international arena. Aid consisted mainly of transfer of capital, technology and goods with the goal of strengthening US technological and capital domination of the world.

To consolidate and strengthen US domination President Harry Truman initiated the Point Four Program aimed at providing economic, technical, and military assistance to countries either allied to or supporting US global politics. In 1961 the US Congress authorized the Agency for International Development (AID) as an independent unit within the Department of State. The agency provided approximately \$2 billion in aid to countries in the Third World on an annual basis.

Between 1946 and 1987 it is estimated that the US dispensed \$ 227.5 billion in aid solely for the purpose of containing the spread of socialist ideologies.³

The other direction of US aid is focused on 'humanitarian' concerns, and was initiated after World War II, when the US began shipping food to people in countries destroyed by the war. Between 1946 and 1948, the United States provided approximately \$11 billion in aid for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of European nations.⁴ Humanitarian aid constituted an important feature of US foreign policy objectives: policy makers within the US government maintain that the United States has a moral obligation to extend such aid to less developed societies. 'We are sometimes asked to do our duty even when it runs counter to our interest.'⁵

Intensive US-Soviet competition for global hegemony eventually led to the crumbling of the later. The tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the fragmentation of the Soviet empire in the late 1980s led a number of scholars and advocates of liberal capitalism to proclaim theses such as 'The end of history', 'Clash of civilizations' and the dawn of a 'New world order' to describe the world situation. They celebrated the downfall of the Berlin Wall as the end of an era-socialism⁶ and the ushering of a new era of rivalry depicted by an alliance of Confucian-Islam versus the West by proponents of 'Clash of civilization's thesis.'⁷ Such analysis does not reflect the dialectics of development in the changing world. Capitalism expands it simultaneously generates both development and underdevelopment. Further degradation of standards of living and of environment elicit popular resistance to capitalist-led development. The form of resistance to capitalist exploitation varies depending on the level of societal development and social awareness.

Affluent Muslims and Confucian orientations have more in common with their counterparts in the West than with their own impoverished fellow countrymen. It invalidates the thesis that they will become antagonistic adversaries to the capitalist system. The articulation of the 'new world order' doctrine offers no panacea to rampant starvation, misery and political and social repression in the developing world. It is an old term which implies different meanings depending on who uses it and for what purpose; it has been frequently used by politicians to mask their own political agenda. President George Bush used the term when he built a coalition of multinational forces to dislodge Kuwait from Iraqi domination. Adolph Hitler also used the term during World War II to expand the sphere of influence of rising German capitalist entrepreneurs.⁸ A number of small oil-producing countries known as OPEC used the term 'new order' to justify the raising of oil prices in 1973 to transform the asymmetric trade patterns between the East and West. The focus of this article is to examine the guiding ideology shaping United States policy toward Afghanistan in the immediate post-World War II period, to study the magnitude of capitalist-led modernization in the 1960s and 1970s, and to explore the implications of the 'New world order' doctrine in the post-Soviet era in Afghanistan.

The beginning of US-Afghanistan diplomatic relations

When Afghanistan gained its independence from the British in 1919, King Amanullah strove to expand the country's diplomatic ties and sent a delegation to the United States. The delegation presented Amanullah's letter to President Harding on 26 July 1921 in which Amanullah requested the US to extend official recognition to Kabul. The letter reads:

As I used to have the sincere wish to establish permanent friendly relations between Afghanistan and the high government of the United States, I expected that your Excellency's high government may be satisfied with the keeping of that friendly relations too.⁹

The Soviet Union was the first country to grant formal recognition to Afghanistan on 28 February 1921, followed by Iran, Egypt, France and Germany. Discussion on resuming diplomatic ties with China started as early as 1920, which culminated in the establishment of diplomatic relations on 2 March 1944. The United States did not look favorably upon establishment of diplomatic ties with Afghanistan, as it regarded Afghanistan's support to anti-colonial movements in the Indian subcontinent and permitting the establishment of the Indian revolutionary government in exile in Kabul as running counter to British imperial interests in the region. It took the United States 17 years to decide to establish diplomatic ties with Afghanistan. In March 1936 the US officially recognized Afghanistan, signed a formal agreement on 4 May of that year and appointed W.H. Homibrook US ambassador to Afghanistan with his headquarters in Tehran, Iran. On 6 June 1942 the United States opened a diplomatic mission in Kabul¹⁰ which was upgraded to an embassy on 5 June 1948 with Ely the US mission in Kabul suggested the stationing of US Air force bombers in Kabul to boost morale in Afghanistan; however, the proposal was rejected by the United States.¹¹

US-Afghanistan relations in the post-World War II period.

In the immediate post-World War II period the United States expanded its development projects in Afghanistan to counter Soviet influence as well as the spread of communist ideologies. Soviet influence in Afghanistan in the mid 1950s was vividly described by

Louis Dupree, an American anthropologist, who wrote that in November 1959 a Soviet oil exploration team told him: 'We are here for a long time. The Afghans need our help...Why don't you Americans go home? Afghanistan is our neighbour not yours.'¹² The US was dismayed by ruling elites in the Afghan bureaucracy, whom it referred to as a reactionary group, stating that:

the removal, of many Western technical advisors from both the Ministry of Mines and Industries and from the Afghan Cartographic Institute where all the topographic and geologic maps and reports were housed²¹

To make the US presence felt in Afghanistan President Eisenhower visited Kabul on 8 December 1959 and assured the leadership in Kabul that the United States continues to assist Afghanistan in her development activities. A year later a US delegation visited Kabul to study the prospects of US markets there. The mission concluded that:

American manufacturers and exporters must give more attention to the Afghan market. Many products such as automobile and truck tyres, trucks and buses, agricultural machinery, commercial ice-making machinery, tannery equipment and shoe-making, construction machinery and materials, appear to us to have an excellent market potential there.²²

The US continued to persuade the leadership in Kabul to normalize its relations with Pakistan. When Daoud's brother Naim visited Washington and met President John F. Kennedy on 27 September 1962, Kennedy encouraged him to distance Afghanistan from the Soviet Union and normalize relations with Pakistan.

The leadership in Afghanistan was divided. The pro-Soviet faction concentrated around Daoud argued for closer ties with Moscow, and the pro-Western faction concentrated around King Mohammad Zahir supported closer ties with the West. The struggle within the ruling

class eventually led to the resignation of Daoud in 1963. This marked a new epoch in US-Afghan relations which resulted in an official trip by King Zahir to Washington during 4-6 September 1963. A pro-US politician, Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal, who served as Minister of Information in 1963-65, was appointed prime minister. He visited Washington on 28 March 1967 and met President Lyndon B. Johnson to discuss regional and international issues and US aid for Afghanistan. The two men had identical views regarding political and security issues in Asia.

This new development in US-Afghan relations led to the signing of cultural and educational exchange programme agreements between the two countries in 1968. Vice President Spiro T. Agnew visited Kabul and expressed continued US support to Afghanistan. He said:

*We Americans feel confident that Afghanistan will continue to improve its agriculture, to broaden its industrial base and create more educational and employment opportunities for its people. As Afghan persevere in their efforts, we look forward to assisting in any way we can.*²³

Although, Premier Maiwandwal strengthened US-Afghan relations, his tenure as premier ended when he was accused of being a CIA agent and was forced to resign in November 1969. When he visited the United States for a medical treatment he was hospitalized in the US Air force hospital at Andrews Air force base outside Washington.²⁴

Economic development, modernization and foreign aid did not improve the country's economy or the standards of living but rather further indebted the country. Afghanistan was in a deep socio-economic and political crisis to the extent that:

The debt repayments were running at some m\$7 million annually, but within five years annual repayments on earlier debts rose to \$25 million-equivalent to over 30

per cent of total export earnings at the time. Almost two-thirds of repayments were due to the Soviet Union the chief creditor by far, with \$900 million (60 per cent of all civil aid) committed between 1957-1972, besides military loans of some m\$300m.²⁵

The last few years of King Zahir's rule coincided with starvation, unemployment, skyrocketing of consumer items and the growing gap between the haves and the have-nots. The growing polarization threat to overthrow the regime was reflected in the growing disenchantment of the ruling elites within and outside the state apparatus over the ineffective leadership of King Zahir. Various social groups were to topple the monarchy. Former primer Daoud, Mohammad Wali, son-in-law of King Zahir, former premier Maiwandwal and Mohammad Musa Shafiq were plotting to seize power. Daoud, a collaboration with the *Parcham* faction of the *Hizb-e- Demokratik-e-Khaliqi Afghanistan* or People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), engineered a military coup on 17 July 1973, seized power and proclaimed the country a republic.²⁶

The United States and the republican regime.

Once in power Daoud appointed members of the *Parcham [Flag]* to key administrative posts and declared that his government will carry out socio-economic reforms which would be compatible with the basic tenets of Islam. The Soviet Union was the first country to extend diplomatic recognition and pledged to provide aid for Afghanistan's economic development. During the two years of Daoud's rule the Soviet Union extended a loan of \$428 million for the survey and construction of development projects²⁷ and granted \$600 million in economic aid for financing a five-year development plan which had been launched in 1973.²⁸

Although the United States was dismayed by Daoud's pro-Soviet proclivities, it extended diplomatic

recognition to 'Afghanistan. The US administration regarded Afghanistan's close ties with the Soviet Union as a threat to the political stability in South Asia and the Middle East. US concern over Daoud's policy toward its two allies, Pakistan and Iran, was reflected in a top US memo by the Department of State that:

*Daoud's cordial relations with the USSR may jeopardize the ratification of a pending treaty on the apportionment of the Hilmand River, as well as the access to road and port facilities that the Shah has promised to Afghanistan. The Shah is likely to view any threat to Pakistan's unity as a threat to Iran.*²⁹

This prompted the U/S administration to explore possibilities to compel Daoud to distance himself from the Soviet Union and its bloc. To this end the US supported Pakistan's efforts to destabilize the regime in Kabul by; (a) providing military training and financial aid to the exiled Islamists in Pakistan in their struggle to topple the state in Kabul, and (b) to instigate public opinion especially those of national minorities to fight for their autonomy in Afghanistan. The aborted coup attempt by former premier Maiwandwal who was detained and killed by the regime and the failed insurgency by the Islamists in the Panjshir valley and Laghman province and huge amount of aid by Iran and Saudi Arabia compelled Daoud gradually to distance himself from the Soviet Union. On 1 November 1974 Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger visited Kabul with the intention to normalize strained relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the question of 'Pushtunistan' and during his second visit to Kabul on 8 August 1976 an agreement was reached regarding the sale of edible oil to Afghanistan at a concessional price. The subsequent improvement in US-Afghan relations convinced the US administration to establish the USAID Credit to the Agricultural

Development Bank of Afghanistan, to finance short-term loan to small farmers and peasants. The US continued its development projects and offered financial aid to Afghanistan's modernization projects. According to the CIAS, total US economic assistance during the period of 1973-78 was estimated to be approximately \$44.0 million.³⁰ This US policy produced tangible results in Afghanistan. Relations between the two countries improved further. According to the U/S administration

US-Afghan relations during 1977 were excellent. The government of Afghanistan (GOA) fulfilled an obligation to USA to establish a joint commission to control narcotic production and trafficking in Afghanistan. Daoud accepted an invitation to visit the United States in the summer 1978. Funding for the US military training program for Afghan officers was doubled in an effort to offset-albeit to a modest degree- the massive Soviet predominance in the area of foreign support for the Afghan armed forces.³¹

During his last two years in office Daoud worked to strengthen ties with Pakistan, Iran and the West. Daoud purged most members of the PDPA from the state apparatus and replaced them with right-wing liberal social forces. Contradictions between the pro-Soviet and pro-US social forces within and outside the state were growing. The Soviet leadership was dismayed by Daoud and during his visit to Moscow in January 1977, Leonid Brezhnev told Daoud to 'get rid of all those imperialist advisors in your country'. Daoud was reported to have 'slammed his fist on the conference table, saying that Afghans were masters of their own house and no foreign country could tell them how to run their own affairs.'³² As relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated, the pro-Soviet parties of *Khalq* (People) and *Parcham* factions of the PDPA re-united in early summer m1977, staged a coup on 27 April 1978 and proclaimed Afghanistan a 'democratic' republic.

The United States and the democratic regime.

Noor Mohammad Taraki, General Secretary of the PDPA, became head of state. The party began to restructure the country's political, economic, defence and civil administrative systems by appointing party members and sympathizers to key administrative posts and opening a political training course within the armed forces to instill Afghan soldiers and cadets with the ruling ideology. The party replaced most previous high-ranking officials, ambassadors, governors and district officers.

The PDPA's social, cultural, political and economic development strategies generated opposition and resistance by intellectuals, the middle-income strata and the peasantry. Kabul blamed clerics for instigating the public uprising or 'Jihad' against the state. Taraki writes; 'In 1357 (1978) the people of Afghanistan declared jihad against Sheikhs (priests), clerics and Ikhwanis (Muslim Brotherhood) made in London and Paris and all our toiling Muslim people expressed hatred against them.'³³

Although the United States recognized the Kabul regime, it was exploring avenues to re-establish its influence in Afghanistan. The US continued to deal with Kabul and appointed Adolph Dubs, who served as minister in the US embassy in Moscow (1972-74) and deputy secretary of state in the department of state of near eastern and south Asian affairs (1975-78), as a new ambassador to Kabul. It is believed the Dubs appointment alarmed the Kremlin, which regarded him as a diplomat who could create the more troubles in Kabul. Dubs was kidnapped by four armed men and killed on 14 February 1979 during a rescue operation conducted by soviet and afghan troopers. The United States requested that negotiations must continue and the armed rescue operation be delayed, but the soviet did not heed the US requested. Between 1955 and 1978 there were 2, 88 afghan students, including 487

military officers, who received their higher education in US colleges and Universities³⁴ while the number of afghan who studied in the Soviet Union during the same period was 3, 725 persons.³⁵ after the killing of ambassador Dubs the United States Congress prohibited US aid to Afghanistan and terminated its educational aid programs.

The United States continued to monitor developments unfolding in the country. A top secret diplomatic note depicted Us concerns regarding events in the Afghanistan in the following words:

One option would be for us to phase out our activities in Afghanistan, but we believed this would be very unsettling to Afghanistan's neighbors and incompatible with their policies. The DRA has not asked us to pack our bags and leave but on the contrary has accepted our policy of maintaining our interest and presence. Closing out our efforts in Afghanistan would likely be seen as an abdication of our responsibility and would accomplish for the Soviets one of their primary objectives, namely to reduce further US and western influence in Afghanistan and in the region. It would not be in our interest to give such a blanc check signed to Moscow.³⁶

As the spontaneous mass uprising to the state was escalating the US began to provide financial support to the exiles Islamists in Pakistan and favoured them our the nationalist and progressive civic and Department of state regarding the consequence of Us support to the Islamists, stating that:

The victory of the opposition and the collapse of the pro-Soviet leftist radical regime would certainly serve the Us interest and it would show the Third world that the perspective of our rival Marxist-Leninists on the 'inevitability' of world history is not necessarily true. A truly international non-aligned movement would be welcomed by us. The Us participation in economic construction would become possible in the case of the

collapse of the DRA. However, there is no clear evidence of the programs of the opposition but inside the country a group of opposition parties' jabha-e-Mili Enqilab-e-Afghanistan (National front for Islamic revolution in Afghanistan) ostensibly supports the creation of a traditional Grand National Assembly to determine the future of Afghanistan. The US would provide democratic support to such an organization if it truly comes into existence.³⁷

Political repression and radical reforms generated anti-regime sentiment. Growing insurgency and factional fighting within the ruling party convinced the Kremlin leadership to remove Premier Hafizullah Amin from power who they perceived to be the main source of all the troubles. When taraki returned to Kabul from a trip to Cuba and Moscow he began to remove Amin from his post. Major Muhammad Daoud Taron, who accompany taraki abroad, informed Amin of the plot. When taraki called Amin for a meeting to his office a gun battle broke out, Taraki was killed and Amin's supporters in the party's central committee meeting on 16 September 1979 elected him president and chairman of the party. President Amin tried to stabilize the country and normalize relations with the US. To accomplish this, it is believed that Amin was prepared, under-certain conditions, to expel thousands of Soviet advisors from Afghanistan. on 11 September 1979 Amin told Bruce Am Stutz. Us Charged d' affairs in Kabul, that he was ready to improve ties with the United states.³⁸ when foreign minister, Shah Wali visited New York on 27 September 1979, he met senior US officials and express Kabul's eagerness ties with the United states. This prompted US diplomat Archer Blood to visit Kabul in October that year.

Seeing Afghanistan slip away form its sphere of influence, the Kremlin leadership decided to intervene in order to maintain Soviet domination of Afghanistan and to

prevent the emergence of a state more friendly to the west. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 1979, claiming that it had been invited by the afghan leaders to defend the country the invasion on the grounds that:

The unceasing armed intervention, the well advanced plot by external forces of reaction created a real threat that Afghanistan would be lose its independence and be returned into an imperialist military bridgehead on our countries southern border, in other words, the time came when no longer could but responded to the request of the government of friendly Afghanistan. to have acted otherwise would have meant leaving Afghanistan a prey to imperialism, allowing the aggressive forces to repeat in that country what they had succeeded in doing, for instance, in Chile where the people's freedom was drowned in blood. To act otherwise would have meant to watch passively the origination on our southern border of a seat of serious danger to the security of the Soviet state.³⁹

The United States and the Soviet invasion

The United states viewed Soviet occupation as a direct to its global interest and security. President jimmy carter characterized the Soviet invasion as follows:

Our own nation security threatened. There is no doubt that the Soviet's move into Afghanistan. if done without adverse consequences, would have resulted on the temptation to move again until they reached warm water ports or until they acquired control over a major portion of the world's oil supplies.⁴⁰the Soviet Union has altered the strategic situation in the part of the world in a very ominous fashion.⁴¹ it places the Soviets within aircraft striking range of the vital oil resources of the persion Gulf; it threatens a strategically located country. Pakistan; [and] it poses the prospect of

*increased Soviet pressure on Iran and on other nations of the Middle East*⁴²

The Carter administration, which was more concerned with maintaining the spirit of détente and persuasion of the Kremlin leadership to get agreements on Strategic Arms Limitation II (SALT II), did not want to seriously antagonize the Kremlin. Its reaction to the Soviet invasion included boycotting the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, postponing educational and cultural exchange programme with Moscow, delaying the opening of Soviet consulate in New York and that of the US in Kiev, curbing Soviet fishing privileges in US waters, stopping the sale of US technologies to the USSR and blocking the sale of grain to the USSR beyond the 8 million metric tons already sold.⁴³

When Ronald Reagan was elected President in 1981 his administration adopted a heavy handed approach toward the Soviet occupation by providing financial aid to forces battling the Soviets and declaring its solidarity with Afghanistan. On 10 March 1982 the Reagan administration designated 21 March as 'Afghan Day' in the United States. The US administration exploited the Soviet invasion as a threat to the security of the Islamic nations and began to portray itself as the 'natural ally' of the entire Islamic world. Senior officials in the Reagan administration firmly stood by the Afghans in their struggle to get the Soviets out of the country. Secretary of State George Shultz addressed a gathering of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and told the crowd that:

*This is a gathering in the name of freedom, a gathering in the name of self-determination, a gathering in the name of getting the Soviet forces out of Afghanistan, a gathering in the name of sovereign Afghanistan controlled by its own people. Fellow freedom fighters we are with you.*⁴⁴

The Democratic Representative of Texas, Charles Wilson, stated that:

*There aren't going to be any more helicopters going back to Kabul with holes in them. They are going down. There were 58,000 dead in Vietnam and we owe the Russians one and you can quote me on that. I have had a slight obsession with it, because of Vietnam. I thought the Soviets ought to get a dose of it. I have been of the opinion that this money was better spent to hurt our adversaries than other money in Defence Department.*⁴⁵

The Reagan administration provided more than \$625 million in aid (which is considered to be the largest CIA covert operation since the Vietnam war) to the Pakistan-based Islamic groups.⁴⁶ In addition to the CIA's covert aid, the United States also provided a total of \$430 million worth of commodities to the Afghan refugees in Pakistan.⁴⁷ The CIA's aid to the anti-Soviet resistance increased in the mid-1980s when the United States provided anti-aircraft Stinger missiles. A CIA observer notes that:

The level of US aid to the Afghan program is believed to have risen to over \$400 million annually at the height of the program in fiscal year 1989 and 1988.... US covert action aid in FY 1989 was \$350 million and FY 1990 it dropped to \$300 million to \$250 million.... Overall US covert action funding for the year, as of September 1989- that is nearly ten years after the war began- was estimated at nearly \$2 billion.⁴⁸

US aid to the Pakistan-based Islamists was channeled through the Pakistani Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) agency. The US intended to transform Afghanistan into a 'Soviet-Vietnam'; to reduce Iran's influence in Afghanistan, to restore confidence within the US allies that US post-Vietnam isolationism is over and they can rely on

the US leadership, and re-establish American domination in the region which was torn apart by the US hostage crisis in Iran. As long as the military circle in Pakistan acquiesced to the US policy the later did not care how the ISI distributed the aid to the resistance or what strategic objective Pakistan pursued in Afghanistan.

The Soviets failed to subjugate the freedom fighters and, facing severe opposition both at home and abroad, it began to search for a graceful exit from Afghanistan. The Geneva Accord of 14 May 1988 signed between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan concerning non-interference in each other's internal affairs provided the Soviets with an opportunity to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan in February 1989.⁴⁹ The Soviet occupation (December 1979-February 1989) resulted in the deaths of approximately 1.29 to 1.5 million people,⁵⁰ the exodus of 5.6 million refugees to the neighbouring countries of Iran (2.3 million) and Pakistan (3.3 million)⁵¹ and the destruction of socio-economic structures. It triggered international reaction and compelled the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to engage in the reconstruction of the country and to render humanitarian aid to the refugees. The United States provided aid to enable the resettlement of the refugees and granted asylum and refugee status to Afghan national in the United States. Those who have been admitted were of privileged social classes, businessmen and former government officials and those who completed their higher education in US colleges and universities. Although the emigration of Afghans to the United States began prior to the Soviet occupation of the country, their number was very small. In 1971-1980 there were approximately 5642 Afghan's residing in the United States and during the Soviet occupation 21,345 individuals had been admitted to the United States.⁵²

The United States and Afghanistan in the post-Soviet era.

After the Soviet troops withdrawal the Kabul regime continued to maintain its rule, but, its authority and influence were gradually eroding. The demise of the Soviet Union in 1990 not only led to the independence of several Central Asian states but also paved the road for substantial political transformation in Afghanistan. The Kabul regime conceded to the United Nations peace formula detailing the transfer of power to a transitional Islamic government headed by Sebghatullah Mojhaddadi in April 1992 who was succeeded by Burhanuddin Rabbani, head of the Jamiat-e-Islamic party on 30 August 1992. Najibullah resigned and tried to leave the country for India. On his way to the airport opposition forces prevented his departure, and he was forced to seek refuge at the United Nations office in Kabul where he remained until he was dragged out and hanged by the Taliban militias who seized power in Kabul on 26 September 1996.

Although the United States did not open its embassy in Kabul, on 7 October 1992 President George Bush declared that the United States will provide financial assistance and resume normal diplomatic ties with Afghanistan.⁵³ When the struggle for power escalated among various Islamists and gradually assumed ethnic character with each ethnic group being forced to rally behind its leader, Pakistan's policy further ethnicized post-Soviet politics in Afghanistan by its support of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar against Rabbani—a Tajik from Badakhshan province. As the civil strife continued unabated the US could not open its embassy in Kabul and closely monitored as events unfold in the country. The Clinton administration pursued its predecessor's foreign policy objectives and continued to build US global hegemony throughout the world and in the countries in Central Asia. Deputy

Secretary of State, Talbott articulated US foreign policy in the following words:

The consolidation of free societies, at peace with themselves and with each other, stretching from the Black Sea to the Pamir Mountains, will open up a valuable trade and transport corridor along the old silk road between Europe and Asia.⁵⁴

The seizure of Kabul by the Taliban, student militia trained in religious schools in Pakistan, could not be accomplished without the support of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United States. The main objective of US policy in Afghanistan has been to establish a secure pipeline to export fossil fuels from Central Asia to Western markets via Afghanistan. US allies, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia's strategic interest in Central Asia include the former's desire to have access to the natural resources and the latter to prevent Iran's influence and religious authority in the newly independent republics. US ambassador John C. Monjo and his Pakistani counterpart visited Taliban's headquarters, Qandahar, in October 1994 without permission of the Rabbani regime. The US considered the Tajik-dominated government's close ties with Iran, India and Russia in stark opposition to its policy of containing Iran. The US favoured the Taliban as the best alternative to serve the US interest in containing Iranian influence in the region because the Taliban do not share a common language, religion and culture with Iran while the Tajiks share the same language and the Shiite Hazaras share the same language (Persian) and religion with Iran. However, head of Hizbe-Wahdat, the late Abdul Ali Mazari and revolutionary Hazara elites, denounced Iran's policy of sabotaging Hazara's struggle for recognition of their national identity and equal political rights.⁵⁵

The US administration depicted Taliban's control of Kabul as a positive development and declared that it would dispatch a delegation to Kabul. Martgy Miller, a Taxan oil

man visited Afghanistan to make the warring factions in Afghanistan agree to the construction of the gas and oil pipeline from Turkmenistan to the Pakistani sea port of Gwadar via Afghanistan. Turkmenistan, with its four million populations, has the world's fourth largest gas reserves. The oil reserves in the Central Asian states are estimated to:

*Fall within the range of 90 billion barrels, or roughly \$2 trillion at today's price of \$20 a barrel- to 200 billion barrels. By comparison, US reserves are 22 billion barrels, while Kuwait and Iraq are each believed to have about 100 billion barrels.*⁵⁶

Construction of the pipeline- which is worth an estimated \$2 billion- responds to two main US objectives (a) it assured the US direct access to the fossil fuels of Central Asia, and the Caspian Sea where a US company, Chevron and Saudi Delta Oil, have a large amount of investment; and (b) to assure the isolation of Iran which would be an ideal choice for the extension of such a pipeline. Deputy Secretary of State Talbott called the \$900 million aid to the eight countries in Central Asia as a 'prudent investment in our nation's future.'⁵⁷

Conclusion

The main objective of US foreign aid to Afghanistan in the immediate post World War II was to counter Soviet domination of the country. To this end the US provided educational, economic and financial aid to Afghanistan to lay the ground work for US cultural and political influence there. US counter interventionist strategy during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was intended to make the country a 'Soviet-Vietnam'. The US provided financial aid to the Islamists battling the Soviet forces through the Pakistan's ISI agency. The US did not bother to see how Pakistan distribute the money and as long as Pakistan

remained a front-line state against Soviet threat southward the US went along with its Afghan policies.

With the demise of the Soviet imperial state in 1990 'the new world order' doctrine of the US administration intended to promote liberal capitalism and its politics at the international arena. With the establishment of an Islamic state in Kabul in 1992 the United States regarded Kabul's close ties with Iran and Russia to run counter to its efforts in containing Iran, which Washington believes lends support to 'international terrorism'. The US administration adopted a wait and see approach toward the civil war in Afghanistan claiming that it does not support one faction over the other. When the Taliban seized power in Kabul the US administration regarded the change there as a positive development. Executive officials of US oil companies visited Qandahar to persuade the Taliban to support the construction of a pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan.

The US administration supported the Taliban, behind the scenes, regarding them as a potential force capable of stabilizing the country, but publicly distancing itself from them because of the latter's rigid Islamization policies and practices, especially those that oppress women. In short, the 'new world order' doctrine not only led to the destruction of Afghanistan but also to continuing civil war in the post-Soviet era in the country.

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Chapter-11

TALIBAN AND THE POST TALIBAN SCENARIO

The horrific nature of the attacks of 11 September enabled the United States to mobilize widespread international support. On 12 September, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1368, effectively authorizing the use of force in response to the events of 11 September. All major powers, including china, denounced the attacks. NATO invoked articles 5 provisions, defining the attacks on United States as an attack on all numbers of the alliance. However, US policymakers were intent on building a US-directed coalitions of the willing not one involving collective decision-making. The United States would request specific support consult with coalition numbers, but reserve decision-making for itself. While NATO acceded to US requests for deployment of AWACS aircraft and other support only Britain became an immediate close collaborator in Afghanistan. Japan agreed to provide intelligence and logistical support within its constitutional constraints. Singapore became of key importance in facilitating air-to-air refueling and providing port facilities to US carries. Russia provided a significant and unusual quantity of military information.

Coalition-building in the region was operationally more essential than elsewhere, but proved more difficult. Afghanistan, a landlocked, remote and mountainous

country is situated far from US bases and facilities. Even the impressive power-projection capabilities of the US armed forces would be severely tested in this conflict. At the outside of the conflict, the United States had no access to bases or facilities in any of Afghanistan's neighbors. Basing operation in the Persian Gulf was problematic because a US presence threatened to touch on political sensitivities. Bin Laden and the Taliban enjoyed political support among a substantial minority of the population and political elites of certain countries-in particular, US allies Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia notably declined to authorize the operation of combat aircraft from its air bases. Iran had been anti-US since the 1979 Islamic revolution and subsequent hostage crises. Although Iran had almost gone to war with the Taliban regime after it had killed ten Iranian diplomats and one Iranian journalist 1998, Iran refused to grant access to its air space for coalition aircraft, despite diplomatic appeals by Britain.

With coalition support in place, the United States still needed to establish a realistic plan for a transitional government in Afghanistan. This entailed navigating internal Afghani politics. First it had to establish partnerships and working relationships with anti-Taliban Afghan forces in order to win the war. Second, it had to pave the way for a post-Taliban successor regime that would establish stability and ensure that terrorist organizations could not re-establish themselves in the country after the war. In limited covert operations targeting bin Laden and al-Qaeda before 11 September the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been providing limited funding to the Northern Alliance and had established connections with certain tribal leaders in southern Afghanistan, including Hamid Karzai, who had friendly relations with Northern Alliance leaders.

In navigating internal Afghan politics, US policymakers had two groups with which it felt it could work the Northern Alliance and the Rome group.

The Northern Alliance, composed of the remnants of the Rabbani government, was the only opposition group with forces in the field. Narrowly based on segments of the Uzbek and Tajik ethnic groups and the mainly Shiite Hazara, which together account for about 30% of Afghanistan's population, its military leader was the charismatic Ahmad Shah Massoud. He was killed by two al-Qaeda suicide-bombers posing as Arab journalist on 9 September 2001 in what is widely regarded as the operational prelude to the 11 September attacks. After Massoud's death, the Northern Alliance's top political leaders were two Islamist figures from the anti-Soviet resistance, Rabbani and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, and one former Uzbek Communist general, Rashid Dostum. Mullah Muhammad Qassam Fahim, who had served as the intelligence chief in Rabbani's government and who had been involved in widespread violence against opposition political groups in the 1990s, assumed command. Estimates indicated that the Northern Alliance had between 10,000 and 15,000 fighters and controlled 5-15% of the country's territory. The alliance's financial and logistical support came largely from Russia and Iran, though additional funds were raised through drug trafficking.

The Rome group was organized around the former king of Afghanistan, Mohammad Zahir Shah, an ethnic Pashtun who resides in Rome. It was composed of royalist elements, pro-Western and moderate elements of the anti-Soviet resistance, technocrats from the pre-Communist government of Afghanistan and leaders of the country's tribal and clan structures. Its social base extended throughout the country but was particularly strong in the Pashtun regions in the south and east. Even

before 11 September, their goal was to convene a grand national council, or *loya jirga*, that would include representatives of all ethnic and social groups in Afghanistan and would create a provisional government, with the former king as the unifying symbol. In their view, this would enable them to mobilise political and military opposition to the Taliban and facilitate defections among commanders aligned with the Taliban out of expedience rather than ideological conviction. Ultimately, such a strategy would topple the Taliban regime. Much of the political work, particularly establishing contacts with traditional leaders and commanders, had been done over course of several years. From an operational point of view, the major shortcoming of the Rome group was its lack of troops in the field. It had not succeeded in recruiting the support of any major regional power for its programme. Pakistan, in light of its strong support of the Taliban, refused to allow the Rome group to operate in its territory. Despite Congressional support for the Rome process, the Bush administration harboured serious doubts about its capacity to win hearts and minds in Afghanistan.

After 11 September, US officials quickly contacted both the Northern Alliance and the Rome group but soon chose the Northern Alliance as its principal partner. At first, there was some momentum in favour of fashioning a coalition between the two groups. The Northern Alliance sent commanders to meet with the former king and the Rome group, which was enthusiastic about creating a common front. US officials only half-heartedly pressed for a coalition, while more seriously pursuing military cooperation with the Northern Alliance, including provision of material and financial support and the building of an airstrip in Golbahar.

(War in Afghanistan. pp.233-234)

Earlier Pakistan, being the only country that recognized the Taliban, had also made very possible

attempt to convince them to heed the demands of the international community. Pakistan 's efforts including the sending of three successive high-level delegations to the Taliban leadership shortly before October 7,2001, in order to prevent the inevitable air strikes. The Taliban, unfortunately, did not change their rigid stand on the issue. The international media, at the same time, ignoring the positive role on the part of Pakistan to make the Taliban leadership consider the international demands, began blaming Pakistan for siding with the Taliban in promoting and protecting terrorism. Given the fact the Pakistan maintained its diplomatic relations, as its President started to keep the window of diploma cy open, the negative media projection, not only made Pakistan completely isolated on its Afghan policy, but damaged its credibility as well by a disproportionate focus on the religious extremist groups, who were sympathizers and supporters of the Taliban. Pakistan's rational decision on, September 15,2001, to join the international anti-terrorism coalition in own national interest followed its sincere and rational efforts to try and convince the Taliban leadership.

According to the Brahimi Plan, it was decided that the first meeting of the Afghan groups be convened in Bonn in the last week of November, 2001. The four major Afghan groups, (the Northern Alliance, the Rome Group, the Cyprus Group and the Peshawar Group), gathered in Bonn (Germany) on November 26, initially only for one day, to discuss the political future of the country. The meeting extended to a nine days marathon consultation. The four groups concluded an agreement on an interim setup, on December 5, 2001.¹⁰ This positive development indicated that the Afghans had realized that enough was enough and it was time for the restoration of peace, national reconciliation, reconstruction and development

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Chapter-12

A ROAD TO NOWHERE AFGHANISTAN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE TALIBAN.

Riccardo Redaelli ⁽¹⁾

When, on 27 September 1996, after long months of fighting, the Taliban eventually conquered Kabul, the fate for President Burhanoddin Rabbani, for the Tajik hero Ahmad Shah Mas'ud and the other Mujaheddin leaders seemed to be doomed. Taliban warriors posed in front of the Gulkhana Palace after the hanging of the former President Najibullah; Pakistan-which has always backed them, notwithstanding repeated official denials ¹ offered diplomatic 'protection' to the newly established temporary government; for the US, they represented a profitable pawn in the complicated game both against Iran and for control of Central-Asian transit routes.²

The great commercial route, which would connect Central Asia with the Indian Ocean via Pakistan and Afghanistan, with a complex network of pipelines, railways and highways, seemed no longer a remote dream.³ Pakistan thought this project could partially solve its growing economic and financial crisis, and underline the country's

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geostrategic importance, challenged by the end of the Cold War. Saudi Arabia and the US sponsored it, more due to regional geopolitical reasons than economic ones, since Iran was Pakistan 's major competitor for handling the transit trade traffic from Central Asia.⁴ Their concern about Iran 's future geoeconomic role vis-à-vis the five Central Asian republics- and m consequently, about its strategic importance over the whole region-was the ultimate reason, although not the only one, for supporting the Pakistani option.

But ion 1994 the situation in Afghanistan was far from being settled: after the collapse of the Najibullah regime in 1992, the political, ethnic and military fragmentation of the country had been exacerbated by the feuds and rivalry amongst the Mujahideen warlords. All the attempts to solve the civil war failed during the following years, all the agreements were broken. Therefore, the meteoric rise of the Taliban in the autumn of 1994, when they captured the city of Qandahar and conquered several provinces in south-east Afghanistan, was welcomed as a possible solution to this never-ending war.

The Taliban claimed to be students of the *madrasah* (Islamic colleges'), organized in the Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan and North-West Frontier by the radical Jima'at-i- Islami (JUI) led by the controversial *Maulana* Fazlur Rah man.⁵ Their ultimate goal was to unify Afghanistan under a strong 'Islamic government', reimposing a narrow-minded and dogmatic view of Shari'ah law (according to the strict Sunni Deoband school): but notwithstanding their claim to represent all the ethnic and cultural communities of Afghanistan, they were essentially a Pashtun movement, with little support from other ethnic groups, such as the Hazaras, Tajiks and Uzbeks.

Driven out of Kabul by the Tajik militia, in 1995 the Taliban, who were still unable to conquer the capital,

obtained significant success with the stunning capture of the city of Herat, gateway to Turkmenistan and Central Asia, and traditionally under Iranian influence. This move increased Iran's concern towards this movement of 'warrior-students', and provoked a shift from its previous policy. After the fall of Herat, Tehran decided to assist and support the Rabbani government, sponsoring direct peace talks amongst the different Mujahideen factions in order to avoid a hazardous fragmentation of the country, and aiming to isolate Pakistan and the Taliban movement. Russia and India reacted too. Both the former, worried by the spread of this radical Islamic movement on the frontiers of its 'near abroad', and the latter, due to its historically-rooted enmity with Pakistan, strengthened their ties with the Tajik government in Kabul, backing it with political support and military aid.

On a regional basis, the results were the worsening of the relations of these three states with Pakistan, which was clearly supporting the Taliban forces, and the stalling of the projected trans-Amu Darya commercial route. And then, in 1996, after the failure of several efforts for a peaceful solution of the Afghan problem, suddenly the Taliban captured Kabul, pushing Mas'ud back to the Panjshir Valley and ousting the Rabbani government. They tried to crush definitely the military strength of the Tajik leaders, to secure their position and to conquer the strategic Salang pass, meanwhile forcing the Uzbek warlord, Abdul Rashid Dostum, to accept an agreement on their terms.

But the Taliban forces were unable to achieve any of these goals. At the beginning of October, Mas'ud launched a counterattack southwards, and at present his forces are not far from the capital. The city of Herat and the route to Turkmenistan are always under threat from the new 'army' of Ismail Khan, Iranian protégé and former 'Governor' of Herat, which has been reorganized and re-armed with the aid of the Tehran government. However,

the major failure of the Taliban and their supporters was the failure of their peace talks with Dostum. Pakistan tried its best to force him to talks; but, although the then Minister of Interior, General Nasirullah Babur, and the Jui leaders, Fazlur Rahman, held personal meetings with him, the Uzbek warlord could not be coerced to accept the Taliban's proposals. On the contrary, he closed a defensive alliance with Mas'ud, supporting the Tajik forces with his 'personal army'.

On a regional level, the fall of Kabul has excited suspicions and fears in some of the neighbouring states-Iran, Russia, the Central Asian republics-of a possible spill-over into Central Asia of fundamentalist and radical Islamic movements, which could affect stability and increase inter-ethnic and social tensions. In particular, it is well known that the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan is of particular concern for Russia. It is in Russia's crucial interest to strengthen the territorial integrity of the Central Asian states and to promote a closer common military and political policy. Thus the survival of strategic buffer areas controlled by friendly warlords, such as those in the Tajik and Uzbek northern provinces of Afghanistan, represents a vital interest for Russia and the Central Asian countries.

A relevant factor in this new political atmosphere is certainly the final declaration of the emergency meeting of CIS states (with the significant exception of Turkmenistan, who did not attend the meeting) in Almaty on 4 October 1996, which warned that 'they would take appropriate measures to defend their interests' if the Taliban tried to take their struggle across the border into Central Asia. This means to prevent the fundamentalist militia from conquering the north of Afghanistan and reaching the frontier of Russia's so-called 'soft underbelly'. On the Afghan-Tajik frontier Russian border troops and soldiers of the CIS Peace-Keeping Force are involved in a difficult fight against both the Islamic opposition to the government

of Tajikistan's President Imomali Rakhmonov, and drug and weapons smugglers. Once again, the Afghan situation is the principal root of these problems.

The worsening of the situation in Tajikistan,⁷ where the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) claims substantial territorial gains, and illicit smuggling and violence are spreading, now affects not only the south of the republic but also the Ferghana Valley and the porous border with Kyrgyzstan (60 km from the region controlled by the Tajik rebels). Therefore strategic interests and priorities are changing, even for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which have shown, during the last few years, the major interest in the Pakistani-Saudi Arabian-American project. The Turkmen position is still determined by the already mentioned gas pipeline project, since the victory of the Taliban forces represents the first step towards its realization. For Uzbekistan, the disintegration of Afghanistan-and Tajikistan, likewise- creates a political vacuum which breeds the myth of the 'recreation' of 'Greater Uzbekistan'. But for these governments, the Taliban's roughness, their radical views, their connections with other militant Islamic movements and Pakistan's inadequacy to control them are probably too high a price for remote and uncertain geoeconomic scenarios, such as the Trans-Amu Darya Trade Route. Finally, with the polarization of antagonistic regional alliances backing the two Afghan factions, these two countries cannot exacerbate the reaction of the Russian Federation joining the coalition which supports the Taliban forces.

Consequently, after the fall of Kabul, CIS military and logistic aid to Rabbani and Dostum increased, under the guise of humanitarian assistance. Russia, Tajikistan, china and India pressured Uzbekistan not to allow Dostum to accept peace proposals from the Pakistani government or from the Taliban themselves, unless the Taliban leaders accepted a withdrawal of their troops from the capital. This

strict position probably contributed to the failure of the UN-sponsored talks between the afghan faction during the last month of November, led by the UN Special envoy, Norbert Holl.

And since, in Pakistan, the political and economic crisis is deepening, with the apparent short-circuit of its decision-making apparatus, Islamabad influence over these 'worrier-students' is taking declining. Pakistan seems to be tracked in a deadlock situation., where it can only try to sustain the Taliban's rule in Kabul, without being able to control or to advise them. Probably, it was it was the same Pakistani policy concerning Afghanistan and central Asia that was wrong: to hope that the Taliban movement could serve to promote economic ties with central Asia is 'to ignore the character, its policies and proclamation. To think that Taliban control over the country would open the doors to close the economic Cooperation with central Asia will not be right...' ⁸

Indeed, the Taliban movement, characterized by a strict tribal Pashtun ethos and by dogmatic religious views, could affect stability within Pakistan's own North-West Frontier Province. Here, radical Islamic groups, demenading a complete Islamisation of Pakistani regislation, have already increase their activities, as well as their aggression- mainly against the Shi'ite minorities. Moreover, as the Taliban is mainly a Pashtun movement, the possible disaggregation of Afghanistan along ethnic could provoke a 'domino' effect, destabilizing Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province, both through the resurgence of the ideology of 'Great Pashtunistan' and through the revival of the historical antagonism between Baluchis and Pushtuns.

In such a situation, the America position also needs to be clarified. After sponsoring, directly pr indirectly, the 'Taliban card', the US is keeping its distance, probably afraid of meeting the same problems with the Taliban as it

suffered with Hekmetyar during the 1980s' that is, the impossibility of controlling them. On a regional basis, as a result of sponsoring a dogmatic and radical regime in Kabul, the US may drive more problems than profit.

As in the past, Afghanistan could be a tarp for all the foreign players.

(Courtesy, Central Asian Journal. No-45)

Chapter-13

PERSPECTIVE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND CENTRAL AISA AFTER THE BREAK UP OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION



Dr. Mohammad Anwar khan⁽¹⁾

1. (i) Pakistan's amicability to the area called central Asia and now dotted with five new states, as a consequence of the liquidation of the Soviet Union in December 1991, is multi dimensional. Pakistan emerged on the world map as an ideological prior to 1947 there exists a pro-Islamic sentiment even for the Muslim population placed out side the indo-Pakistan sub-continent.

The founder leaders of the movement and later the political party (Muslim League) in their sessional meetings often talked about the issues confronting the Millah everywhere on the globe. The Russo-Turkish war (1877), the Anglo-Afghan war (1878). The Greco-Turkish war (1897) formed part of some of its 19th century sessional proceedings, while the

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Balkan-war, Russia encroachment on the Persian territory, the Western occupation of the Arab land, fall of Amanullah in Afghanistan, the Palestine issue, the West's tentacles in North Africa (Libya, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), the Dutch landing of 1946 in Indonesia, formed part of the worry and concern in the resolutions of the Muslim League in this century. The liberation of around fifty million Central Asian Muslims from Russian rule necessarily is taken with excitement and anxiety in Pakistan.

- (ii) Central Asia holds signed significance for the land and people of Pakistan. Its culture and the society are central Asian. South Asia has been on the natural track of the north westerners compelled by geo-political hazards finding safe and solvent haven in its warm climate and vast resources. Islam was born in Arabia but it came to south Asia through the Central Asian channel. Islam was introduced in Central Asia in the 7th century AD but moved into the subcontinent of Indo-Pakistan three centuries later. A new culture and society was shaped in Central Asia during the course of this period. Though the subcontinent had been the haunt of the Central Asian invaders since time immemorial yet it never had such constant and regular flow from the northwest as from the later half of the tenth to the middle of the sixteenth century.

Central Asia during this period had established some of the finest seats of medieval learning and handicrafts in its cities at Bukhara, Khiva, Samarkand, Farghana, Khokand, Charkent, Osh and Andijan becoming models and objects of emulation in the newly re-emerging socio political

community in the subcontinent. For about seven centuries the subcontinent remained under the spell of Central Asia thereby setting a politico religious environment which became the harbinger of an organizational system leading to the creation of Pakistan. Almost all ruling houses during this period came from Central Asia. Of the four great mystic orders three Naqshbandiah, Suharwardiah and Chishtiah hailed from Central Asia. To name a few saints, All Hajveri, Khawaja Ajmeri, Ali Hamdani, Mujadid Sarhindi, Shah Nematullah, Khawaja Baqi Billah were Central Asians.

- (iii) Arabic, Persian, Uzbeki subsequently assuming the new names of Dari and Urdu grew out of amalgamation with Sanskrit and Hindi. So was the rise of a new architecture. The Turco-Islamic buildings, followed by an astounding process of painting and calligraphy. The Chughtai art ----- back to this period. The new dress and cuisine changed the outward look of the society. Qablah, Kulah, Salwar, Pagri, Topi, Pishwaz, Dupata and Lehnga replaced local Sari and Dhoti. Meat dishes replaced pulses and vegetables. Halwah, Kabab, Korma, Koftah, Zardah, Pulao, Somosa, Katlama and Chapati added new taste to eating habits. The word Khan adorns majority of Muslim names in the subcontinent. The addition of Beg, Chughtai, Bukhari, Badakhshani, Lodhi, Ghoris and afghani with our names is a distinct testimony to our Central Asia connection. It may be of further interest to know that some of the major cities of the subcontinent like Karachi, Agra, Gujrat, Delhi and Mazang have been named after their earlier synonyms in Central Asia.

- 2(i) A geo-political factor was imminently noticed by Pakistani strategists at the dawn of the Muslim

sates to the northwest of Pakistan. Pakistan physically is placed in oblong position (1600x885 kms) with small depth in front of a hostile neighbor in the east. Northwest beyond Afghanistan was a closed door. The northern connections were only discernable, in the historical perspective and had little commercial or strategic use for the early policy makers. Pakistan therefore continued to shut its eyes to the north, until the emergence of new realities. Both public and government were excitedly awakened to the situation and attempts at all levels commenced forthwith to revive the links, Pakistan was probably the first to send a 23 members delegation drawn from industrialists, businessmen and subject experts in November 1991 to visit the new Muslim states of Central Asia and apprise them of the cordiality prevailing for them in Pakistan. It has been followed by many more such visits by important political leaders and technical experts placing the area high on the foreign policy priority list. The heads of government and administration from both sides have visited each other and 55 protocols, agreements and memoranda have been signed to promote educational facilities, trade relations, energy cooperation, tourism, postal and telecommunication services along with easing up road link obstacles in the area². The area states along with Afghanistan and Azerbaijan also form part of the ECO since November 1992. Embassies have been established in each others capitals. Airlines have been established through PIA from Peshawar, Islamabad and Karachi to Tashkand. Islamabad is linked again with Almati and Karachi with Ashkabad. Bishkek will shortly be air linked with Pakistan followed by Dushanbe. Similarly the Uzbek airline has linked

Pakistan with Tashkand. Pakistan extended a credit of \$10 million to each of the Central Asian States with \$20million additional to Kazakhstan. Pakistani entrepreneur has offered to set up a textile mill in Uzbekistan and a Cement plant in Kazakhstan. These are a few, though sound but insignificant, instances that can be quoted governing the underlying will permeating in the issue.

- 3(i) economically the area presents vast pot entail both as mineral kingdom and a consumer market. Spread over an area of 3,994,100 sq. kms, with a population exceeding 50 million souls, is a subject of attraction to all neighbours and regional powers. Central Asia was governed by command economy regulations catering to industrial needs of the big brother. This south north service partially exhausted the granary and mineral properties of the south, along with enlarging its consuming capacity and hence at the end game the Central Asians found themselves cash stripped sovereign states running around the globe bowl in hand for help and assistance. It urged them to see options open to them.

Option No.1:

A Turkic nations alliance with five Central "Asian states, joined by Turkey (Istanbul declaration October 1994) forming as politico economic grouping provided one such opening. Turkey, as of ethnic affiliation currently is the biggest donor (\$ 1.2 billion) to the Central Asian States. It has invested another \$ 5.5 billion in other technical and economic programme in Central Asia and Azarbaijan. A large number of Central Asian students (8400) are studying in Turkish educational institutions. The problem with this alliance is that Turkey does not border Central Asia.

3(ii) Option No.2:

Iran offers another option, it borders Turkomanistan both by land and through the Caspian and the latter connects it with Kazakhstan also. Iran has extended its cash credit and transit route facilities to the Central Asian States by signing a number of protocols with these states, notable amongst them are oil and gas transmission agreements with Turkomanistan and Kazakhstan. At the Iran-Turcoman border about a dozen crossing points have been opened to facilitate goods exchange. Iran intends connecting Tejen in Turkomanistan through the Sarakhs border post with Mashhad railway line which will further link Central Asia with the Persian Gulf. Iran has also signed an agreement for laying a Turkomanian pipeline onward to 'Europe. Iran has invested \$ 49 million in building the Aktau, Caspian port of Kazakhstan to link with Bandar 'Anzali, the Iranian port in the south on the Caspian, thus paving the way for the Tengiz oil field of Kazakhstan to be operative through the south west.

3.(iii) Option No.3:

Russia remains offering its good offices through CIS to the Central Asians, expressing also its displeasure with ECO and Turkish offers. The West joins it in countering the Iranian influence in the area. Russia through its aid packages ranging from 40 to 70% of GDP, intends keeping hold over its southern rim land. It also provides credit on flexible terms with tempting access to its industrial produce. Under the CIS economic cooperation programme. Moscow has legalized its veto (50% voting right) in economic affairs of these states. Moscow is also meeting their Western trade demand through quick disposal at the Baltic ports.

4(i)Option NO.4:

Pakistan does not border any Central Asian State; in between lies currently strife ridden Afghanistan and land locked area of Peoples Republic of China. Pakistan opens Central Asia to south Asian, southeast Asian and European goods and markets. It also provides the shortest outlet to the world seas. There are currently four entry points for Pakistan into Central Asia, three via Afghanistan and one through the Sinkiang Province of PRC. Pakistan can reach three Central Asian States (Tajikistan, Turkomanistan and Uzbekistan) through Afghanistan and a similar number (Tajakistan, Kirghizistan and Kazakistan) through the Karakoram-Sinkiang route.

4(ii) Afghan Routes:

- a) Tajikistan entry via Sher Khan Bandar (Qunduz Province) is a ferry service on the Amu. It connects Pakistan via Salang Pass, Kabul and Peshawar.
- b) Uzbekistan may be penetrated through Hairataan (Balkh Province) across a bridge over the Amu into Termez. This route too passes through the Salang pass via Kabul south eastward into Peshawar.
- c) Turkomanistan is linked with Heart through Torghundi-Kushka points. The route passes through Qandahar into Chaman.

Sinkiang Routes:

The Karakorum highway finds prominence in this link programme. A quadrilateral agreement concluded in October 1993 between China, Kazakistan, Kirghizistan and Pakistan provides for transit trade facilities on the Karakorum highway. This highway inside Pakistan Thahkote to Khunjrab (625 km) needs improvement as land slides often remain disturbing its traffic. The Chinese side

Khunjab to Kashgar (350 km) however is well maintained and better laid with the exception of three seasonal streams that remain disturbing this line." The road offers entry into Tajikistan from Tashkurgan Junction into Murtghab valley passing north east of lake Zarkul (Tajikistan). Kashgar road further on provides sentry into Kirghizistan at the Torghat (Torugart) Pass connecting Bishkek via Narin at a distance of 110 kms. Almati is placed 150 kms northwest-ward to Bishkek. Total distance lately worked out by travelers and field specialists from Almati to Islamabad comes to 2200 kms. Karachi is further placed at 1581 kms southward

- 4(iii) The easiest Afghani routes are Torghundi and Hairataan. Torghundi is placed near Baluchistan province of Pakistan, while Hairataan similarly connects Peshawar through the Khyber Pass and Chaman via Heart with Pakistan. Torghunmdi is placed at about 951 kms distance from Chaman and Hairataan is at a distance of about 875 kms, with Torkham (Khyber Pass). Karachi's distance is 1794 kms from Torkham and 666 kms from Chaman.
- 4(iv) The Indus highway now under construction is likely to reduce distance on all directions. Provision of port facilities at Gwader can further shorten distance and time worries. Plans are also underway to open Chitral (Garam Chashma) Wakhan route into Tajikistan but this is the toughest terrain chisling through Hindukush Pamir lines and once completed would provide for all weather road into Chitral through the Lowari Pass of NWFP.
- 4(v) Now working on the available data in public, the distance on the roads, under current use between Almati to Karachi via KKH Gilgat-Islamabad is 3708 kms. Tashkand Karachi via Kabul-Peshawar-Lahore-Hyderabad is 3209 kms, and the distance between

Ashkabad Torghundi Chaman Khazadar Karachi comes to 2255 kms.

A quick glance at the port facilities available to the Central Asians at Novorossiysk the Russian port at the black sea, the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas on the Indian Ocean, will be interesting Karachi falls closer to Almati, Bishkek or Dushanbe as compared to Novorossiysk, Vladivostok or Bandar Abbas. Novorossiysk may have some utility for Tashkand, but it falls over 400 kms from it. Bandar Abbas is located more or less 2200 kms. From Ashkabad. ³ Bandar Bahishti will add further 300 kms. distance.

6. Pakistan, India and some of the other countries could become good buyers for Central Asian fuel, gas, pig iron, and cotton items. South Asia also proves the biggest consumers market. Central Asians need variety of consumers' goods from tooth paste to stitched cloth, garments, pharmaceuticals leather goods, processed food, rice, sugar, citrus and mangifera fruits and durous vegetables. India could divert its transit trade this way to Central Asia. Pakistan despite many handicaps has transacted some gains during the last three years. Uzbekistan remained the biggest buyer for the Pakistani goods at Rs.1.32 million in 1991-92, to Rs.84.41 millions in 1992-93. Kazakhstan exported goods worth Rs.78.54 million, Tajikistan Rs.2.39 million, Turkomanistan Rs.1.88 million and Karghizistan Rs.528, 000 from Pakistan during 1992-93. The figures for the years 1993-95 for Pakistan's import and export in million of US dollars are given below:

Country	Import 1993- 94	Import 1994- 95	Export 1993- 94	<u>Export</u> <u>1994-</u> <u>95</u>

Kazakistan	0.070	2.177	8.958	7.873
Kirghizistan	0.129	0.011	0.308	0.994
Tajikistan	0.002	1.297	1.156	1.564
Turkomanistan	-	0.383	1.661	9.813
Uzbekistan	0.056	4.084	17.917	22.907

- 6.(1) Having said all this rather in an optimistic tone, we should keep in mind the ground realities as a consequence of the geo-political imperatives of the area. Freedom to central Asia had not come on demand, rather initially they were not even included in the earlier (Brest Dec.8, 1991) Common weaklth. The Central Asians were neither physically nor mentally prepared to should the new responsibilities. Inside Russia colonial resuscitation has lately made powerful expression and forced Yeltsin to enunciate his "near abroad" formula, which re-extends Russian sphere of influence to the old borders. The Central Asian States faced by internal politico-economic disorder acquiesce to the new prescription, even the defiant Tajik leaders acknowledge Russian stake in the area. Nor would any sane Central Asia leader be able to repudiate new Russian interest in the area.
- 6.(ii) The ruling junta in the Central Asian states, one must appreciate, is Moscow trained, is pro-Moscow and is drawn from the urban society, is secularized and is scared of the rural conservatism. They find comfort with the existing slavic ties. Religion endangers their power bases, though almost all heads of states, excepting Tajikistan which is locked up in system struggle, have extended their tenure of office till the end of this century and some even beyond it.
- 6.(iii) Central Asian cultural orientation with the north carries powerful stimulus. It is getting hard to break

off instantaneously. The language, the literature and above all the art and music remain carrying their spells and it would take ages before they overcome it.

- 6.(iv) Dependence on Russian army and equipment is another important factor fgorging unity in their geo-political perception. Russia in defence do main extends liberal cooperation to keep m,onopoly of their arms supply and other strategic needs. Early th is year (1995) 17 defence agreements were signed with Kazakistan, four meant to lease out nuclear bases to Russia. Tajikistan is housing more than 20,000 Russian soldiers to flight its Islamic protagonists. A large number of Russian troops (15000) till late were guarding the Turkoman border with Iran, though lately reported Russian soldiery were substituted by local militia but still are officered by the Russians. Over 5000 Russian soldiers are reported present in Uzbekistan with around .3500 in Kirghizistan. By one of Russo-Kazak military pacts both the Kazak and the Russians will serve in each others armed forces.
- 6.(v) The existing economic ties further grid them together. All communication lines pass through Moscow. America's Chevron and British Gas (AGIP) failed to transmit Kazak gas to Europe, as the Russian pipeline refused to accommodate it. Russian roadway and telecommunication at the moment serve lifeline for Central Asia and they find no alternative to the available infrastructure.
- 6.(vi) Moscow also receives support form the West in its south servile policy, as it serves its dual purpose of restricting fundamentalism and containing Iran. The West's sermons to Russia differ in dealing with the Balkan and other Eurasian groups. The civil war in Afghanistan has handicapped Central Asian South

eastward commercial drive and Iran's confrontation with the West obstructs their south west bound trade., Russia currently is meeting out their all western and far eastern demands from its Baltic ports (St.Petersburg, Murmansk, Tver, Archangelsk), Vladivostok and from Novorossiysk.

7. Leaderships crisis in Russia is likely to result in most unpredictable political scenario in the region. New Duma will be elected in December this year, followed by presidential elections the following June. Yeltsin is weary. Retiring army generals are entering politics. Alexander Rutskoi has already made headlines in news media. Generals Lev Rokhlin, Boris Gromov, Alexander Lebed are some of the names that have lately come to political surface. Duma is likely to be cosmopolitan, as 262 political parties have been formed till August this year (1995). A weak parliament, with a hard lining executive faced by sick economy, rampant corruption and incessant internal lawlessness, may disturb the existing equilibrium with the south. It will necessarily weaken the present political elites hold in Central Asia, may spark nascent wave of nationalism, which finds rescue in religion in the East.

8. To sum up Pakistan's rapport with central Asia stems out of its past traditions, current geo-political necessities and futuristic economic imperatives which hitherto remained mystified as political events of early 90s concerning Soviet Union remained unpredictable. There is a political will discernible on both sides which will find its blossoming over the time.

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(Courtesy, Central Asia No.38, Summer. 1996, Peshawar University, Peshawar)

Chapter -14

POWER GAME IN CENTRAL ASIA

Lieutenant Colonel Asim Saleem Bajwa⁽¹⁾

Introduction

The emergence of five independent Central Asian States (CAS) in the wake of collapse of Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991 came as a surprise to the entire world. Having lived under a highly centralized Soviet system for decades. CAS neither had any experience in international politics, nor any exposure to governance of a state, nor was caught unprepared. The security and ideological levels to the enormous energy and mineral resource potential of the region. What ensued was a re-enactment of the 19th .Century *Great Game*; a race for influence. While the regional powers are attempting to exert their cultural and religious affinity to fill the vacuum and seize a big economic market, the great powers look at the region as an alternative source of energy and are concentrating on monopolizing their control. Such a race, apart from hampering the development of these states, is disregarding the underlying potential for division and internal conflict, causing instability in the region.

The complex nature of the internal dynamics of these states presents serious challenges to their existence, warranting an immediate relief in the development of

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institutions and their economics. The inheritance of underdeveloped economics, failed centralized political systems and resurgent nationalist and religious forces have negatively impacted these societies. In addition to the tensions between titular nationalities and imported minorities, their division on the basis of clans, tribes and dialects has added to the complexity.

Due to lack of finance and inadequate transport and communication infrastructure the vast energy and mineral resources have remained untapped. Reforms have so far not met much significant success due to corruption and ex-communist party leadership who switched their loyalties from the Soviet system to their titular nationalities, disregarding the large mix of minorities. Political systems are gradually shifting back to the centralized system of governance. Nationalist Islam and Iranian style fundamentalism emerged as an attractive substitute to communism with sufficient underlying support from the Muslim population.

This paper will attempt to analyze the interests of various players seeking influence in the CAS and its effect on the stability of the region. In the internal dimension it will analyze the potential for instability and its linkages with the external influence of particular players. In the external dimension, it will analyze the interests of the actors participating in the power game and strategies employed by them to achieve their goals. For this purpose, it will utilize the articulation of *Power* by Zbigniew Brezinski as the aggregate of military, economic, cultural and technological dimensions.

Central Asia as a Region.

Central Asia consists of five states of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan and is

located at the crossroads, linking Europe and Asia. While four Central Asian Republics account together for 1.3 million square kilometers, Kazakhstan alone is 2.7 million square kilometers, being twice the size of the other four combined and as large as India.¹ Its long borders with the other regional states expose it to the outside world. Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, and Tajikistan have over 3000 miles common border with China. Turkmenistan has an unguarded border of 1100 miles with Iran. The region is land locked and routes to the sea are long and arduous. In the South, it is some 1400 miles through Iran and Pakistan to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, to the 'West 2000 miles through Russia to the Black Sea and 3000 miles through China to South China Sea².

Total population of the five Central Asian Republics is 51.5 million, 32.6 percent of which is in Kazakhstan. 40.5 percent in Uzbekistan, 10.57 percent in Tajikistan, 8.73 percent in Kyrgystan and 7.37 percent in Turkmenistan³. This population includes more than hundred different ethnic groups from Germans and Austrians to Tibetans and Koreans. The Uzbek population is the highest and also forms a substantial minority in the four other republics⁴.

Central Asia has a vast resource base. Together Azerbaijan and Central Asia possess 7.5 trillion cubic metres of known, and an estimated 20 trillion undiscovered, reserves of natural gas, Gas reserves of Turkmenistan (3rd largest in the world) alone are twice those of the North Sea and four times those of the Gulf of Mexico. Tenghiz oilfield of Kazakhstan, one of the largest, has 22 billion barrels with the potential to rise to 50 billions while Turkmenistan's undiscovered reserves are estimated at 37 billion barrels⁵. Kazakhstan with its rich oil and gas reserves is likely to become the Kuwait of the future⁶. Uzbekistan is claimed to have the largest gold deposits in the world⁷ and is currently the eighth largest gold producer

and fourth largest cotton producer in the world. The main mineral riches of Kazakhstan include coal, gold, titanium, aluminum and iron ore. Its communication infrastructure is better developed and major projects like the space launch facility in Bikanour and nuclear installations were established here⁸.

THE INTERNAL DIMENSION

Political Factors.

The democratic fragility of the political system and the remanants of the *old guard* occupying leadership positions are the two main political factors which contribute to internal instability in the region. This has increased discontent within society, which is being exploited by external powers, fuelling internal tensions.

The present political system of all the states has been described as secular and democratic with separate powers for the executive, legislature and the judiciary⁹. However, a lot of contradictions are found in the application of the newly enunciated constitutions. Pursuit of a nationalist agenda and banning of political parties unmask the democratic and secular character of the governments. Most of the opposition parties have not been able to register themselves. Suppression of democratic political processes has promoted existing sub national trends.

_____ In 1987, many informal groups, which had initially emerged on the political scene to restore national culture and language, shifted their focus towards a political agenda and independence for their respective states by late 1991¹⁰. However, all such groups including Islamic parties have been banned by their governments and their leadership has been persecuted." The new anti terror campaign has been exploited by governments to crack down on their opponents and secure their political future. Meanwhile, new parties are being sponsored by the Governments to be

used as a vehicle to their position ¹¹. It has prevented transformation of, these parties into a credible political force, and has increased friction between the nationalists and the government. None of the pre-conditions for a democratic political system exist in these states ¹².

All of the president Central Asian leaders were members of the Communist party and appointed by Gorbachev to speed up his reforms¹³. they were allowed to continue at the time of independence, as there was no alternative source of power. Even the new leadership that emerged as opposition was from amongst the alienated communist party leaders who were looking for an opportunity to rise¹⁴.

Economic Problems

Lack of cash, infrastructure and investment, resulting from the Russian incapacity to develop the region, are some of the economic factors causing instability. Being part of the Soviet Union, diversified or independent economic development of republic was hampered by centralized economic planning. Each state served to provide a particular kind of raw material to meet the consumption and exports targets of the centre¹⁵. this turned them into uni-crop agriculture economies with wasteful production. Cotton formed 81 percent of Uzbekistan's and 98 percent of Tajikistan's exports in 1994. use of excessive fertilizers, to enhance the production of their assigned crops resulted in pollution of sub surface water and erosion of soil fertility. Self-sufficiency in food production was thus undermined¹⁶. since Russians had monopolized the skilled jobs and managerial posts, their flight from the states in the wake of renewed ethnic nationalism has exacerbated the problem in the limited industrial sector.

Development of financial and communication infrastructure was avoided in order to minimize interaction with the surrounding states. Oil and pipelines were laid to

serve Russia. Exploitation of their natural resources and their export to international markets has now presented enormous problems and their options are restricted by the need to use Russian infrastructure.

The states are short of hard cash as there is no more capital investment coming from Moscow and other regional states. A trade relationship did not exist during the Soviet era due to a centralized system. The centre would receive raw material from these tenant states individually and then distribute the finished products. The collapse of the center disrupted the flow of raw materials within the CAS affecting the productivity of all the dependent states.

The effect of all these factors has been exacerbated due to the non-availability of any financial and legal infrastructure. They relied on the Russian Rouble until the Russians withdrew all their currency in circulation setting hard conditions for joining the new currency regime¹⁷. Introduction of new currencies was made more difficult by the underdeveloped banking system and absence of foreign banks until end of 1993¹⁸. Inflation has been mounting and the gap between production and demand has been widening. The resulting recession is increasing unemployment and poverty.

Reforms have been introduced to attract investment and loans. The transformation from a socialist economy, based on large public sector to a liberal market economy and privatization in the living standards of the common lots. The process of privatization, a pillar of market economy, has run into difficult position, as they have to compete with major industrial units still in control of ministries.

Foreign investment is being hindered due to rampant corruption in the state mechanisms, inefficient procedures, and the lack of financial, legal, and communication infrastructure. Investment is also being seriously affected by the power game of external powers.

While Russia is attempting to prevent Turkish and Iranian influence by preventing any deal by the states, the USA is opposing Iranian inroads.¹⁹

ETHNIC BREAKDOWN OF CAS POPULATION						
Detail	Uzbekis tan	Kazakhs tan	Tajikistan	Turkme n istan	Kryge stan	
Population in millions	20.9	16.8	5.5	3.8	4.5	
Urban (%)	41	57	32	45	38	
Titular Na- tionality (%)	71	40	62	72	52	
Main Mimortiy	Russian (10.8%)	Russian 3.8%	Uzbeks (22.9%)	Russian s (12.4%)	Russians (21.5%)	
Minorties	6% karakal paks 4.2 % Tartars 4% Kazakhs 3.8% Tajks	5.8% Germans. 5.4% Ukraininas 2% Uzbeks 2% Tartars 1.2% Uighers 0.6% Koreans	10.4% Russians 2.1% Tartats.	8.5% Uzbeks 2.9% Kazakh s		

Source: Union of Soviet Socialist Republic Europa World Yearbook Vol 1, 1991.

Have been destabilizing to the region. The first has been the sprinkling of ethnic minorities within each state. Only a per-functory effort was made by the Russians to include major parts of various tribal groupings falling within a state as suggested by their names e.g. Uzbek, Kyrgyz etc. this has sharply divided Central Asia along ethnic lines, which is reflected in result of the 1989 Census. For example, 2.1 of all Uzbeks live in Kazakhstan, 7 percent in Tajikistan and 3,4 percent in kirghystan. The population of Uzbekistan consist of 71 percent Uzbeks, 7.5 percent Kyrgyz and just over 21 percent Tajiks²⁰. in Tajikistan, tajiks comprise 62 percent while remaining 24 percent are Uzbeks²¹⁺. A table below illustrates the ethnic brake down of these states.

The second factor of instability has been the high concentration of Russians who migrated to this region in Tsar's and then in the Soviet area. They present a sizeable minority in each republic, especially in Kazakhstan, where they almost equal Kazakhs with 38 percent of the population. The Russians' privileged position and domination throughout the Soviet area in all managerial posts and the skilled label further widened the economic gap between the richer, Arabians Russians and the poorer, rural natives creating class competition²². this has led to serious resentment, which on independence translated into marginalization of non native Russians through nationalist movemnets²².

Danger of such a dispute spreading form one state to the other has been enhanced, especially as minorities are concentrated in enclaves mostly close to the border. Such a conflict if initiated would be likely to spill over to the neighboring states of the turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and China due to the large presence of the same ethnic groups across the borders creating a domino effect²⁴.

The factor of instability has been the rise of negative nationalism. Natives see the assertion of their identity exclusive of all minorities. As a result minorities in each republic are being marginalized. In Uzbekistan the slogan of Uzbekistan for Uzbeks is indicative of intolerance for all the minorities including Russians. It triggers a chain reaction in all the states where minorities are victimized. Russia also reacts with protests and interference in these states. The irony is that, government also covertly support their titular nationalities in order to strengthen there hold on power. In Kazakhstan, the 40 percent Russians slaves occupying the northern and most of the Eastern part of Kazakhstan threaten secession. The slaves have a firm grip of the economy of Kazakhstan both in industry and agriculture. Both nationalities are

competing for survival as is manifested by the ethnic flavour of their respective nationalist parties²⁵.

Almost all states had adopted their titular languages as national while other nationalities demand equal right and protection for their languages. In Uzbekistan, Tajiks demand dual languages status for Tajiks Farsi along with Turkic Uzbek. In Kazakhstan also, language issue is very sensitive, where the Russians are infuriated with neglect of their language.

Religious Dimension

Islam being the religion of the majority, it could not be eliminated even under tight Soviet control and remained alive through generations of suppression, reflecting its influence²⁶. To keep the religious fervor under strict check, the Soviets attempted to divide the Muslims by introducing an official version of Islam. Though independence gave freedom to worship, all the states continued with the official Islam, despite which unofficial Islam has wider appeal. It served as an attractive substitute to the communist ideology imposed on these states by the Soviets. Titular nations started taking the Islamic legacy as part of their national heritage with hardly any distinction between the two²⁷. Any ethnic clash in future therefore has the prospects of involving the opposing religious forces as well adding to its lethality with the possibility of engulfing the entire region due to the ethnic and religious mix of populations. The civil war in Tajikistan has involved virtually all the regional states, Russia and even Taliban remnants are known to be supporting the opposition Islamic forces in Tajikistan²⁸.

Repression of Islamic groups by the present leadership on the pretext of their militant nature has pitched them at odds with the state and also aligned them with the wider international Islamic network, bringing more financial support from the Muslim world. The revival of

such nationalist Islam poses a serious challenge to the state mechanism. Such a threat though, exaggerated by the state leaders to justify their totalitarian regimes as in Uzbekistan, does exist to a degree. Outfits like Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb-ul-Tahrir, and Tajikistan 's Tajik Opposition Front, though now banned have remained a security threat to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and were also found to have links to Al. Qaeda. An extreme Islamic fundamentalism, though a worst case scenario, is likely to flourish in case of an internal upheaval or social turmoil from within, and thus enhances the need of internal stability²⁹.

EXTERNAL DIMENSION.

External Influence and the Power Game.

Central to the Power Game in Central Asia is the notion of *Power* and *Great Power*.. However, one must keep in mind that power is an *essentially contested concept*. Power can be described as the ability to influence and coerce. This is done through what Brzezinski describes as the four key dimensions of power, military, economic, technological and cultural³¹. Martin Wight maintains that great powers are those who must be able to maintain against all others even if they are united, and are characterized by having general interests as wide as the world itself³². Differentiating between great and dominant power. Wight says that, *every great power aspires to be a dominant power, as every dominant power aspires to be a universal power*³³. It is out of this aspiration that all great powers are trying to exert their influence in this region. In addition to being concerned about security of these states, they are equally being attracted by their huge energy potential.

Viewing the *Great Game* of the 19th Century in retrospect, it becomes evident that its main thrust came on the one hand, from British anxiety to check Russian

advances into the subcontinent, while on the other the Russian fear of Britain getting to the Central Asian region first. However, while the game was exclusive to these two players, there are many contenders to replace Britain today, adding to its complexity. The 20th Century Power game in Central Asia involves Russia, USA and China as dominant powers, while Turkey and Iran are regional and secondary powers. Stakes are high as the large energy resources of the region have added weight to its geo-political importance. When regional republics felt most vulnerable in the field of security and economics, external powers from all over the world rushed to fill the vacuum and carve out their own sphere of influence. Suffice to say, a race for power is on; simultaneously at three different levels, i.e., global, regional and bilateral, although clear distinctions cannot be drawn.

Russia and the Near Abroad.

Seventy years of Russian dominated Soviet rule has served to intertwine these states with Russia in political, economic and security fields. Maxim Shashenkov observes, *Russia and the near abroad will remain inter dependent because internal upheavals or disturbances in one will have negative repercussions in the other....I either in Russian Federation will shape and stabilize outer ego political space, or the events in the near abroad will determine. Russia's own development through waves of refugees, political upheaval, regional conflicts and instability*³⁴. Of the three main Russian objectives in the *Near Abroad*; the first is geopolitical which manifests her desire to be a Eurasian Power; second, the economic ties of the Soviet era that bind them together and finally the ethnic dimension to their relations which is perhaps the most sensitive with 10 million Russians living in the newly independent states³⁵. Russians also see Islamic extremeism from the South as a threat to regional stability, which could

spark disturbances in Central Asia, affecting the Russian population there and also causing unrest amongst Russia's Islamic minority³⁶.

Of all its objectives, Russia seems to be more serious in pursuing power status and gaining influence. Russia, though advantage by her well-entrenched geo-strategic position in the region, is rivaled by America and china as dominant powers. It sees NATO's expansion as an attempt to narrow down its borders by surrounding it through Eastern Europe and Central Asia³⁷. Russian opposition for the East European countries joining NATO is based on the same premise, which is why Russia is seriously contemplating prevention of new influence in the region. While still status as a power, Russians see a security vacuum emerging in Central Asia by their exit, which if not addressed will be filled in by some outside power³⁸. Ever since these states less Turkmenistan has used it as a vehicle to further her influence in the region. CIS is an asymmetric relationship, which has virtually put Russia in the same commanding position as Soviet Union, especially in the military and economic fields³⁹. the afghan War has provided an ideal opportunity to Russia to consolidate her hold over the CAS. To counter increasing US influence as a consequence of their increased engagement, Russia is hurriedly trying to revitalize regional forums ensuring the exclusion of extra regional states in the resolving of regional issues. The summit meeting of the shanghai Cooperation Organization at St Petersburg and the first summit meeting of the conference on interaction and confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) at Almaty were held in June 2002 to realize the same objective⁴⁰

Military Influence

The signing of the collective Security Pact in 1994 and the common Air Defense agreement have put these states under Russian control, while military exchanging and

training programs for their armies by Russia has also given it clout. The concept of Russian security policy is based on extending the Russian borders as far as the borders of CAS, using them as a buffer to thwart possible encroachment from China, Iran, Turkey or even Afghanistan⁴¹. Russian analyst, Pechenev, observed the need for Russia to be surrounded by friendly countries and strengthen of new borders, which, he said had become more important on account of NATO's expansion to the East⁴². The Russians therefore did not take time to move into Afghanistan as the Taliban's sudden collapse created a vacuum on the CAS borders.

Russian's role in Tajikistan's civil war has been used more than any thing else as a support to the present regime and has served as an incentive for other states to join the security Pact in the absence of another alternative. Russia will keep supporting these authoritarian regimes even at the cost of democracy as they have been favorable to Russia and were able to maintain stability⁴³. Russia also has the capability to destabilize these states by inciting ethnic clashes by arming ethnic groups as it in Armenia and Georgia. Some analysts say that Russia's 201 MR Division locals into the Division and is forging strong informalities as a parallel axis. This Division may be dissolved in place and can provide readily available militia for the ethnic minorities, especially Russians, in case of an ethnic strife. Such pressure levers meant to blackmail the states and keep them in the Russian web are being ignored by the local leadership⁴⁴.

The Russia peacekeeping initiative in the FSU manifests its ambition of widening its influence and involvement in all CIS member states, which will also lessen the Russian economic burden. The Russian foreign minister, on the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces in the near abroad said that *it reduced the chances involvement of other regional powers in Russian's traditional sphere of influence*. However due to the ethnic

mixture of CAS, it is very difficult for the participating armies to remain neutral.

The restructuring plan of the Russian army envisages small, agile and quickly deployable forces, showing that it is trying to emulate NATO. Russia is contemplating a force projection role in the future, to further her influence, with the in situ border guards, peacekeeping forces and bilateral agreements. An increase in the number of US troops in the CAS following the events of 9/11, has only added to the Russian resolve to certain influence. The Russian military exercises conducted in the Caspian Sea in August 2002 involving around 60 warships and 10,000 men along with some Azeri and Kazakh units aimed at checking the preparedness of Russian seamen at tackling terrorist threats in the region, is a clear manifestation of Russian military plants in Kyrgyzstan further enhance Russian control.

Economic Expansion

Russia had a tremendous edge in the economic field due to existing Russian biased infrastructure and economic dependence of CAS on Russia. All Central Asian oil was transported to the world market either through the Russian pipeline or the Russian train system. New states are helpless when Russia blocks pipelines and demands higher shares of profit from new projects. Russian still these states as their most convenient market for cooperation, trade and investment⁴⁶

To keep influence, Russia has resisted any major foreign commercial initiative in these states. It has not only obstructed development of an alternative pipeline, it also threaten to minimize the capacity of Russians lines unless higher stakes promised for Russians forms in new projects. Inclusion for Russian firms in all world consortia is forced on the states in there new energy deals. Turkmenistan's comparatively better economy is resented by Russia

because of which of Turkmenistan was forced to supply oil and gas to poor countries of CIS despite their not having paid previous bills⁴⁷. Turkmenistan is entirely dependent upon Russia's state owned gas giant Gazmprom for its gas export except for a small pipeline for its runs through Iran⁴⁸. a trans afghan pipeline is a distant dream as it is conditioned to the long term peace ion Afghanistan. Russia's opposition to a US and western sponsored alternative pipeline through the Caspian Sea or trans Caucasus, has hampered the export of oil to the west. The Kazakh pipeline, sponsored mainly by Chevron, through Russia to Novorossiysk was agreed only after 24 percent shares were given to the Russian firm as insurance to keep Russian influence in the oil export⁴⁹.

Measures were taken to foil attempts by Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to explore alternative supply routs through disused Turkish and Iranians pipelines or even a new line to the Turkish port of Ceyhan in Mediterranean. Turkmenistan was punished by the cutting of its oil deliveries to Europe through the Russian pipeline and export of Kazakh oil by chevron was suspended on the pretext of it being dirty⁵⁰.

Russia's fragile economy is seriously threatened by the prospects of Russian population returning from these states. Some Russian experts have suggested that if instability continues in the near abroad, up to six million refugees could flood into Russian economy⁵¹. Protection of rights of the Russian military doctrine in 1993, although the final version of the document down played it⁵². The biggest dilemma faced by these republics how they should strike a balance between the popular nationalist agenda and the large number of Russian nationals holding privileged positions. Russia is prepared to go the great length to pursuit of this objective as is manifested by her demand of dual nationality for all Russian's⁵³

Technological and culture Engagement

Russians already huge cultural engagement in the area due to the large number of Russian's present in each state, a unique advantage in her power projection role. All the present leadership has spent more time in Russia than in their own states.

The limited technological investment of the soviet era in terms of industry is still functioning because most of the Russians population present in the states provides the technological expertise.

Us and Central Asian States

The first US priority in this region was to check nuclear proliferation with full infrastructure had become available to Kazakhstan. Transfer of any nuclear related material to any contender, especially Iran poses a probable danger to the world security. The issue of technology by nuclear scientists, now unemployed and desperate for jobs, enhance this danger. The Us has invested \$84m in Kazakhstan in dismantling the nuclear weapons and removal of 1300 IBS of enriched Uranium from the site⁵⁴. this threat of proliferation has increased with the fear of super terrorism in the wake of increasing radicalism and emergence of rogue states and non state actors such as AL Qaeda . Other objectives are to prevent 'he spread of radical Islam by containing Iran and promoting turkey's role as the main regional player⁵⁵, to enhance US economic interests by exploiting the region's minerals resources especially its oil and gas; to incorporates these countries in to the western economic and security system; to promote democracy and human rights; and finally to use these republics to regulate Russian behavior in the context of its expansionist polices.

All these objectives show a strong desire to extend influence and dominate the region. This is no secrete now

that, most of US intelligence and administration talks of a hegemonic policy in the region. This region has always been viewed as crucial for becoming a global power for the American policy makers. The US goal is to try to exploit the Russians weakness and fill the power vacuum thus created. Brezezinski in the grand chessboard warns, that how this vacuum will be filled will be determined if and when another Eurasian power will challenge America's preponderance on the western region of the great continent. He is therefore a strong proponent of enlargement of NATO as the most effective mechanism for expanding and consolidating US dominance on Eurasia⁵⁶ US policy makers view extension of Russian influence as a counter move to NATO's influence towards the East⁵⁷, exactly the opposite of what Russia feels. Russia feels marginalized and is trying to flex muscle through newly created organizations like the CIS.



Military Dimension

The US suffers from the disadvantage of remoteness of the area in comparison to Russia and China. However, given the mobility and global reach of its forces the US can enforce policy anywhere. The US conducted the longest airborne operation from North Carolina to Kazakhstan involving 500 US paratroopers with Russian, Turkish and Kazakh forces in a 19 hour flight and three refueling en-route. This was meant to send a clear message to Russia, China and Iran. General Sheehan heading the exercise said on landing, *there is no nation on the earth that we cannot get to*⁵⁸. Uzbekistan was being prepared as a listening post surrogate state in the region while Kazakhstan was being arm twisted into being a Russian surrogate e. The events of September 11 suddenly endeared all these states to the US when they offered bases. The US promptly positioned troops in support of operations in Afghanistan⁵⁹. The bases will also serve the purpose of

enhancing influence in the region and containing both Russia and Iran while at the same time enforcing the US strategy of containment with regard to China. Given such a development, there is tremendous potential for a Cold War like situation.

Economic Dimension

Economically the US is facing a great challenge in the region due to a rush of different players pouring in huge sums in the development of the infrastructure and exploration of natural resources. The US is contemplating use of Turkey's influence to achieve its objectives. The US sees the biggest threat to its interests from increasing Chinese investment. China, with her rapid growth rate and military build-up is being viewed as a potential challenge to the West. As Colonel William writes, *Chinese realpolitik regarding Central Asia and her accelerating economic and military momentum will likely combine to outweigh the impact of sputtering Russian nationalism*. He is thus casting China and US as new rivals in the great game scenario⁶⁰

This US policy of containment meant to contain Russia and China is gradually transforming into pro-active engagement⁶¹. The American administration has been urging its business enterprise to invest in Central Asia's. Energy resources, which it considers as an alternative to oil from the Middle East. The US administration has been pushing for a pipeline through the Caspian Sea to the Turkish port of Ceyhan to ensure an uninterrupted supply of oil to the west, despite the fact that it is economically less viable and will pass through Armenia and Georgia's war ridden areas. This, though, will obviate Russian ascendancy over the pipeline. A much cheaper option through Iran has been vehemently opposed by USA due to estranged relations with Iran. Chevron, a major US Oil Company is investing heavily in the region oil as it did in

Tenghiz oil field in Kazakhstan. Considerable economic assistance has been promised to all the states by the US as a reward for joining the anti terror coalition. These are huge inputs to these cash strapped feeble economies and will help bring them closer to the US.

Cultural Engagement

Culturally, Islamic radicalism will always threaten the US objective of democracy and stability. If Iranian influence predominates, Islamic revival groups within the republics may emerge stronger than the Government. To earn more cash, these states may transfer nuclear technology to third world countries and terrorist groups. The US, being the strongest exponent of liberal democracy and capitalism is pursuing free elections and a democratic process. Aid packages are being conditioned to promote democracy and economic reforms even though the emphasis on the latter two has diminished in the interest of gaining support for the fight against terrorism and consequent entrenchment in the region. Exchange programmes have benefited thousands of Central Asian educationist, parliamentarians, lawyers, and journalists.⁶² Personal visits by many administration officials have accelerated the momentum of personal contacts. While one would argue that these steps may be aimed to pre-empt the spread of Islamic fundamentalism by isolating Iran in the cultural domain, enhancement of the Turkish role in this region substantiates this argument. Turkey is viewed as ideally placed to influence the region with its Turkey to *take on the role of the West's Sentinel* in 1992 is still regarded as a *solid suggestion*.⁶³

China and Central Asia

China's Xinjiang province shares 5000 kilometres of borders with Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan and Tajikistan. The common culture of its people brings them close to their

Turkic neighbours just across the border. Stability in this region will therefore be in the highest Chinese interest to prevent any conflict in these states from spilling over to China. China's other main interest is to diversify her energy resources in this region.

Economic Factor

China has started investing heavily in Central Asia to safeguard against centrifugal tendencies in the adjacent Xinjiang Province, which is inhabited by seven million Kazakhs, Uzbeks and Uighers. This area is important to the Chinese due to its strategic location, presence of a large Islamic population, and nuclear sites ⁶⁴ Chinese growing economic pot entail, search for new markets and her ever-increasing energy demands warrant her investment in the region. Border posts have been opened and rail links established between Kazakhstan and Xinjiang since 1992, a 1350 kilometres long railway line between Alma Ata and Xinjiang capital was opened to passengers, ultimately to link Beijing with Iran, Turkey and Europe ⁶⁶. One is reminded of the strategic railway built by the Russians in the *Great Game*.

China's energy consumption is growing rapidly due to her economic boom. From being the world's 4th largest oil producer. China has suddenly become an oil importer. China, like the rest of the developed world, would be very sensitive to its oil; needs, as reflected by its aggressive response in the Separately Islands. The Chinese naval build up in the Indian Ocean is meant to ensure continuous oil supply from the Gulf. Chinese state oil companies have clinched \$4.4 billion deal with Kazakhstan to build a pipeline to China and Iran, taking in line to 'China and Iran, taking in return 51 percent stake in their oil production Company' ⁶⁷

Military Factor.

Though China has no direct military involvement in the region, its huge military build up in collaboration with Russia poses a challenge to the US. China feels alienated by American involvement in Asian affairs that China thinks are in her direct sphere of influence. The American presence in Afghanistan and the CAS is worrying. China responded cautiously to it, but accepted the change under pressure of the new environment of a post 9/11 world. Memories of the Korean War and Vietnam are still fresh when the Chinese chose to contest the Americans. Munro in the coming conflict with China asserts, "China believes, it only has a short time to establish domination over Asia before it is blocked by the US or regional coalitions that will form to respond to the Chinese challenge"⁶⁸. Such confrontation will be lethal to international security.

Turkey in Turkestan.

Turkey enjoys a profound influence in the region. A majority of the CAS population except in Tajikistan speak different versions of the Turkic dialects. Nearly 50 million Turkic people live in Central Asia and Azerbaijan with 85 percent Muslim population⁶⁹. Turkey's interest in the region, therefore, is along Western lines in the economic field and on Turkic lines in the cultural, and social field. In the absence of a friendly infrastructure, the West found Turkey to be the most suitable conduit to further their interests in the region. The Independence of these republics came at a time when Turkey's importance in the West was diminishing and its membership in the struggling EU agrees to grant its membership to Turkey is still a question mark. Turkey is now engaged at the regional level in fierce competition, mainly with Iran and Russia, which coincides with Western interests.

Economic Interests

Turkey's economic interests in the region aim at diversifying her energy resources, dominating a big market and improving trade. It has come a long way by investing hugely in the field of communication and transportation and it trying to influence the energy sector by competing for an oil pipeline through the Caspian Sea to Turkish port of Ceyhan. Turkey also opposes the pipeline through Iran. Her only handicap, shortage of credit, is being compensated as the USA is advancing economic assistance through Turkey, showing the importance attached by the UIS to Turkey. Use of Turkey as a conduit by the UIS could repeat the Cold War scenario, with Russia using Iran to neutralize Turkey.

Cultural Engagement.

Culturally, perhaps Turkey has the strongest base. This was exhibited when Turkey won the battle of *Alphabets*, between the Arabs, Iran and Russia to change from Cyrillic to Latin or Arabic ⁷⁰. All the states adopted Latin except Tajikistan, who aligned with Iran adopting Arabic alphabets. Setting up of Eurasian TV, with its regular broadcasts from Ankara ⁷¹. In Turkic, reflects Turkic ambitions of influence in the region. Pan Turkism, an ideology that aspires to the establishment of a common homeland for all the Turks, led by Alpaslan Turks, has suddenly-gained prominence ⁷². Simultaneously groups have also emerged in these states such as the Birlik and Erk Party of Uzbekistan, the Agizbirlik in Turkmenistan and the Alash in Kazakhstan.

While Pan m Turkism is becoming a popular cry amongst the masses, the leader of the former welfare party of Turkey, Erbakan, claims a new *Muslim world order* under Turkish leadership, indicating the latent potential of a Muslim block. Considering a worst case scenario, if Iran's

radical Islam is combined with Erbakan's Islamic world. Afghanistan's Pro-Taliban elements and Tajikistan's IRP, prospects for instability in the region are very high. Such a development will involve China due to under currents of East Turkestan in Xinjiang Province, which is considered endemic to Chinese integrity ⁷³.

Apart from alienating Russia, such a tendency will further divide Turkish and non-Turkish population in each state and non-Turkish population in each state and isolate the Tajik Republic. Fuller observes that, if common Turkic ethnicity is to be the *nationalist* basis for any future unity, then Persian-speaking Tajikistan is technically excluded ⁷⁴. Such a policy is divisive and likely to destabilize the region in the long run. It will put Uzbekistan, with its Turkish inclination in a dominating position. Turkey envisions itself in the same role as the Egypt of Nasser in the movement of Pan Arabism ⁷⁵. Such a possibility will however, be resented by other states.

Iran and Central Asia

Being one of the littoral states of the Caspian Sea and with contiguous borders with Turkmenistan, Iran has high economic stakes in the region's oil and gas. Most of its overtures have been orientated towards realization of this objective. In 1992, Iran signed a deal with Turkmenistan to import gas, and in turn export regional oil to the West. It also discussed construction of a Mashad-Ashkabad railway line and started a joint transport company with Tajikistan. Cultural and historical links with these states, though much less than those of Turkey, give Iran an advantage. To further cultural links, Iranian TV is broadcast in Tajikistan every night and free Persian books are provided for the Tajik elementary schools. Despite such an influence, it has adopted a moderate approach to the export of Islamic fundamentalism due to its own economic interests in the region, probably because it was hit by

serious economic problems caused by US sponsored isolation of Iran⁷⁶. Establishment of the first cultural association of Persian speaking peoples in the region, comprising Iran, Tajikistan and Afghanistan came quite late⁷⁷

Recognizing the Iranian interests in the region, which ostensibly seem to be legitimate, the fear of Islamic fundamentalism seems to be overstated. The Civil War in Tajikistan, though viewed in the context of ethnic fighting and Islamic fundamentalism, suggests no evidence of Iranian involvement. Iran is frustrated and is desperately looking for a breakthrough as is seen in their rapprochement with the USA. As already stated, Iran may join a Russian or Chinese nexus to threaten Western interest if isolated any further, Islamic fundamentalism, though a potential threat in the future, especially with the Iranian form of radical Islam, does not seem to be on the Iranian agenda.

Since Pan Iranism attempts to unite all Persian speaking people of Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran and is perhaps as much supported by the official channels as by the private groups⁷⁸, it may confront Iran with Turkey, Iran is naturally quite averse to the idea of pan Turkism or of a greater Turkistan.

Conclusion and Future Scenario

The CAS has been subjected to an unfortunate power game in the most crucial stage of their transition from Communism to Liberal Democracy, which has immensely affected their development. The external influences are complementing the negative dynamics of the society and have driven the region to the brink of instability.

While ,the 19th century power game pushed the region into subjugation and darkness, this episode has not done any better, Fragile institutions, in placed at the ,time of their

independence, were not strong enough to absorb such an intense external involvement, which was thrust upon them by the actors of the power game. Having set off to achieve their objectives of political and economic development, they have been de-tracked while en-route. Political democracy as a new ideology and route to economic prosperity, despite huge economic potential remain an illusion. Communism is being replaced with secular authoritarianism and any opposition to the present regimes is being suppressed by the present leadership. Poor economic inheritance and failure to make significant progress in their economic development has rather increased their dependence on Russia. Reforms have not been significantly successful due to rampant corruption, slow and disjointed foreign aid and game of influence in foreign investment.

The resulting frustrations have accentuated nationalistic, ethnic and religious divisions. Concentration of large minorities in enclaves close to the borders has increased the chances of an interstate conflict. A regional conflict has the potential to disrupt all its neighbours due to contiguous borders and historical links, and affect stability at large.

Islam has substituted the communist ideology as an active element of the nation building, but fundamentalism has not emerged in a shape as feared by the US and Russia. While potential for its exploitation remains, it will assume a radical form only if its growth is suppressed and in case of a socio-economic turmoil. Similarly, suppression of political parties will only add to their lethality. Although external powers especially Russia and Turkey have established linkages to influence the internal politics of these states, such interference is proving detrimental to the democracy. The race for geopolitical influence and the seizing of energy resources of the region is fueling tension at a much larger scale, and new trends are developing.

While Russia is being antagonized by expansion of NATO and role of new mechanisms like partnership for peace (PFP) and the organization for security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in her near abroad, NATO is apprehensive about the assertive role taken by the CIS under Russian patronage. Alienation of Russia and china by US is likely to cause a North-South divide with Russia, china and Iran joining hands against US. The US use of turkey as a conduit to further her influence has given impetus to a Russian alliance with Iran. If Uzbekistan is a pivotal state for the US, though well within her capability, will be at the cost of world peace. While Russia controls the region military, the US is using its affluence to extend influence. With the presence of US forces on Uzbek and Tajik bases, the Americans have tried to extend their security umbrella to the CAS thus diminishing the military role for other power players. China too is busy in the pursuit of a serious economic agenda. Use of surrogates from within these states or without with starts a new cold war. Despite the fact that stability of the region is a common interest of all the power players, as it will also impinge on their own internal stability, they are rather perpetuating instability to win influence hampering the independent development of the region.

As per the realist school of thought and the framework used in the paper, Russia is a clear winner so far in all dimensions of the power game, except the economic field, a factor which may have promoted the Americans to base there troops physically in Russia's near abroad. The states in question weary of Russian domination are eager to welcome any alternative, especially one that provide relative independence through economic assistance. The US is the only power in this position and can affectively engage in all encompassing economic developments of CAS, rather than contorting only on energy.

It is abundantly clear that the ethno-cultural factor faked to forge a credible alliance. CAS have come along way upon formulating g foreign policies, which seem to be pragmatic and based on realism. Economic factors are the biggest determinant of the future destiny of the region. Pakistan too needs to forge pragmatic economic relations with these states by offering them a window to the outside world in the form of Gawader port, Tans Afghan pipeline and a rail/road network in addition to emphasizing historical, cultural and religious links. Future alignments in the long run will emerge in the wake of economic assistance in developing these states. Since these states are in a transitory phase and have transformed into neither democracy nor capitalism, their future remains uncertain. The ideal finish of the current game would be through ensuring victory of the region and distribution of their energy resources t the rest of the world.

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Chapter-15

SOUTH-WEST ASIA AFTER THE TALIBAN.

Mohammad Ayooob

In its war on terrorism, the United States has attempted to unite the knot of Islamic extremism that has been at the center of Pakistani-Afghan relations for years. Optimists can point to two achievements; the installation of an interim Afghan government under the moderate Pashtun leader, Hamid Karzai; and the 12 January 2002 speech by Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, vowing to break Pakistan-based terrorist groups and to pull the country away from the brink of a 'theocratic state'. Both developments have been greeted with palpable relief in Washington and other capitals. Yet the threat of instability throughout South-west-Asia- that is a region that includes both South Asia-is far from over. Further conflict and fragmentation in Afghanistan could have continued ripple effects spreading through the region. In Pakistan itself- despite the acknowledged boldness of Musharraf's crackdown- a history of creating, harboring and aiding terrorist groups will not cease to haunt the country for the foreseeable future. Pakistan could yet become a new epicenter of instability, terrorism and stage breakdown in the extended south-west Asian region. With al-Qaeda terrorists losing their safe haven in Afghanistan, some surviving members are likely already to have moved to Pakistan. The existence of similar terrorist groups in Pakistan, many of them supported by elements in the

Pakistani military and by fundamentalist Islamic groups like the Jamiat-ul-Islam, could provide them adequate cover and sustenance-even in the face of Musharraf's announced crackdown.

There is evidence that the autonomous tribal belt on the border of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Afghanistan has already become the refuge of hundreds if not thousands of Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters. The Pakistan Government's writ does not run here and the tribal population is overwhelmingly sympathetic both to al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

Pakistan-based terror groups stepped up attacks in India during October-December 2001, culminating in the suicide attack on the Indian parliament on 13 December. This suggests that Pakistani groups have been receiving fresh recruits from across the Afghan border willing to do jihad against the Indian 'infidel' now that the war against America has been lost. It also indicates that such groups are willing and able to defy Pakistani injunctions against such dramatic terror attacks after 11 September. They seem intent on acting as catalysts for escalating hostility between India and Pakistan by forcing India to attack terrorist bases and training camps across the 'Line of Control' in Kashmir, thus raising the danger of war between the nuclear-armed states.

The events since 11 September have sharpened the long-standing dilemmas that have troubled US policies towards Pakistan and India. Clearly Musharraf deserves American support if he can demonstrate continued determination to divert his country from an extremist trajectory. Yet, in the long run, it is India and (perhaps less obviously) Iran- pre-eminent states in South Asia and the Gulf and natural status-quo powers-that stand out as logical American partners. Musharraf's undeniable political risks do need to be rewarded. But India, a stable if somewhat raucous democracy, is a far safer bet as a US partner than

Pakistan's struggling military dictatorship. Iran may look like an unlikely partner, especially as after US President George W. Bush's hard-line classification of the country, in his 30 January 2002 State of the Union address, as part of an 'axis of, evil.' Yet, the American decision to renounce hopes for rapprochement with Iran-if that is indeed what has been decided- is misguided. The US should not neglect the strategic logic of increasingly converging interests between Washington, New Delhi and Tehran.

Post-war Afghanistan.

The Bonn conference, which met from 27 November to 5 December 2001, brought together four Afghan factions to form a transitional regime under Karzai. Yet no single government, even if it has the backing of the United Nations and, the United States, will be in a position to control all or even most of the country effectively for a long time to come. The squabbling at Bonn among the different factions, the visible divisions within the Northern Alliance and the absence of several major contenders for power from the Bonn meeting, do not bode well for, the future of 'Afghanistan as an integrated polity. Neither does the controversy among Pashtun factions and, the subsequent fragile compromise over who should govern Kandahar after the departure of the Taliban from their heartland. Similar conflicts among Pashtun tribal leaders, have been reported from other parts of eastern and southern Afghanistan. Above all the perception that Karzai was imposed as the, interim leader by the United States could undermine, his legitimacy.

The warlord in control of much of western Afghanistan, Ismail Khan, has already expressed his displeasure at the constitution of the interim government in which, according to him, the western provinces are under-represented. The Uzbek General Rashid Dostum, who controls Mazar-e-Sharif and much of northern Afghanistan,

has also expressed his disapproval. Of the way the spoils of office have been distributed in the interim government. He was particularly miffed that the Tajik component of the Northern Alliance has retained control of the defence, interior, and foreign ministries and the power and patronage that go with these portfolios. Although both Ismail Khan and Dostum seem to have been temporarily mollified, such bickering suggests that the Northern Alliance-the core of the anti-Taliban coalition-may break apart sooner than expected.

Despite the diplomatic skills attributed to Karzai, the interim government's writ is unlikely to run in a sustained fashion very far from the capital. The presence of an international force in the numbers currently contemplated- some 4,500- is unlikely to change this out some. Afghanistan's terrain and its internal division, especially among those leaders who have men, money and guns at their command, make political fragmentation the most likely scenario. The scenario might be avoided if the international community were willing to deploy upwards of 50,000 highly skilled troops equipped for mountain warfare for an indefinite period of time. Even then the outcome would remain uncertain. In any event, there is no indication that such a force is being contemplated under the aegis of the United Nations or a multinational coalition. International financial aid may temporarily provide incentives for the warlords to cooperate with Kabul, but is unlikely to resolve, the underlying political conflict among them.

Stability looks elusive also because the strategic interests of Afghanistan's major neighbors -Iran, Pakistan and Russia in [particular-are at odds. All have their favorite clients. One or two, if not all three, of them are likely to conclude that if they cannot get a regime favorable to them installed in Kabul, they would rather have the country divided into fiefdoms so that they can dominate areas of

Afghanistan that they consider to be strategically and politically most important. Reports of Iranian meddling in western Afghanistan and Pakistani maneuverings in the east of the country support this conclusion.

The bloodshed of the past two decades has augmented and entrenched ethnic and tribal animosities that were never very far from the surface in Afghanistan. Continued warfare has also created elements with vested economic and political interests in its prolongation. Poppy cultivation, drug traffic, gun-running, protection money and control of scarce resources in a context of acute shortage have provided enormous benefits to conflict 'entrepreneurs' who have an abiding interest in perpetuating insecurity in the country. As in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Congo, the major warlords in Afghanistan have been, and continue to be the principal economic beneficiaries of fragmentation and civil war. It is unlikely that they will be willing to relinquish this role and its benefits any time soon.²

Moreover, illicit economic activities have also benefited external partners, especially Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and international drug mafias. Elements within these organizations are likely to encourage and support the activities of, the conflict entrepreneurs covertly. Resources and conduits for illegal transit will be provided by such external agents to warlords engaged in the drug trade—thus generating cash that can be spent on weapons and manpower. Since any UN-sponsored authority in Kabul is expected to be under tremendous pressure from the US and the UN not to allow opium cultivation and to desist from the drug trade, the Afghan government is likely to lack adequate resources. It is also liable to become increasingly unpopular among both poppy cultivators and those engaged in narcotics trading, the two major economic activities in the war-ravaged country. External aid will be able to make up only partially for the

central government's lack of resources, especially since international donors will strictly control its disbursement. They are unlikely to allow such funds to be used for buying off regional warlords who have returned to reclaim their former fiefs following the, disintegration of the Taliban regime³

External involvement.

Afghanistan's major neighbors have conflicting visions for the country's future. The Russians and their allied regimes in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan would have preferred the Northern Alliance to be the senior partner in any government in Kabul. All three equate Pashtun domination with Islamic fanaticism. Faced as they are with their own Islamic insurgencies, they are extremely afraid that this contagion may spread if the Pashtuns, even if they be anti-Taliban for the most part, come to dominate the ruling coalition in Kabul. While the control of the crucial ministries of defense, foreign affairs and the interior by the Northern Alliance may give them comfort, the elevation of the American-sponsored Karzai adds to their concerns.⁴

The interests of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan also could diverge quickly as the Tajik and Uzbek ethnic groups within Afghanistan begin to quarrel over the spoils of victory. Given the history of Uzbek-Tajik relations in Afghanistan over the past two decades, especially the rivalry between General Dostum and the late Ahmed Shah Masood, such a falling out would, not be surprising. Uzbeks, who form a small minority of about 6% within Afghanistan and are concentrated in the north, have traditionally feared domination by the neighbouring Tajiks, who form a quarter of the Afghan population and are more widely spread throughout the country, in addition to demographically dominating the north-east⁵

Iran would also prefer to keep the Pashtuns of the east and south from playing a major role in the power

structure. The American attempt to build up Karzai is likely to have Tehran concerned as well. The Saudi-inspired Wahhabi fundamentalism of the Pashtun based Taliban and their treatment of Shia Hazaras, whom Iran supports, have made nearly all Pashtuns, many of whom harbour visceral anti-Shia and anti-Hazara feelings, suspect in Iranian eyes. For all their ostensible commitment to a radical version of political Islam, the Iranians, including their religious class, are a cultured lot for whom the medieval brutalities of the Taliban were highly repugnant. For strategic and political reasons, Iran has also been apprehensive of growing Saudi religious and financial influence on the Pashtun population.

Furthermore, despite ostensibly cordial relations with Pakistan, Tehran remains suspicious of Islamabad's motives in Afghanistan. Iran perceives Pakistan to be a client state of Saudi Arabia because of Islamabad's financial dependence on Saudi handouts and the religious affinity of important sections of the Pakistani population, including sizable elements of its political and military elite, with the Saudi – Wahhabi version of Sunni fundamentalism-----Pakistan carried out by Sunni extremist outfits, often clandestinely financed by the Riyadh, has driven home the lesson to Tehran that the Saudi-Pakistani version of militant Islam and that of Iran are fundamentally opposed. Saudi influence in Pakistan is also perceived by Iran as targeted at curbing Iran's rightful role in the Persian Gulf region.

While Pakistan's interests run counter to those of Iran and Russia, nor are they congruent with those of the United States. The United States is committed to, and has succeeded in, putting a coalition of different ethnic groups and political factions, excluding the Taliban, in power in Afghanistan. Pakistan, on the other hand, would have preferred the major share of power to remain in the hands of Pashtun tribal leaders, many of who had spent the last

decade in Pakistan. It would, have preferred to see the Northern "Alliance's sphere of influence strictly limited to the extreme north of the country, away from Pakistan's borders. It is particularly wary of the Northern Alliance's close relationship with India, a fact that was underlined by the visit of the Alliance's interior, defence and foreign ministers to New Delhi immediately after the Bonn conference.⁷ The Alliance's close Indian connection was one of the main reasons why Islamabad was stridently opposed to the Northern Alliance's capture of Kabul. Pakistan felt its external security directly threatened by the Alliance's capture of Kabul undertaken-as Pakistan perceived it – with American connivance.

Pakistan and the Taliban.

Pakistan's support for the Taliban was not merely major pillar of Pakistan's foreign policy, but an important element of its domestic policy as well. The Taliban were deliberately fashioned as a military and political force by the ISI for, the purpose of ensuring a client government in Afghanistan that would provide Pakistan strategic depth during times of conflict with India. This need became particularly acute in the 1990s, as war over Kashmir appeared to be a distinct possibility with the Pakistan-supported insurgency, escalating in the Kashmir Valley. The Taliban, and their friends in al-Qaeda, were also used by the Pakistani military to provide facilities and expertise for training Pakistani, Kashmiri, Arab and Afghan terrorists steeped in the jihadist ideology who were then infiltrated across the Line of Control into the Indian-administered parts of Jammu and Kashmir to create may hem in the Kashmir Valley⁸.

In addition to these external security concerns, the Pakistani support to the Taliban was intimately connected to two domestic trends that became increasingly prominent during, the late 1970s and the 1980s. The first was the

dramatic increase in the influence and visibility of Islamist forces in the Pakistani body politic. This was the result partly of Pakistani military dictator Zia-ul-Haq's policy of using Islam to legitimize his regime during the period he ruled Pakistan (1977-1988). An integral part of this strategy was the bestowing of state patronage on fundamentalist religious groups and institutions in order to build a support structure among them. It also manifested itself in the increasing Islamisation of the officer corps of the armed forces as loyalty to the regime came to be tested on the basis of religiosity and the public observance of Islamic rituals.⁹

The increasing Islamisation of the Pakistani polity was also in part the result of an increase in the inflow of Saudi money and puritanical and militant Wahhabi religious ideas into Pakistan, through Pakistani immigrants working in Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich states in the Gulf, and through the deliberate effort of Saudi charities and, above all the Saudi government. Beginning in the late 1970s, the Saudi regime came to see the spread of Sunni-Wahhabi fundamentalism as the best ideological antidote to Iran's revolutionary Islam, whose appeal transcended the Sunni-divide. Pakistan's critical position on the eastern borders of Iran made it an important part of the Saudi strategy to checkmate the spread of Iranian influence and, therefore, of anti-monarchical revolutionary Islam. It was the same reason that led Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf Sheikdoms to financially underwrite Iraq's 1980-1988 war against Iran.

The insurgency against the Soviet-supported Marxist regime in Afghanistan in the 1980s, aided financially by the US and Saudi Arabia and militarily by the United States and Pakistan, augmented this trend. It did principally by providing ready recruits to the militant Islamic schools close to the borders of Afghanistan that were run by fundamentalist Pakistani groups and funded

largely from Saudi sources. These schools not only provided shelter and food to their students, they also inculcated among them a jihadist ideology based upon the strict and intolerant Wahhabi version of Sunni Islam.¹⁰ The Taliban (literally, those who search for, knowledge') were the products of these schools who were then trained, funded, armed (and, according to some reports, led) by the Pakistani military to take over Afghanistan.

The second trend that surfaced in the 1980s in Pakistan was also directly related to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and to Pakistan's role as the frontline state aiding the insurgency against Marxist rule. The Soviet invasion had a major impact on the attitude of the Pakistani Pashtun population, larger than the Pashtun population in Afghanistan (12 million as against 10m), and led to their increasing integration into the Pakistani polity. Pakistan's role as the primary supporter of the anti-Marxist insurgency and a safe haven for 2m Afghan, primarily Pashtun, refugees changed many Pashtuns' perceptions of Pakistan as Afghanistan's hostile neighbour. Similarly, the economic opportunities for drug trafficking and gun-running that the unsettled situation in Afghanistan provided to enterprising Pakistani Pashtuns created for many of them a larger economic stake in Pakistan. As a result, there appeared to be a remarkable reduction in the sense of alienation from Pakistan that the Pakistani Pashtuns had harboured since the creation of that country in 1947, when the British divided India before they quite the subcontinent.

The Pashten Alienation was primarily the product of the resentment felt against the artificial border called the Durand line. Imposed by the British in the nineteenth century, that divides the pashten population, and British individual pashtun tribes and sub-tribes, between Afghanistan and British India. All afghan regimes before the Taliban refused to accept the Durand Line as the border

between Afghanistan and the successor state of Pakistan. The two neighbors came to the verge of the war over this issue more than once in the 1950s and 1960s. Even the Taliban, although they were Pakistan's protégé's, did not officially indorse the Durand line as the border with Pakistan. Afghan essentially Pashtun, irredential had, therefore, imbued relations between the two countries with a substantial degree of hostility that continued to nature Pashtun separation within Pakistan until the end of the 1970s.

The soviet invasion changed all that, as Pakistan became the prime supporter of the Pashtun/Afghan cause against Moscow and the Soviet-supported regimes in Kabul. Pakistan's critical role on the 1990s in installing and maintaining the Pashtun Taliban in power in Kabul reinforced Islamabad's image as the main supporter if the pashtun cause in Afghanistan and the principal bulwark against Iranian and Russian designs to help minority ethnic groups dominate the afghan polity at the expense of the traditionally dominate Pashtuns. This perception had a remarkably positive effect on Pashtun opinion within Pakistan, as it did, for somewhat different reasons, on the fundamental groups within that country.

Pakistan and the Taliban's collapse.

In this context, Pakistan's post-11 September decision to pull the rug from under the Taliban came as a rude shock to both the Pashtun population and the fundamentalist religious constituency in Pakistan. It should, therefore, come as no surprise if the Pashtun resentment against the Pakistani regime's sell-out of the Taliban is eventually transformed into a resurgence of Pashtun separatism within Pakistan.

The prospect of such a scenario becoming reality has caused great consternation within the Pakistani establishment. It explains in substantial part the desperate attempt on the part of General Musharraf to prevent the

Northern Alliance from entering Kabul and thus inflicting a grave insult on Pashtun tribal honour. It also explains his equally desperate attempt to find 'moderate' Taliban willing to join a new dispensation. Musharraf's failure on both counts has created an ominous situation for Pakistan. On the one hand, it portends the disenchantment and consequent alienation of substantial segments of Pakistani Pashtuns from the Pakistani state. On the other, it clearly signifies the failure of Pakistan's Taliban-based strategic calculations and raises the prospects of Pakistan having to face hostile neighbours on both its eastern and western borders. It also raises the clear possibility of rivals, such as Iran, Russia and India coming to have a far greater say in Afghanistan's internal affairs and in its foreign policy than Pakistan, thus reversing the trend that had been in existence since 1990.

The problem is likely to be further compounded for Pakistan's rulers by the fact that the Taliban had close religious and ideological links with both Pashtun and non-Pashtun elements in Pakistan that espouse militant fundamentalism within Pakistan and a jihadist foreign policy abroad, especially in relation to India and the United States. While these elements were temporarily stunned into silence by the speed with which the Taliban regime disintegrated, they are unlikely to forgive Musharraf for the indignities heaped upon their ideological brethren and their own religio-political cause. Once they overcome their present predicament, they might look for ways of destabilizing the Musharraf regime to get their revenge, as well as to reorient Pakistan's foreign policy in a more radical direction.

Finally, there are credible indications that the officer corps of the Pakistan army is deeply divided. Rifts within the top brass became clearly visible when, in October 2001, Musharraf removed or shunted aside several leading generals, including the head of the ISI, who were

considered sympathetic to the Taliban and were opposed to his alliance with the United States against the Taliban.¹¹ That there must have been substantial opposition in the armed forces to Musharraf's change of course appears logical in light of the political and financial investment made by the ISI in first bringing and then keeping the Taliban in power.¹²

Despite the major investment that the Pakistani military had made in the Taliban, most military leaders went along with Musharraf's decision, hoping that Pakistan would benefit more from ties with the US than by supporting the Taliban and opposing Washington. Massive economic assistance and debt write-offs, access to sophisticated weaponry and, above all, an assurance that the US would not support India in the latter's disputes with Pakistan seemed to make Musharraf's radical shift acceptable to them.

However, for the Pakistani military brass, the American assurance that the Northern Alliance would not be allowed to take Kabul was key yardstick by which to judge Washington's reliability and its genuine concern for Pakistan's vital interest. With that promise in tatters and with anti-Pakistan forces in control of large parts of Afghanistan, Musharraf's policy is likely to cease making strategic sense to many of the top military commanders. Musharraf could increasingly appear either too gullible or as an agent of the United States working for American objectives, to the detriment of Pakistani interest.¹³

Musharraf's decision, announced on 123 January 2002, to crackdown on militant Islamic groups, including some of those operating in Kashmir, could further fuel military discontent. This is especially likely to be the case as Musharraf's latest action against jihadi elements was clearly undertaken under pressure not merely from America but from India as well. The Indian military mobilization following the 13 December attack on the

parliament in New Delhi appears to be the key factor determining Musharraf's change of tactics against militant groups operating within and from Pakistan. Giving in to blatant Indian military pressure is unlikely to endear Musharraf to the armed forces' top brass, many of whom continue to be committed to pursuing the 'jihad' in Kashmir and are disillusioned over the failure of Pakistan's policy in Afghanistan. India's refusal to de-escalate its military mobilization, despite what is perceived as Musharraf's appeasement of the traditional enemy, is likely to detract further from his regime's legitimacy.

Consequently, the overthrow of the Pakistani regime by disgruntled factions of the military opposed to Musharraf's foreign policy cannot be ruled out. What this will do to Pakistan's political stability remains an open question. But a likely scenario would, be a successor regime that is increasingly fundamentalist and overtly anti-American with major revanchist tendencies.

It is becoming increasingly clear that Pakistan is in the middle of a deep crisis, much of which is of its own making. It is overextended in the east by its military and political support to the insurgency and terrorism in Kashmir, which could draw it into a war with India. At the same time, it is faced by the grave possibility of instability and possible, guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan to the west, again the result of its support for the Taliban, which has backfired.¹⁴ Furthermore, at likely increase in Pashtun restiveness within the country itself, may threaten its territorial integrity or at least make it highly unstable.

If one adds the current severe economic crunch to all these political factors, Pakistan's future looks very gloomy in deed. While the promise of American and international aid may give the regime some breathing space, this is unlikely to last beyond a few months. International assistance is not capable of changing the lot of the common Pakistani in such a short period. Absent

such a change, economic disillusionment is likely to augment political disgruntlement.

Pakistan's nuclear arsenal

If Musharraf is unable to purge Pakistani politics of fanaticism and return the country to a modicum of stability, one major concern for the United States and the international community would be the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. A nuclear-capable failing state with religious zealots, ethnic secessionists and disgruntled radical military officers vying for control of nuclear weapons is a terrifying prospect. The arrest of several former high officials of the Pakistani nuclear establishment with close ideological ties to the Taliban, and to the al-Qaeda leadership, has heightened concerns about the security of warheads, nuclear technology and nuclear-weapons grade material in Pakistan's possession.¹⁵ The Musharraf regime's own recent moves suggest that it is very concerned about the safety of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.¹⁶ Reports also suggest that Washington recognizes the danger that Pakistani nuclear warheads may fall into the wrong hands and that it has devised contingency plans for either securing or destroying Pakistan's nuclear weapons, should, there appear to be a credible chance that this may happen.¹⁷

US policy towards Pakistan will also continue to focus on preventing any leakage of nuclear technology, and on keeping the Pakistani and Indian nuclear deterrents as 'recessed' as possible—that is with warheads and delivery vehicles separated. This is easier to achieve in the case of India—it is committed to a 'no-first-use' nuclear doctrine.¹⁸ Pakistan, on the other hand, is unwilling to subscribe to a 'no-first-use' doctrine and adopt a corresponding posture because of its conventional inferiority *vis-a-viz* India and the consequent need for holding out the threat of nuclear response to a conventional Indian attack. Moreover, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, unlike India's, is under the

control of the military: thus the decision to launch nuclear strikes is not so directly subject to the moderating influence of civilian elites. These two factors together make Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons highly dangerous risks of miscalculation or unauthorized use are much greater. These risks are likely to increase manifold if the control of Pakistan's nuclear weapons passes into the hands of groups more fanatical and irresponsible, than the current regime.

The United States also will need to put continued pressure on China to stop its clandestine collaboration with Pakistan on nuclear and missile development. The United States must make this issue a centerpiece both of its non-proliferation policy and of its policy toward China, which has violated several assurances it has given Washington about cutting off the supply of missile-related technology to Pakistan.¹⁹ The latest such assurance, given in November 2000, has already been honoured in the breach.²⁰

The United States, India and Iran.

In this context of projected and possible prolonged instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the best and most viable long-term US policy towards South-west Asia is one of that coordinates US strategies with those states in the extended region that have, a stake in regional stability, backed by the capacity to contribute to its security. India and Iran immediately come to mind.

The United States and India have been able to cultivate important economic and political links in the 1990s. Many have significant security implications, such as intelligence-sharing and combating terrorism,, but are not limited to them. The pace of Indian-American security cooperation has increased visibly since the terror attacks of 11 September 2001.²¹ It is likely to pick up further following the terrorist attack on the, Indian parliament on 13 December 2001, which seems to have been conducted by radical Pakistani groups, with ideological and political

affinities to al-Qaeda. However, their common interest goes much beyond countering terrorism. Washington and New Delhi share common long-range strategic objectives both in South-West Asia and in the wider Asian region. The virtual endorsement by India of the Bush administration's decision to deploy ballistic-missile, defence in both its theatre and national versions, very clearly indicates the convergence of Indian and American strategic perceptions.²²

Two goals that India and the United States share stand out from the others. The first is containing instability in Pakistan and insulating the rest of the region from its negative effects. The second is the need to contain an increasingly powerful China whose long-term interests in the wider Asian region are likely to clash with those both of, the United States and of India.

India considers China to be its primary security threat.²³ It is also increasingly clear that China is becoming, if it has not already become, America's principal strategic competitor.²⁴ On a number of issues, ranging from Taiwan to ballistic-missile defence, American and Chinese interests run directly counter to each other. President Bush's decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABNM) Treaty is likely to force these contradistinctions to the surface very clearly and quickly. Moreover, China's long-term aspiration to become the second pole-----
-----with the US is bound to deteriorate sooner or later. Therefore, it makes a lot of sense that Washington further upgrades its links with India to the level of strategic partnership.²⁵

While it may not be the current conventional wisdom in Washington, a shared suspicion of China provides a logical basis for strategic cooperation with India. Such cooperation would not necessarily entail a defence pact obliging the India two parties to aid each other in case of war. However, it could provide a framework for, military and intelligence coordination and the supply of

sophisticated American weapons and dual technology to India that could serve the interests of both countries, if the existing balance of power in Asia comes to be threatened by a more assertive China in the next couple of decades.

India's democratic credentials add to the attraction of an American-Indian relationship that has the potential to become a major pillar of, the projected global democratic community. While India has demonstrated its democratic resilience against heavy odds over the past half, century, Iran too is struggling to achieve true democracy. As Robin Wright puts it, the country, 'often inspite of its theocrats, has begun to achieve one of the revolution's original goals; empowering the people'.²⁶ Despite the attempt by the conservative clergy are the institutions it controls to delay political reform and engagement with the United States, both these trends have gained significant support from the politically conscious strata of the Iranian population.²⁷

Moreover, Iran's antipathy toward the extremism and militancy of the Taliban and their ideological brethren in Pakistan, and its interest in ensuring them, uninterrupted flow of oil from the Gulf, underlines its stake in regional stability. Iran has been integrated into, and is highly dependent upon, the, international economy, primarily through oil exports, which form the bulk of its foreign-exchange earnings. Iran's rulers, therefore, will pay a heavy price if they continue to act irresponsibly in their dealings with the outside world. This is one of the main reasons why several of yesterday's Islamic revolutionaries have become today's political and economic reformers.

Although heavy historical baggage makes it counter-intuitive, the strategic logic of rapprochement between the US and Iran is compelling. Yet the Bush administration signaled an end to rapprochement in the president's January 2002 State of the, Union address. Thus hardened line will not-or at least, should not-be sustainable. Rather than burying détente, Washington should endeavor

to bury the past. The liberalization and further democratization of the Iranian political system is in the interest of, the United States, as is Iran's reintegration into the security structure of the Persian Gulf, where it is by far the pre-eminent state. Iraq continues to remain unrepentant and hostile to the United States. Saudi Arabia has become increasingly suspect because of its financial and ideological support to fundamentalist elements, including the Taliban, that continue to thrive on anti-American sentiments.²⁸

The Saudi regime is caught between its adherence to Wahhabi dogma, which has helped both to legitimize the regime and to produce Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, and its political and economic ties to the United States.²⁹ This has resulted in immobilize in Saudi policy, most clearly demonstrated in the wake of 11 September, and precludes Riyadh from playing a major role in helping to provide security and stability in the oil-rich Gulf. The internal contradictions within the Saudi polity have also raised questions about the regime's survival beyond this decade. All these factors have drastically reduced Saudi Arabia's strategic worth to the United States, except as a major supplier of oil to the industrialized world.³⁰ However, with Russian oil supplies rapidly increasing and oil and gas reserves in Central Asia now, coming on to the market, alternative sources of energy clearly abound. Consequently, Saudi Arabia's importance, in this arena is also bound to decline at least in the short-to medium-term-as long as these other resources are not exhausted.

As a result of a combination of the factors outlined above, Iran increasingly appears to be the only power in the Gulf with sufficient regional capabilities and the corresponding interest to contribute to regional stability. As such, it ought to be the centerpiece of an American strategic and economic interests in the region.

There are obviously aspects of Iranian policy that continue to cause consternation in Washington. These

include its long-standing support for the Hizbollah in Lebanon and, most recently, the attempt, thwarted by Israel, to smuggle a large quantity of Iranian weapons into the Palestinian Authority. Yet the problems are not insuperable. Hizbollah is a local phenomenon and the products of a specific context: the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon now ended. It does not, have the global aspirations of al-Qaeda and the consequent desire to hurt American interests worldwide. And while Washington may have reason to be angered by Iranian support for the Palestinian uprising, it must know that a return to diplomatic engagement with the Palestinians is unavoidable in the long term. Why, then, should Iran be forever quarantined? In any event, Iran's position toward Israel also is starting to look less uncompromising. Recently, President Khatami hinted that Iran might eventually recognize Israel if an Israeli-Palestinian settlement acceptable to the latter is achieved.³¹

Furthermore, Washington should give up the habit of treating Iran as a unitary, hostile actor. The rift between the reformists and the conservatives is clearly visible. The Khatami-led government and the reformist parliament has been at loggerheads with the hard-line Council of Guardians for the past several years. While this has obstructed the government's efforts both to liberalize domestically and to improve relations with the United States, it has also demonstrated that the larger majority of Iranians, who support Khatami and have elected reformists and liberals to parliament in overwhelming numbers, no longer consider the US to be their enemy. It is in the American interest to cultivate and strengthen those forces in Iran who represent the majority as well as symbolize the liberal, pragmatic trend in Iran's decision-making circles. Demonizing Iran no longer serves any American purpose. In fact, it is counterproductive because it prolongs the conservatives' hold on important state institutions by

allowing them to portray the reformists as being soft on the 'enemy'.

If American-Iranian relations took a positive turn and the reformists could consolidate their control over the country, Iran's support to organizations like Hizbollah would probably diminish. In the changed circumstances they will come to be seen as albatrosses around Tehran's neck rather than as instruments for the advancement of Iran's foreign-policy goals.

A major hurdle in the improvement of US relations with Iran is the American suspicion that Iran is engaged in a clandestine effort to build nuclear weapons. Much of this suspicion is related to the nuclear cooperation between Russia and Iran, especially Russian help in building a nuclear reactor in Bushehr in south-eastern Iran. Russia insists that its nuclear cooperation with Iran is conducted 'in accordance with the rules of [the IAED] and under its control'.³² American suspicions will persist, but they can be overcome if the general atmosphere surrounding US-Iranian relations improves. IAEA verification can also contribute to reducing the saliency of this issue in US-Iranian relations. The bottom line is that once Washington comes to perceive Iran as a 'normal' rather than a 'rogue' state, Iran's nuclear ambitions, whatever their scope, could appear as non-threatening to the US as those of India or Israel. Such an outcome is easier to contemplate under a pragmatic Bush presidency that is not obsessed with non-proliferation goals than it would have been under an administration, like Bill Clinton's, more committed to non-proliferation objectives for their own sake.

Before 'Bush's 'axis of evil' speech, there had been no dearth of semi-clandestine contacts between the United States and Iran officials have held consultations, relatively openly, on the sidelines of the Bonn conference on Afghanistan and at the United Nations. These have signaled that Iranian and American interests converge more than

they diverge on issues central to the stability and security of the South-west Asian region. However, more needs to be done. For example, the US must lift trade sanctions on Iran and drop its objection to the construction of pipelines to export Central Asian and Caspian oil through Iran. The latter will benefit American companies as well as give Iran greater stake in the health of the Western and Central Asian economies. Iran's Central Asian neighbours, specially Kazakhstan, have been urging the United States to remove, this barrier to increased economic integration between Central Asian states and Iran.³⁴ In addition, a sustained political and security dialogue with Iran should become a serious priority for Washington. Common concerns about, Iraq, the spread of Wahhabi fundamentalism, Pakistan and Afghanistan can provide the incentive to begin such a dialogue.

In return, the US can expect Iran to tone down its opposition to Israel, cooperate with the US in Afghanistan, de-escalate its anti-American rhetoric, and above all, satisfy the international community that it does not aspire to become a nuclear-weapons power in the near future. Given patience and good will, none of these issue should pose insuperable problems, but neither can all these goals be achieved at once. The US must learn to compartmentalize its expectations of Iran as well as demarcate clearly areas of agreement from those of disagreement. Insulating the latter from the former will prevent disagreements on certain specific issues from disproportionately influencing America's overall policy toward Iran.

With Afghanistan and Pakistan likely to be in turmoil for much of this decade and possibly longer, the United States needs the support of India and Iran to stabilize the South-west Asian region, of which all three components-South Asia, the Gulf and Central Asia-will continue to be important to it for strategic or economic

reasons or both within the American government and in the wider American and Western strategic communities.

Two sides of this proposed triangle are already in place, though they need further augmentation. Indian-American and Indian-Iranian relations have improved in the 1990s, to the extent that the idea of India building strong strategic relationships with either or both will find serious takers in the most important circles in New Delhi. The convergence of Indian and American interests has been mentioned already. India and Iran have major common interests: the security of energy supplies; the, installation of a friendly regime in Afghanistan (both India and Iran were staunch supporters of the Northern Alliance during its war with the Taliban); and trade with Central Asia, including India's access to Central Asian oil and gas reserves via pipelines traversing Iran.³⁵ Additionally, talks have been underway between Iran and India to build a pipeline either under the sea or via Pakistan to ship Iran's natural gas to India, one of the largest consumers of natural gas in the world.³⁶ The overland route through Pakistan is more economical and even appeared politically feasible, after the, Musharraf government gave an undertaking to Iran last year that Pakistan would not only permit such a pipeline to be built but ensure its security as well. This was not an altruistic gesture. Cash strapped Pakistan was expected to earn \$500-700m every year in transit fees. However, events since the 13 December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament, make this option seem remote under-the-sea pipeline option continues to be explored and feasibility studies are currently underway. It is almost certain that one way or another, the India-Iran gas pipeline will be built in the near future to convey Iranian gas, currently transported through tankers in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG), to India more efficiently and economically.

Common concerns about preventing Afghanistan from again falling under the sway of Wahhabi

fundamentalists and keeping Central Asia stable and secure have added greater depth to India-Iran relations. Instability in nuclear-capable Pakistan and the likelihood of its fragmentation or 'Talibanisation' can also be added to this list of common concerns. Many of these Indian and Iranian concerns coincide with those of the United States.

Clearly, Tehran and Washington still have a long way to go to establish mutual trust. But, given the new strategic climate in the, aftermath of the war against the Taliban, both Iran and the, United States have a vital stake in ending fences, India, which is on very good terms with both, and which could benefit from the proposed tripartite security structure in South-west Asia, could be persuaded to act as the conduit for, future attempts to bring about a genuine rapprochement between Iran and the United States. This is an opportunity that the United States, India and Iran should not squander. It may also turn out to be the most long-lasting positive outcome of, the war against terrorism waged by the United States in Afghanistan.



NOTES

Arnaud de Brochgrave, 'Holes Found in Pakistan's 'Sealed' Border',

WasjomgtmTimes, 18 December 2001.

After a week-long visit to the tribal belt, de Borchgrave, a veteran American journalist, concluded, that 'Pakistan's tribal areas are free-passage zones for Taliban and al-Qaeda's foreign legionnaires escaping from Afghanistan'.

1. For a general discussion of conflict entrepreneurs, see David Keen. *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars*, Adelphi paper 320, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998).
2. Jane Perlez, 'The Corrupt and the Brutal Reclaim Afghan Thrones', *New York Times*, 19 November, 2001.
3. That Hamid Karzai was Washington's choice to head the interim administration in Afghanistan, and that this is why he was chosen by the Bonn conference, was very clear to the participants at that meeting. See, Norimitsu Onishi, 'G.I.'s Had Crucial Role in Battle for, Kandahar', *New York Times*, 15 December 2001.
4. According to the latest CIA estimates for 2001, Pashtuns form 38% of the Afghan population, followed by Tajiks at 25%. Other significant ethnic groups are the Hazaras at 19% and Uzbeks at 6%. Detailed statistical data reflecting CIA's estimates for 2001 are, available at

<http://cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/afhtml>

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6. 'Afghanistan FM Abdullah Arrives, To Meet Jaswant', *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 13 December 2001.
7. Jonah Blank, 'Kashmir. Fundamentalism Takes Rool', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.78, no.6, November/December 1999, pp.36-53.
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11. For one authoritative account of the ISI's role in creating the Taliban and maintaining them in power, see Peter Tomsen, 'Untying the afghan Knot', *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, vol.25, no.1, Winter 2001, pp.17-23.Tomsen served as US Special Envoy to the Afghan mujahideen

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12. For Musharraf's travails, see Arnaud de Borchgrave, 'Tense Dilemma in Islamabad', *Washington Times*, 15 November 2001.
13. It is interesting to note in this context that even 'one month after the Pakistan government had agreed to end its support to the Taliban; its intelligence agency was still providing safe passage for weapons and ammunition to arm them'. Douglas Frantz, 'Pakistan Ended Aid to Taliban Only Hesitantly', *New York Times*, 8 December 2001. There were also several reports to Pakistani officers and soldiers fighting on the Taliban's side in Kunduz in north-eastern Afghanistan well into November. They had to be airlifted clandestinely to Pakistan when it became clear that the Taliban were about to surrender Kunduz. For one such report, see Dexter Fikins and Carlotta Gall, 'The Siege: Pakistanis again Said to Evacuate Allies of Taliban', *New York Times*, 24 November 2001.
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15. Molly Moore, and Kameran Khan, 'Pakistan Moves Nuclear Weapons', *Washington Post*, 11 November 2001.
16. For one such report, see Seymour M. Hersh, 'Watching the Warheads: The Risks to Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal', *New York*, 5 November 2001, pp. 48-54.
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24. I have argued this at greater length in Mohammad Ayoob, 'India Matters', *Washington Quarterly*, vol.23, no.1, Winter 2000, pp.27-39.
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 26. Amy Wildman,' In Iran, an angry Generation Longs for Jobs, More Freedom and Power', *New York times*, 7 December 2001, and Nazila Fathi, 'On the Sly, Iran Weighs Closer Ties with the US', *New York Times*, 9 November 2001.
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 28. F.Gregory Gause III, The Kingdom in the Middle: Saudi Arabia's Double Game, in James F.Hoge, Jr, and Gideon Rose (eds), *How Did This Happen Terrorism and the New War* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), pp.109-122.Also, seeThomas omestad, 'The Kingdom and the Power', *US News and World Report*, vol.131,no.19,5 November 2001,pp.34-36.
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Chapter-16

WALKING SOFTLY IN AFGHANISTAN: THE FUTURE OF UN STATE-BUILDING



Simon Chesterman

During the initial stages of military action in Afghanistan, there was considerable debate about the role that the United Nations would play after the war. Some feared that the UN would be handed a poisoned chalice once the United States had completed its military objectives; others eagerly looked forward to the next big mission' and a dominant role for the UN in rebuilding Afghanistan on the model of Kosovo and East Timor. These expectations were tempered by the challenging security environment and the decisions by major states contributing forces to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to limit their presence to the capital city of Kabul and its immediate vicinity. (Ongoing coalition action in the east of the country continues to provide additional coercive power-referred to as the B-52 factor- but this is largely outside the control of the UN). Expectations were also limited by the political context

Within which the UN was to operate: however dysfunctional, Afghanistan had been different from the ambiguous status with undisputed sovereignty. This was quite different from the ambiguous status of Kosovo and the embryonic sovereignty of East Timor.

Under the leadership of Lakhdar Brahimi, the architect of the Bonn process, the UN mission adopted the guiding principle that it should first and foremost bolster Afghan capacity – both official and non-governmental- and rely on as limited an international presence and on as many Afghan staff as possible. This has come to be referred to as the light footprint approach. Such a departure from the expansive dates in Kosovo and East Timor substantially reduced the formal political role of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). This was in keeping with the limited role accorded to the United Nations in the Bonn Agreement, negotiated in December 2001 after the route of the Taliban by the United States and its foreign and local allies, but also represents a philosophical challenge to the increasing aggregation of sovereign powers exercised in UN peace operations since the mid-1990s.

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Survival .vi,44,no,3,Autumn 2002,pp,37-46 The International Institute for strategic studies.

Politics and the light footprint.

Afghanistan represents a radically different model in the panoply of UN peace operations. On paper it resembles earlier assistance missions that provided governance and development support to post-conflict societies. In practice, however, it remains intimately involved with the Afghan Transitional Administration and therefore with the peace process that put it in place. This disjunction between formal authority and practical influence increases the risk that the political consensus established in Bonn will spin

out of the control of the Transitional Administration and its UN partner.

Senior UN staff in the mission is blunt about the reasons for the light footprint approach. A mission on the scale of East Timor's transitional administration was not necessary and not possible', according to Lakhdar Brahimi.³ Bolstering Afghanistan's capacity to govern itself requires Afghans taking charge of their situation wherever possible- an end that may be compromised by throwing international staff at a problem. A large international presence may also have perverse effects on both politics and the economy. As another senior UN official put it, 'we are protecting a peace process from the hubris of the international liberal agenda as promoted by donors'.⁶ Such an end might include setting policy (on, say, human rights, democracy, gender, rule of law) in accordance with donor requirements and time-lines, rather than on the basis of what is locally feasible. Creating space for Afghans to establish their own political trajectory has extended not merely to reducing the number of staff that takes up positions in Afghanistan, but to the length of time they are likely to be there. Unusually for the United Nations, at least some staff appear to be taking to heart the philosophy of the better development non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that its main job is to work itself out of a job.

In any case, armchair commentators' enthusiasm for the benevolent takeover of Afghanistan was cooled by its history of resistance to foreign rule. The British and the Russians tried in before and failed; the UN knows that it runs the risk of being seen as simply the at least invasion force. For this reason, the Security Council-mandated ISAF has been reluctant to deploy outside its original sphere of operations in and around Kabul. The UN sees expansion beyond Kabul as essential, to the stability of the Transitional Administration put in place by the Emergency

Loya Jirga, but has been careful to limit itself to 'endorsing' Chairman Hamid Karzai's call for a wider development. The United States has been customarily reluctant to submit itself to a UN mandate. But has actively opposed any expansion of ISAF-despite the fact that it plays no formal part in the force. This may change once mopping up operations in search of al-Qaeda operatives and evidence of Osama bin Laden have been completed, leaving only the reluctance of those countries that would actually supply the troops.

Most importantly, however, a limited role for the UN was what was politically feasible at the time of the Bonn Agreement. One should be careful about taking the passive role of the UN at face value, of course-the 'procedural' decision to invite Hamid Karzai to speak at the Bonn meeting was not unconnected with his eventual appointment as Chairman of the Interim (and now Transitional) Administration. But a central element of the peace in Afghanistan established in Bonn has been encouraging Afghan leaders of various stripes to see their interests as being served by buying into a political process. Asserting a lead role for the UN, it is argued would have fatally undermined this aim.

The accepted wisdom within the UN community is that successful UN peace operation should, ideally, consist of three sequential stages. First, the political basis for peace must be determined. Then a suitable mandate for a UN mission should be formulated. Finally, that mission should be given all the resources necessary to complete the mandate. The accepted reality is that this usually happens in the reverse order: states determine what resources they are prepared to commit to a problem and a mandate is cobbled together around those resources- often in the hope that a political solution will be forthcoming at some later date. A more scientific survey was conducted by medical Doyle, now a Special Advisor in the Executive Office of

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who (uncontroversially) concluded that more hostile, complex and impoverished post-conflict situation will generally require greater international assistance and effective authority for a Sustainable peace.

On either measure, the UN mission in Afghanistan is doomed to failure. The Bonn Agreement put in place a process but the political basis for peace is still uncertain. The limited resources at the UN's disposal constrained its mandate and restricted its field presence largely to Kabul. By concentrating those limited resources in the capital, the UN made a bet that Hamid Karzai and the Interim Administration could hold the country together- even though the Interim Administration was less of a centralized government than it was a centralized gathering of factions, dominated by those favoured by the United States in its recent battle with al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

This hands-off approach has now become central to the political strategy currently being pursued by the UN- a high-risk strategy that requires two conceptual leaps from the normal mould of peace operation. The first is that it is possible to blur the normal divide between negotiating a peace agreement ('peace-making' in the UN argot) and implementing it. Thus the Bonn Agreement should be seen not as final status agreement but as a framework for further negotiations, mediated through the institution that it provides for over the subsequent two-and-a-half year period (the Interim Administration, the Emergency Loya Jirga, the Transitional Administration, the Constitutional Loya Jirga and so on). The flexibility inherent in this approach may be contrasted with the peace agreements that have locked the UN and other international actors into their roles in Bosnia and Kosovo. (The Dayton Accords in particular have become a de facto constitution for Bosnia." They served their purpose as a peace agreement but are utterly unworkable as a constitution- any attempt to change

them, however, is seen as a threat to re-ignite the conflict.) The Bonn Agreement avoids these pitfalls, but presumes that the UN can continue to have a meaningful role in the ongoing negotiations. Again, on paper, there is little formal authority for the UN to do so, but through high-level diplomacy and subtle interventions in its capacity as an assistance mission, it is endeavoring to 'cook' the political process into a sustainable outcome.

This assumes the success of the second conceptual leap, which is that the UN can make up for its small mandate and limited resources through exercising greater than normal political influence. Brahimi goes one step further, arguing that it is precisely through recognizing Afghan leadership that one obtains credit and influence.¹⁰ Such an approach places extraordinary importance on the personalities involved. It is generally recognized that Brahimi was instrumental to the success of Bonn, but his continuing involvement and his personal relationship with Karzai and the three Panjshiri 'musketees' who largely wield power (Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullah Abdullah, Defence Minister and Vice-President Muhammad Qaseem Fahim and Education Minister and Special Adviser Mohammad Yunus Qanooni) are essential to the process remaining on track.

And, until the Emergency Loya Jirga, things were always likely to remain on track. Indeed, the greatest measure of the success of the operation to date is that no major group opted out of the Loya Jirga process entirely. There were cases of intimidation and pressure on the part of local commanders to have themselves or their men 'elected', but this is sanguinely interpreted as a compliment to the perceived importance of the political process. Few people deluded themselves into thinking that the Loya Jirga was a meaningful popular consultation- the aim was to encourage those who wield power in Afghanistan to exercise it through politics rather than through the barrel of

a gun. Mao Zedong's aphorism is apposite here because the most dangerous period for the UN will come now that the Loya Jirga has taken place. At that point, if politics are not seen to deliver at least some of the benefits that were promised, those commanders may revert to more traditional methods of promoting their interest.

The Loya Jirga did produce a somewhat more representative government than that created by US bombs and UN diplomacy in December 2001. The question now is whether tinkering with a few positions is enough to assuage the disgruntled Pashtun population that sees itself as marginalized for the past sins of the Taliban. The difficulty confronting the UN is that it is neither mandated nor in a position to conduct meaningful consultations outside the power centres of Kabul. This is why many UN staff continues to see expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul as essential to the success of the larger mission. Any expansion now is highly unlikely. If it was going to happen, it should have been done while all parties were buying-in to the Loya Jirga process. Once in place, ISAF could have acted as a political guarantor in the areas outside Kabul that have thus far seen little evidence of the UN's presence. This would only be possible with US acquiescence, however- and it would only be likely if the US agreed to provide over the horizon' support in the event of a major conflict. Given the various other distractions in the world at present, however, even sustained US attention on Afghanistan beyond its military objectives seems unlikely.

Development and Afghan 'ownership'.

If the 'light footprint' approach has complicated the high-level diplomacy of UNAMA's political pillar, it has turned the development components of the UN mission on their head. During the anarchic Taliban period, humanitarian and development agencies frequently ran their programmes in Afghanistan without any formal

relations with the government (with the notable exception of the health sector). In the absence of government capacity, the UN sometimes functioned as a surrogate ministry of planning. Now, with a recognized Afghan administration and a UN commitment to respect its authority, agencies and NG Os have had to undergo a mental revolution.

Every UN mission or development programmes now stress the importance of local 'ownership': 'Afghan solutions for Afghan problems' were a mantra of the preparations for Afghanistan's reconstruction. But this may be the first such mission where some of the local population themselves are truly taking charge. In part this unusual dynamic is the result of one man. Ashraf Ghani, formerly employed at the senior levels of the World Bank, has returned to Afghanistan and now heads an organization called the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA). Chaired by Hamid Karzai, AACA functions like a cabinet office on development issues. (Some archly suggest that Ghani himself functions more like a prime minister, noting that in addition to directing AACA he also serves as National Security Advisor.) This combination of experience and relative legitimacy has ruffled feathers, particularly when the AACA has refused to let development agencies and non-governmental organizations unroll their pre-packaged programmes and lay them out over Afghanistan.

Ghani has stated in the most explicit terms that he is determined not to allow Afghanistan to become a beggar state, dependent on international aid. The draft National Development Framework issued by AACA at times reads like a manifesto to which many developing countries might subscribe: 'donor-funded investment projects, unless they are anchored in coherent programs of government, are not sustainable Structural adjustment programs, unless they are translated into feasible projects, do not result in reform.'¹¹

Together with the Interim Administration, AACA is producing a Development Budget that will guide donors and agencies.

This serves a political function also. The legitimacy of the Transitional Administration depends on being seen to deliver a peace dividend. Agencies are therefore being encouraged to do less of their own flag-waving (at least within Afghanistan) and present their projects as action taken in support of the Transitional Administration. As a senior UN development official describes it, 'we are supporting the creation of the *appearance* of authority in the hope that it leads to the creation of actual authority'.

There are limits to how far this can go. Development is notoriously supply-rather than demand-driven; donor countries are notorious for pledging one thing and delivering another. (Current wisdom puts the amount delivered at an average of around 60% of the pledged). Agencies must therefore take this into account when constructing fictional budgetary targets that they know will not be met, making responsible financial planning still more difficult.

Compounding these problems is confusion in Afghanistan as to what projects are actually going to be funded and when. This is partly caused by the refusal of some of the largest donors to have their money pooled into a trust fund for the whole of Afghanistan. There are good and bad reasons for this. The good reasons concern the high overheads and at times glacial pace of the World Bank and the UN Development Programme. The bad reasons are that countries often want their names up in lights next to their per programmes, sometimes administered by their own national NGOs. Everyone wants to send children back to school; no one wants to pay military salaries. The result is that many donors want to do their own feasibility studies-sometimes on the same sector, sometimes even using the same consultant. As in Kosovo, this leads to a proliferation

of local NGOs (and, in Afghanistan, government agencies) spending more and more of their time working out how to get foreign money and keep donors happy than actually running their programmes. Karzai railed against this at an April 2002 donors conference, attacking criticism of Afghan bureaucracy when donor countries' procedures were similarly obtuse.

We will not remove our red-tapeism unless you remove yours. Don't expect us to give you a report every month we will give you a report when we like to give you a report. There are too many groups of donors, reconstruction groups, and assistance groups. I don't know the names of all of them.¹²

Other recipient states would, have been quietly cheering him on.

A radical approach to dealing with this problem was proposed in early 2002 but did not lead anywhere. This was to retain a private consulting firm to set up a trust fund that would be drawn upon directly by the Interim Administration, overseen by a board that would include both Afghan and UN members. Such a mechanism might allay the concerns of donors at giving funds directly to the UN or the World Bank, while at the same time directing money where it is most needed and encouraging fiscal responsibility on the part of the new regime. Such a mechanism would only be possible where local partners are in a position to absorb the money but this seemed to be the case in Afghanistan (as demonstrated by its relations with donors to date). It remains an interesting hypothesis.

More can be said about the capacity of Afghanistan to absorb the sudden influx of wealthy foreigners. Every significant UN mission creates a parasitic and unsustainable economy to serve the needs of the transient internationals. As in cities from Deli to Freetown, the rental market in Kabul has exploded, accompanied by dubious evictions of existing tenants to make way for more

lucrative foreign occupants. This can above a benefit to the economy if, as sometimes happened in East Timor, families move into a back room and rent out the rest of the house while using some of the money to renovate their property. In Kabul, many houses are of questionable ownership, or are claimed by absentee landlords. Much foreign money that enters the country thus leaves almost as quickly, while occupants formerly in cheaper accommodation become homeless.

Disputes over the microeconomic impact of the UN presence have focused on the question of salaries. The average monthly salary of an Afghan civil servant working for the government is currently about \$28, for a Supreme Court judge. An Afghan national doing the same work for the United Nations or an international NGO earns between 15 and 400 times that amount, according to salary scales established by the International Civil Services Commission (ICSC). In May 2002 this was increased. Such differences foster and deepen the parasitic bubble economy, with staff leaving government positions to take the short-term international jobs on offer—even if it means that a judge is working as a driver, or an electrical engineer as a guard. This causes predictable problems as staffs are poached from one place to the next, with organizations losing their institutional memories and such local capacity as actually exists being distorted into servicing the needs of the internationals.

The problem is unfairly blamed on the UN alone, when it is the ICSC that independently establishes the pay-scales for national staff. A creature of the UN General Assembly, modification of its procedures requires the initiative of a member state. Nevertheless, moves to lower the pay of national staff are unlikely to prove popular in New York. The problem is exacerbated by the low and relatively flat pay-scales of the Afghan administration. Raising basic pay and increasing the differential on the

basis of responsibility may help reduce the incentive to leave, but the government will never be able to compete with the UN and international NGO's. Innovative solutions have been mooted, such as a proactive policy to recruit UN staff from the Afghan Diaspora, and establishing two-way secondments between UN agencies and the government. In the short term, basic respect for notice requirements in contracts would help minimize the disruption of sudden staff changes. This could be enforced through a code of conduct-if there were one in place. Ultimately, the problem will most likely solve itself. As the international presence peaks and begins to decline, the job and property balloon will burst.

The relative lightness of the, international 'footprint' has encouraged Afghan ownership of the development process and placed, at least some controls on the distortions caused by the arrival of hundreds (rather than thousands) of international civilian staff. Nevertheless, the political and economic sides of the mission interest with some obvious uncertainty on the part of donors about the political process. It is noticeable that few major infrastructure projects have yet been funded. Rather, the focus to date has been on delivering relief supplies, sending children back to school, agricultural projects and the like; The assessment of some in the development community is that donors, have been waiting to see what happens after the Emergency Loya Jirga before releasing larger funds-and in the short term focusing on projects less likely to be affected by the outbreak of renewed fighting.

Will it work?

It is, of course, too early to make serious predictions as to the likely outcome of the process currently underway in Afghanistan. Nightmare visions of the Pashtun. Population rising up in bloody mutiny against a Tajik-dominated administration and their foreign abettors would

require the political process spinning utterly out of control. At present, this seems unlikely. Ongoing spats between rival commanders are highly likely, though to date these have been relatively localized. The first major tests were the staging of the Emergency Loya Jirga and how the new Transitional Administration presents itself to the population. The Loya Jirga is properly regarded as a success, but the Transitional Administration has got off to an extremely bumpy start. (The assassination of Vice-President Haji Abdul Qadir on 6 July 1002 was establishing both as a blow against the government, but especially because it removed the most prominent political leader with a political base among the Pashtuns). Nevertheless, if most of those who have bought into the process achieve some of their expectations, and the Administration and the UN are seen to be facilitating the flow of assistance to the Afghan population, the fragile consensus that Afghanistan enjoys today will continue.

It is ironic that this mission reached its most crucial test within weeks of the conclusion of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). UNTAET may come to represent the high-water mark of UN peace operations, where the UN exercised effective sovereignty over a territory for more than two years. UNAMA has a fraction of its staff and budget and operates in a country perhaps 25 times the population of East Timor. Brahimi hopes that people will look back at East Timor and question whether it was necessary to assert such powers. Any such evaluation may well be coloured by the fate of the UN operation in Afghanistan.

Acknowledgements.

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NOTES

1. This enthusiasm was encouraged by the impending staff reductions in East Timor and Kosovo, as well as staff cuts in UNHCR.
2. See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001) para. 1. The United States and France were particularly adamant that the force would not be expanded outside Kabul and its immediate surrounds.
3. See *The Situation in Afghanistan and its implications for International Peace and Security* (Report of the Secretary-General), UN Doc A/56/875-S/2002/278 (18 March 2002) para. 98.
4. See e.g. Richard Caplan, *A New Trusteeship? The International Administration of War-torn Territories*. Adelphi Paper 341, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the HSS, 2002).
5. Interview with Lakhdar Brahimi, Kabul, 9 May 2002.
6. Confidential interview, Kabul, May 2002.
7. See Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305/S/2000/809 (21 August 2000), available at
8. Michael W. Doly and N Cholas Sambanis, *international*.
9. The accords do, in fact, include a constitution in an Annex; the reference here is to the peace agreement as a whole—especially the military aspects in Annex 1A.

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10. Interview with Iqbal Brahimi, Kabul, 9 May 2002.
 11. National Development Framework (Draft for consultation), (Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority, Kabul, April 2002), 6;
 12. 'Karzai Urges Donors to Fulfil Pledges', *Final Times*, 11 April 2002.

Chapter-17

THE AFGHAN SPILLOVERS

By Najmuddin A. Shaikh

Writing in the *New York Times* of May 5 the paper's Pakistan correspondent Carlotta Gall, says "Quetta is a home away from home for the Taliban. CDs of Taliban leaders' speeches are on sale in the shops, the Friday sermons in the mosques are openly supportive of those who consider themselves to be waging a holy war against Americans or other non-Muslims, and young men speak openly of their desire to go to Afghanistan to fight.

"The border regions of Pakistan, and Quetta in particular, are emerging as the main centre of Taliban support in the region, and a breeding ground for opposition sentiment to the American campaign in Afghanistan and Mr. Lazai's government." The report adds: "Senior Taliban officials and commanders are taking refuges, here too, Afghan and American officials say..... Members of the political opposition in Pakistan confirm that Taliban leaders are active and are recruiting young men to fight..... Those familiar with the situation contend that Pakistan's army and secret service are allowing the Taliban to operate in Pakistan, and even protecting them. Further, the local government, now dominated by an alliance of religious parties sympathetic to the Taliban, provides them with legitimacy by association".

While this is a press report, we also have a statement by the UN secretary-general's representative for Afghanistan, Brahimi Lakhdar, talking of "worrying reports of hostile elements crossing into Afghanistan over the eastern and southern borders."

Some Pakistani observers go even further, maintaining rather bitterly that if Quetta is "a home away from home" the border city of Chaman is "home" for the Taliban. It became a Taliban city many years ago and its nature has not changed following the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In the Chaman area or not that matter along the entire Pak. Afghan border immigration and customs controls are, to say the least, extremely lax.

As for the allegation that the sympathy of the provincial governments lie with the Taliban, there is the memorable quote from Mr. Munawwar Hassan, the secretary-general of the Jamaat-e-Islami, immediately after the MMA's electoral victory; "We will stop the ongoing pursuit of the Taliban and Al Qaeda when we form the government", and that "we will go by the rule of law. The Taliban and Al Qaeda members are our brothers".

Perhaps things are not as bad as these assertions would suggest but these certainly determine the perception of President Karzai who made this the central part of his discourse with President Musharraf during his April visit to Pakistan. It should be noted that Karzai, despite criticism from his Tajik colleagues, has maintained the position that ordinary Taliban who have renounced the goal of seeking the overthrow of the present government in Afghanistan are free to return to Afghanistan or come out of their hideouts without fear of reprisals.

Possibly, Karzai proposed to Musharraf that in the light of this general amnesty, the Pakistani should have no hesitation in persuading or coercing the Taliban in Pakistan

to return to their homes in Afghanistan. What action we have been able to take on this account is not clear.

The Americans have a similar perception. In an interview with the *Los Angeles Times* (May 6) the outgoing commander of US forces in Afghanistan, Gen. McNeil, "criticized Pakistan for not doing more to police its border and control the movements of terrorist forces known to seek shelter there." Gen. McNeil and other American commanders have also publicly stated that they have proposed coordinated patrolling of the Pak. Afghan border by American and Afghan troops on one side and Pakistani troops and paramilitaries on the other- so that the Taliban fleeing Afghanistan after attacks on American or Afghan targets would not find safe passage across the border. There is no publicly available information to confirm that this has been done.

The Americans are very happy about the cooperation that they have received from Pakistan in the apprehension of Al Qaeda and Taliban suspects and giving the US military transit, flyover and basing rights..." More recently US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, during his visit to South Asia, paid warm tribute to Pakistan's intelligence agencies and armed forces for what they had been able to achieve.

Particularly impressive was the apprehension of Khalid Shaikh Mohammad not only because of the important place he had in the Al Qaeda hierarchy but because it was a wholly Pakistani intelligence effort with no contribution being made by the American agencies and their electronic tracking devices. President Bush himself publicly thanked Pakistan for Khalid's apprehension.

At this time the American priority and the principal American demand on Pakistan is the apprehension of Al Qaeda leaders and activists. Recent reports following the horrific attacks in Saudi Arabia and in Morocco suggest that Al Qaeda or organizations linked to it or replicating its

modus operandi have gained new strength after the American invasion of Iraq. American intelligence reports now assert that Al Qaeda it self is reorganizing and that new or reorganized base are being created in a number of countries, including Pakistan. The Americans are therefore not likely to press Pakistan for action against the Taliban if it means the diversion of resources away from the redoubled effort that would be needed against Al Qaeda.

That, of course, is the American priority, and one that we have perforce to share because more and more it is evident that, like Saudi Arabia and Morocco, Pakistan too is on the Al-Qaeda hit-list. The Americans may not therefore press us on the Taliban question at this time, but is that any reason why we should not identify what we need to do in our own national interest?

We may be unhappy with the current set up in Afghanistan. We may believe, quote rightly, that this set-up cannot bring peace and stability and that the Pushtun plurality must have a bigger share in the administration Afghanistan. But turning a blind eye to the activities of the Taliban will only exacterate instability and make more difficult the task of persuading the Americans and their coalition partners to take the steps necessary to give the Pushtun majority its due.

Allowing the Taliban to continue to have the freedom of action that they currently seem to enjoy also worsens our domestic problems. It is known that many of them have had intimate links with Al Qaeda and are providing them with logistic and manpower support. It is also known that they have no hesitation in using their military muscle to support particular political inclinations in Pakistan.

If we are genuine pursuing a "Pakistan First" policy, we must take steps to send the Taliban back to Afghanistan permanently and to ensure that our territory is not used as 'safe haven' by the Taliban or other opponents

of the Afghan regime. Our assessment of how peace can best be brought to Afghanistan will fall on more receptive ears if we have to make sure our hands are seen to be clean.

Let us make no mistake: if we don't recognize our national interest and pursue it vigorously we may soon find ourselves receiving the same sort of blunt demarches that followed the events of September 11. The Al Qaeda factor will insulate us from such pressure for only some time.

There are some who say that the current Afghan government's flirtation with India is another reason for us not to stand in the way of anything that discomfits the present government. Maulana Fazlur Rehman has told Reuters: "The real power in the present Afghan government is with the Northern Alliance, which is pro-India and not pro-Pakistan," and that "our information is that India has not only strengthened its political ties with Afghanistan but has also extended its defence and military influence upto Pakistan's western border." These remarks were probably prompted by the indecent haste with which the Panjsheris in Kabul approved the setting up of Indian consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad and the warm welcome they have accorded to the scheme for India and Iran to cooperate in building the roads necessary to carry Indian goods shipped to Iranian ports to markets in Afghanistan.

There is no doubt that India is seeking to bolster its presence in Afghanistan and is doing so primarily to annoy Pakistan but it is also doing so to strengthen its claim to preeminence in South Asia. It would be foolish to believe, that the growth of Indian ties with Afghanistan can be curbed by adopting hostility towards the Karzai regime.

Pakistan and Afghanistan have common interest. If Central Asian states wish to trade with the world or with South Asia, exporting their energy resources and importing their requirements, it can only happen via routes passing through Afghanistan and Pakistan. To benefit from such trade Pakistan needs a working relationship with whatever

stable government is in power in Afghanistan. By the same token. Any government in Afghanistan needs a working relationship with Pakistan not only because of the transit trade of South Asia but because the most economic route for Afghanistan's own trade with the outside world lies through Pakistan.

Our primary concern should be to promote a stable government in Afghanistan and we can argue with the powers-that-be that such stability will come only if the Pushtuns are given their due, but we do not need to take up cudgels on their behalf at the cost of our own national interest.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.

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Chapter-18

AMERICA'S NEW WORLD ORDER



By Afzaal Mahmood

The Bush administration's post-September 11 doctrine to use US military power to achieve national security objectives provides the underpinning for America's New World Order. The US is now committed to use its military force to shape the world in its own lights and according to its own interest. The Iraq war was only a symptom of this new disposition; a war Washington chose to wage on its own terms to achieve its goals.

It is interesting to recall that today's sole superpower, the United States of America, was not considered even a front-ranking nation about a hundred years ago. It was not until 1892 that the great powers of Europe agreed to raise the rank of their diplomatic representatives in Washington from minister to ambassador. However, the ascendancy of Europe did not last long as the two fratricidal wars in the first half of the 20th Century brought to an end the domination of Europe and the US emerged as the leading world power.

America did not become a global superpower by playing Boy Scout. Like any other big power, it got to the top and has stayed there by tenaciously pursuing its self-interests. However, it is also true that American self-

interests have sometimes coincided with great benefits for mankind. The most outstanding example in this respect was the Marshall Plan of the late 1940s, the most ambitious reconstruction plan the world has ever seen, which helped reconstruct the war-ravaged Europe.

September 22, 2002, will go down as a seminal point of the 21st Century. On that fateful day the White House submitted to the US Congress the National Security Strategy that has come to be known as the Bush doctrine. The doctrine provides a sort of blueprint for the New World Order in which the United States will enjoy permanent military dominance over all other countries, allies and potential foes alike. Making no distinction between friends and enemies, the doctrine declares the US “has no intention of allowing any foreign power to catch up with the huge lead the United States has acquired the fall of the Soviet Union.”

The tragic events of September 11 appear to have provided the needed impulse to go ahead with the plan. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld saw the attacks as “opening a door” to a new hard-line US policy world-wide. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice says she asked her staff “to think seriously about how you capitalize on these opportunities to fundamentally change American doctrine and the shape of the world in the wake of September 11.”

The National Security Strategy, in a way, espouses the Monroe Doctrine on a global scale. It asserts the right to intervene wherever and whenever the US perceives that a threat of terrorism or mass destruction exists. With imperialist overtones, the doctrine gives the United States the right to not only decide who is a terrorist and which state is supporting terrorism, but also the right to launch unilateral pre-emptive strikes without even waiting for a go-ahead from the UN Security Council. This policy, which seems to underlie the New World Order, goes a long

way beyond the traditional interpretation of a nation's right of self-defence as defined in the UN Charter. It also poses a serious threat to the security of small countries from their big neighbours.

Encouraged by the US doctrine of preemptive strikes, New Delhi sought to claim that every country had the right to pre-emption and that Pakistan was a fitter case for pre-emptive strikes than Iraq. Realizing the seriousness of the Indian threat, Secretary of State Colin Powell had to intervene, saying: "I don't think there is a direct parallel between the two situations." The State Department spokesman warned that "any attempt to draw parallels between the Iraq and Kashmir situations are wrong."

The current Middle East policy was articulated two years ago in a document, commissioned by Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, called "Rebuilding America's Defences". This document amply shows that the recent Iraq war did not begin or end with a bad guy equipped with the weapons of mass destruction. "While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein", says the document.

As Hans Blix, chief of the UN inspection mission, later observed, the Iraq war was "planned well in advance," not to find weapons but to topple the regime. The document produced by Washington and London about Iraqi purchase of uranium oxide was proved a "fabrication" and the so-called mobile germ warfare trucks turned out to be food delivery vans.

The New World Order, being projected by the Bush administration, kills the hopes of those who had thought that the world was gradually moving towards a system of international law that would allow for peaceful resolution of conflicts and disputes. Under the new dispensation, a single country intends to dominate the world militarily,

intervening pre-emptively at will to eliminate a perceived threat. The United Nations has suffered a serious blow in the process. If the present US policy continues, the UN may become a rubber stamp or another League of Nations restricted to dealing with peace-keeping and humanitarian aid.

The change of regime by invading a country, as we have seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, has set precedents that may be followed in the days to come. Actually, "regime change" is an old American practice of intervening in the affairs of other countries to change governments or defend existing ones. Even a cursory look at the list will bring such names as Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Chile, Afghanistan and recently Iraq.

According to a study prepared by Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the United States, since its founding, has used its armed forces abroad on more than 200 occasions. US military interventions abroad have consisted of major wars (such as the two World Wars), peace-keeping missions (as in Bosnia today), proxy wars (as in Nicaragua and Angola in the 1980s), covert operations (such as the coup in Chile in 1973), humanitarian interventions (such as in the Balkans in the 1990s), the defence of its allies under attack (such as in Korea in 1950), and one time retaliatory strikes (such as the bombing raid against Libya).

What is important to note is that most of these interventions took place when the US did not enjoy an unrivalled superpower status as today. It is not difficult to see how the world's sole superpower, enjoying overwhelming military power and bolstered by post-September 11 domestic support and post-Iraq euphoria, will now respond in similar situations.

It makes one sad to reflect how the inspiring precepts of America's founding fathers have been tarnished

in recent years. Of course, there has been a clash between moral idealism and real politick in US history. There have indeed been wars of expansion and interference in other countries' affairs. But there have also been successful anti imperialist movements by American writers and intellectuals such as by Mark Twain and Henry James during the occupation of the Philippines by US forces.

By and large, the United States has sought to influence other nations through its democratic values and culture. Americans have never seen themselves as a militaristic people. Perhaps for the first time in US history, Washington has publicly announced its intention to claim, on the basis of its military might, global dominance and its right to act unilaterally and even pre-emptively whenever it deems that its security or vital interests are threatened. The Bush doctrine has indeed put the American presidents in the company of Roman emperors and their legions.

The writer is a former ambassador.

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